1. On June 1, 1923, the appellant obtained an award against the respondent under the provisions of the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act, 1925, for Rs. 809-4-0. He applied to carry out the award in the Dharwar Court on a certificate granted by the Registrar under the provisions of Section 59 of the Act. The application was dismissed by the Court on March 7, 1927. It is common ground that from then until July 17, 1931, he took proceedings before the Mamlatdar under Section 59(1)(b) of the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act to recover the amount due under the award. He was not able torecover anything in these proceedings ; and so, on August 2, 1932, he filed an application for execution again in the Dharwar Court on a fresh certificate granted by the Assistant Registrar on June 25, 1932. The judgment-debtor pleaded that the application was barred by the law of limitation. The plea was accepted, first, by the trial Court and, then, by the District Court, and. it is from these judgments that this appeal is taken.
2. Two contentions are raised by the learned Counsel on behalf of the appellant. The first is that, having regard to the provisions of the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act, an award made under the provisions of that Act is not governed by or subject to the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act. j His second contention is that the application for execution was in time, as proceedings taken by the appellant from March 7, 1927, till July 17, 1931, are steps-in-aid of execution of the award within the meaning of Article 182 of the Indian Limitation Act.
3. On the first point, he relies upon a decision of a division bench of this Court in Raghavendra v. Industrial Bank, Guledgud (1935) 38 Bom. L.R. 927. In our opinion, there is nothing in that judgment to support the contention that the Indian Limitation Act is inapplicable in such cases.
4. Section 59 of the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act, so far as material, provides that orders and awards made by arbitrators under the provisions of the Act, if not carried out, shall be executed-
(a) on a certificate signed by the Registrar or a liquidator by any civil Court in the same manner as a decree of such Court; or
(b) according to the law and under the rules for the time being in force for the recovery of arrears of land revenue, provided that any application for the recovery in such manner of any such sum shall be made to the Collector and shall be accompanied by a certificate signed by the Registrar or by an Assistant Registrar to whom the said power has been delegated by the Registrar.
5. The section thus provides two methods for carrying out the orders and awards made by arbitrators under the Act. Under Sub-clause (a) an award can be executed by a civil Court in the same manner as a decree of that Court. It follows that for the purposes of execution under Sub-clause (a) an, award stands on the same footing as a decree made by the executing Court itself. If so, it is difficult to see why the execution of an award should not be subject to the law of limitation. It is significant to note that in this respect the corresponding provision in the Indian Arbitration Act is quite different. Section 15 of that Act, so far as material, provides that an award may be executed as if it were a decree. These words were considered in Tribhuvandas v. Jivanchand I.L.R. (1910) Bom. 196 : 12 Bom. L.R. 860, and it was held that an award filed in Court under Section 11 of the Indian Arbitration Act is not a decree, although it is enforceable as provided by Section 15 of that Act as if it were a decree. To hold that an award under the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act is not subject to the law of limitation would obviously lead to some absurd results. We think, therefore, that an application to execute an award under the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act will fall within Section 3 of the Indian Limitation Act.
6. The second method of execution is that provided by Sub-clause (b) of Section 59. The question, therefore, is whether the proceedings taken under Section 59(1) (b) can be treated as steps-in-aid of execution within the meaning of Article 182(5) of the Indian Limitation Act. If they are, then it is clear that the present darkhast is saved. Under Article 182(5) an application in accordance with lawhas to be made to the proper Court for execution or to take some step-in-aid of execution of the decree or order. The question, therefore, is whether the proceedings taken by the appellant under Section 59(1) (6) were by way of or in the nature of applications made to a proper Court. In our opinion, it is difficult to hold that an application made to the Collector for the re- covery of the amount of an award under this provision can be treated as an application to a Court for execution, or to take steps-in-aid of the execution of the decree, and that seems to be clear from the provisions of Section 59 itself. Under Sub-clause (a) it is the Court to which an application for execution of an award is to be made, and under Sub-clause (b) the application has to be made to the Collector. Under Sub-clause (a) the award is executable by a Court, where-as under Sub-clause (b) the award is to be executed by the Collector. The section thus makes a distinction between a civil Court as such and the Collector as such. The word ' Collector ' therefore means and is used to mean some agency for carrying out an award, different from a Court. It follows from this that an application to enforce the award made to the Collector cannot be treated as an application made to a Court and proceedings thus taken between 1927 and 1931 cannot be treated as steps-in-aid so as to save limitation within the meaning of Article 182(5) of the Indian Limitation Act. The appeal, therefore, fails and must be dismissed with costs.
N.J. Wadia, J.
7. I agree.