Amberson Marten, C.J.
1. The solution to the question submitted to us will, in my judgment, be found in the Privy Council decision of Rangasami Gounden v. Nachiappa Gounden 50 Ind. Cas. 498 : 46 I.A. 72 : 21 Bom. L R 640 : 36 M.L.J. 493 : 17 A.L.J. 536 : 29 C.L.J. 539 : 23 C.W.N. 777; (1919) M.W.N. 262 : 42 M 523 : 26 M.L.T. 5 : After summarising at page 84 page of 46 I.A.-[Ed.] the two main grounds on which an alienation by a Hindu widow may be upheld, and after dealing next with the question of estoppel which, in that particular case, their Lordships held did not arise as the plaintiff never consented to the deed, nor was his claim traced through any consenting party, their Lordships dealt with yet a fourth branch under which transactions may be upheld. Put shortly that branch amounts to an election by a reversioner to treat the transaction as good. Their Lordships point out at pages 86-87page of 46 I.A.-[Ed.] that that can be done either after the reversion has fallen into possession, or alternatively it may be done even before that time. Thus they say:
Of course something might be done even before that time which amounted to an actual election to hold the deed good.
2. In the present case the plaintiff actually joined in the deed by which the property in question was alienated. That is, I think, a clear election to hold the transaction as valid. That being so, in my judgment, it makes no difference whether in such a case of election, the party electing was a male or was a female. A reversioner whether male or female could bring an action in the lifetime of the widow to set aside an alienation alleged to be invalid. If that is so, and he or she can thus elect to challenge transaction as invalid, then surely it follows that he or she may also elect to hold that deed as valid. I think it must also be conceded that an election testified by actual joinder in a deed of alienation must be at least, as good as any act of ratification or sanction given after that deed of alienation.
3. That being so, I respectfully agree with the result and the reasoning of the majority of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Fateh Singh v. Thakur Rukmini Rawanji 21 A.L.J. 235; A.I.R. 1923 All 387. There the judgment given by Sir Grimwood Mears is expressly put on this point of election.
4. That being so, it follows that I also agree with the conclusion arrived at by Sir Norman Macleod and Mr. Justice Shah in Basappa Dodfakirapa v. Fakirappa Shenkrappa 64 Ind. Cas. 214 : 46 B. 292 : 23 Bom. L.R. 1040; A.I.R. 1922 Bom. 102 though, as I have already intimated, I base my decision on the ground of election and not on the ground of estoppel.
5. I need only add by way of warning that we are not dealing here with a simple alienation by a reversioner alone. That would clearly be void for the reasons given in Ananda Mohan Roy v. Gour Mohan Mulliek 74 Ind. Cas. 499 : 50 I.A. 239 : 25 Bom. L.R. 1269 : 21 A.L.J. 718 : 4 P.L.T. 609; A.I.R. 1923 V.C. 189; (1923) M.W.N. 803: 45 M.L.J. 617 :33 M.L.T. 365 : 50 C. 929 : 28 C.W.N. 713 : 40 C.L.J. 10 . What we have here is an alienation by a Hindu widow with the consent of the next reversioner, which is a totally different matter.
6. I would, accordingly, answer the question submitted to us by saying that the reversioner in the present case cannot now challenge the validity of the transaction having regard to her election testified by her being a party to the deed of August 14, 1911, Ex. 45.
7. I agree.
8. I agree.