J.C. Shah, J.
1. These are cross-appeals against the decree in Civil Suit No. 36 of 1946 of the file of the Joint Civil Judge (Senior Division), Poona, The plaintiff, Shree Mahadoba Devasthan, filed Suit No. 36 of 1946 for a declaration that certain alienations of the lands described in the plaint by previous managers were void and that the lands were of the ownership of the Devasthan and for a declaration that the plaintiff was entitled to recover possession of S. Nos. 240-A, 242, 243 and 244 from the Government of Bombay and for a decree for possession of S. No. 245 from the defendants and for costs of the suit from the defendants. Even though relief was claimed for possession of S. Nos. 240-A, 242, 243 and 244 against the Government of Bombay, in substance the plaintiff claimed the relief that the rent which was being paid for occupation of the lands by the Government should be paid to the plaintiff and after the land was vacated possession should be delivered to the Devasthan.
2. In the village of Theur in Haveli Taluka of Poona District there is a religious endowment known as Shree Mahadoba Devasthan which owns certain properties. The image of Shri Mahadoba is installed in house No. 586 in Kasba Peth, Poona City. One Ganoji Bin Rakhamaji Sali Waghule was a devotee of Shree Maliadoba. By a grant exh. 81 of Shake year 1694 (1772 A.D.) Shrimant Madhavrao Peshwa granted certain lands in the villages of Lohagaon and Kesnand in inam to the Devasthan of Shri Mahadoba and issued orders in that behalf to the revenue officers. Thereafter at the Inam Inquiry of 1863 the grant in favour of the Devasthan was confirmed by the Government of Bombay. Ganoji, and after his death his sons and grandsons continued to manage the property of the Devasthan, For some time before the year 1863, Chimnaji, one of the descendants of Ganoji, was in management of the property of the Devasthan. Some time before the year 1863, Chimnaji granted Mirashi rights in S. Nos. 240-A and 242 to one Ladha Ibrahim, in consideration of the latter agreeing to pay Rs. 45 per annum. In 1863 Ladha Ibrahim sold the rights acquired by him to one Ghelabhai. In 1879 Ghelabhai retransferred the rights to Ladha Ibrahim and thereafter on July 4, 1930, one Zullubai, a descendant of Ladha Ibrahim, sold the rights vested in her to defendants Nos. 1 and 2. Chimnaji died leaving him surviving his son Waman; and Waman entered upon management of the properties of the Devasthan. By deed dated January 29, 1930, Waman transferred the Mirashi rights in S. Nos. 243, 244 and 245 to defendants Nos. 1 and 2 for Rs. 6,750. It appears that lands S. Nos. 240-A, 242, 243 and 244 were requisitioned by the Government of Bombay for State purposes and S. No. 245 alone remained in the occupation of defendants Nos. 1 and 2. Thereafter Keshav, son of Waman, claiming to be the Wahiwatdar of Shree Mahadoba Devasthan, filed on behalf of the Devasthan Suit No. 36 of 1946 on June 6, 1946, for the reliefs which we have set out earlier. At that date, it may be noted, Waman was alive, and he was impleaded as defendant No. 3 in the suit.
3. The suit was resisted by defendants Nos. 1 and 2. They inter alia denied the grant in favour of the Devasthan and contended that Ganoji was not a manager of Shri Mahadoba Devasthan and that the right of management if any was not hereditary in Ganoji's family. They also contended that Keshav, son of Waman, could not sue as Vahivatdar of Shri Mahadoba Devasthan and that the alienations made by Chimnaji were not void, and the same were binding upon the Devasthan. In the alternative they contended that the plaintiff's suit was barred by the law of limitation. They also contended that they were entitled to the benefit of Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act.
4. The learned trial Judge by his judgment dated March 11, 1948, held that there was a Devasthan of Shree Mahadoba and a grant was made in 1772 A.D. by Srimant Madhavrao Peshwa to the Devasthan, and that Ganoji Rakhamaji was a 'trustee' and the 'trusteeship' was hereditary in his family. But in his view, Keshav, son of Waman, could not sue on behalf of Shree Mahadoba Devasthan, and on that view, the learned Judge proceeded to dismiss the suit filed by Keshav.
5. Against the decree passed by the learned trial Judge dismissing the plaintiff's suit, First Appeal No. 434 of 1948 was filed in this Court. That appeal was decided by a Division Bench of this Court. This Court set aside the decree passed by the trial Court. For reasons which we will presently set out this Court held that the trial Judge was in error in dismissing the plaintiff's suit, and remanded the suit for trial and disposal according to law. It was observed in that case that in the absence of the manager, or the shebait himself being not in a position to file a suit as the next friend of the idol, it is competent to another person, even a beneficiary, to file a suit in the name of the idol acting as its next friend. It was also observed that no Court will appoint the manager or the shebait who was himself a party to an unauthorised alienation as the next friend of the image or the idol where the alienation is being challenged, the next friend must of necessity be some other person other than the manager or the shebait of the image or the idol, and no better person can be found than the person next in order of succession of the shebaitship. Observing that the grant made by Shrimant Madhavrao Peshwa was primarily a grant to the religious foundation, that is, Shree Mahadoba Devasthan and not to Ganoji bin Rakhmaji Waghule for his own benefit or for the benefit of his male descendants, the Court held that 'Waman himself being the transferor of properties belonging to the religious foundation a suit could be maintained by Keshav who was next in order of succession to the office of manager.
6. On remand, to the trial Court, the learned Judge recorded findings on the issues which had not been found upon at the earlier trial. He held that the alienations made by Chimnaji were void and not binding on the Devasthan, but defendants Nos. 1 and 2 and their predecessors having been in adverse possession of lands alienated before 1863 for a period exceeding 12 years prior to the date on which the Limitation Act was amended by the introduction of Articles 134-A, 134-B and 134-C by Act I of 1929, the plaintiff's suit for possession of S. Nos. 240-A and 242 was barred. On that view, the learned Judge passed a decree declaring that the transfer of S. Nos. 243 to 245 dated January 29, 1930, by defendant No. 3 to defendants Nos. 1 and 2 was void against the Devasthan, and ordered defendants Nos. 1 and 2 to deliver possession of S. No. 245 to the plaintiff, and declared that the plaintiff was entitled to recover possession and mesne profits of S. Nos. 243 and 244 from the Government of Bombay. The learned Judge also directed an inquiry into future mesne profits of S. No. 245 under Order XXI, Rule 12(c), of the Civil Procedure Code.
7. Against that decree defendants Nos. 1 and 2 have appealed to this Court by First Appeal No. 819 of 1952, and the plaintiff has filed First Appeal No. 185 of 1953 in so far as the suit stands dismissed for possession of S. Nos. 240-A and 242.
8. Mr. Jahagirdar who appears on behalf of defendants Nos. 1 and 2 contended that on the finding recorded by this Court in First Appeal No. 434 of 1948, Keshav, son of Waman, had at the date of the institution of the suit no cause of action, Waman being then alive, and the suit was premature and was on that account liable to be dismissed. Counsel also urged that in any event the suit was barred by the defendants' adverse possession. Finally, it was urged that defendants Nos. 1 and 2 may be awarded the value of the benefit which the plaintiff-institution has obtained out of the moneys paid by them for purchasing the land in suit under the transaction of the year 1930.
9. Article 134-B of the Limitation Act, in so far as it is material, provides a period of twelve years from the date of death, resignation or removal of the transferor, in suit to recover possession of immoveable property comprised in a Hindu religious or charitable endowment where the property has been transferred by a previous manager for a valuable consideration. Relying upon this article, it is urged by Mr. Jahagirdar that the cause of action in favour of Keshav arose when the transferor, i.e. Waman, died; and as Waman was alive in the year 1946 when the suit was filed, Keshav could not maintain a suit for possession, and that by the death of Waman in the year 1950 the institution of the suit which was unauthorised in its inception could not be retrospectively validated. In our judgment, this argument cannot be accepted. The Indian Limitation Act does not, except to the extent provided by Section 28, invest a party with a cause of action to maintain a suit. The Limitation Act only deals with the commencement and duration of the period of limitation for institution of suits, for which causes of action have arisen under the substantive law of the land. A suit for possession of property described in the first column of Article 134-B has to be instituted within twelve years from the date on which the transferor died, resigned or was removed. There is no warrant for the assumption that the cause of action for a suit for restoration of property unlawfully transferred by a manager arises only on the death of the transferor or his resignation or removal. It is open to the Deity or the endowment to file a suit for restoration of possession of the property even during the lifetime of the transferor. This Court has taken the view in First Appeal No. 434 of 1948 that even during the lifetime of Waman it was open to a person interested in the Devasthan to file a suit for possession of the property unlawfully alienated, and if Keshav as a person interested in the religious foundation is according to that decision competent to maintain a suit, it is implicit in the decision that a cause of action for the suit had arisen before it was instituted. In any event, Keshav is not seeking to file a suit on a cause of action which is personal xo him. The suit is filed by the Devasthan and there is nothing in Article 134-B, which lends support to the contention that a suit cannot be filed during the lifetime of a manager who has committed a breach of trust by disposing of property of the Devasthan. It may be that after the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed by the third column of Article 134-B the suit for possession of property unlawfully alienated may not lie. But that does not justify the view that before the point of time prescribed in the third column as the commence ment of the period of limitation, there is no cause of action for claiming a decree for possession of the property of the endowment.
10. We are also unable to agree that the suit filed by the endowment is barred by the law of limitation. It is true that in the sale deed (exh. 76) Waman had described the property sold by him as of his full ownership and 'not Devasthan Inam', and that Waman had stated in para. 9 of the sale deed that the consideration was required for purposes of legal necessity of his own family. Relying upon these recitals it was contended that the property was sold on a claim that it did not belong to the Devasthan but belonged to Waman personally. Our attention was also invited to the averments made in para. 5 of the plaint, that Waman 'out of selfishness and for his personal needs' sold S. Nos. 243, 244 and 245 claiming the same as of his personal ownership. Relying upon these recitals and averments, Mr. Jahagirdar submitted that as the property was transferred by Waman claiming it as of his ownership, possession of the alienee became adverse against the Devasthan from the date of the transfer and a suit for possession against the alienee had to be filed within 12 years from the date of the transfer, and if it was not so filed, the suit must be held barred under Article 144 of the Limitation Act. In substance counsel contended that Article 134-B of the Limitation Act only applies to those cases where the manager has transferred property of the endowment in his capacity as a manager and not where he transferred the property claiming it as his own. It was urged that if a manager has transferred for consideration the property of a religious endowment not as manager but claiming it as his own, the article applicable to a suit for possession of the property is Article 144 of the Limitation Act; and in support of that contention reliance was placed upon two judgments of the Calcutta High Court.
11. Before we advert to those authorities we may refer to the phraseology used by the Legislature in Article 134-B. By Article 134-B, in the first column the description of the suit governed thereby is set out: 'By the manager of a Hindu, Muhammadan or Budhist religious or charitable endowment to recover posession of immoveable property comprised in the endowment which has been transferred by a previous manager for a valuable consideration.' Mr. Jahagirdar says that the expression 'by a previous manager' is used in the sense of 'by a previous manager purporting to Act as manager or in his capacity as manager'', and he submits that if the alienation by a manager is made on a claim of ownership of the property alienated, the suit is not governed by Article 134-B. We are unable to accept that contention. The first column of Article 134-B describes the suit as one filed by the manager of a Hindu religious or charitable endowment for recovery of possession of immoveable property. It does not directly refer to the capacity of the transferor in which the alienation has been effected. It is true that the immoveable property must have been transferred by a previous manager for a valuable consideration. But if property has been transferred by a previous manager, there is nothing in the Article which either expressly or by implication requires for its application that the alienation for consideration must be made by the manager in the capacity as a manager and not on a claim of ownership by him. Article 134-B requires that the transferor must be a manager of a Hindu religious or charitable endowment, the property must be the property of that endowment and the transfer must be for consideration. If these conditions are fulfilled Article 134-B will apply, and the capacity in which the transfer is made by the manager is immaterial. Article 134-B and its two allied Articles 134-A and 134-C, were incorporated in the Limitation Act of 1908 by Act I of 1929. Prior to the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Vidya Varuthi Thirtha v. Balusami Ayyar (1921) 48 I.A. 302 : 24 Bom. L.R. 629 it was assumed by the Courts in India that the period of limitation for a suit for recovery of possession of immoveable property of a Hindu religious or charitable endowment transferred by a previous manager was prescribed by Article 134, Limitation Act. But their Lordships of the Privy Council observed that the endowments of a Hindu math were not 'conveyed in trust' nor was the head of the math a ' trustee' with regard to them, save as to specific property proved to have been vested in him for specific object, and consequently Article 134 of Schedule I of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, which contained the expressions above quoted, did not apply where the head of a math had granted a permanent lease of part of its property not proved to be vested in him subject to a specific trust. After this pronouncement of the Privy Council, the Legislature enacted Articles 134-A, 134-B and 134-C.
12. Before the introduction of Articles 134-A, 134-B and 134-C, where the head of a math or a religious endowment granted a lease of math lands without legal necessity, the period of limitation for a suit by a successor in possession of land was held to be governed by Article 144 of the Limitation Act and the starting point of limitation was the date of the death of the grantor, the reason being that the head of the math is entitled to grant a lease during the period of his life and there could be no adverse possession until he ceases to be in office by death, retirement or resignation or removal. The same rule applied when the transfer was by sale of some item of the endowed property. But where the entire property of the endowment was sold without legal necessity by a shebait, it was held that the period of limitation was twelve years and limitation commenced to run from the date of the alienation and not from the date of the vendor's death. Since the amendment, the period of limitation in all cases, whether the transfer is in the nature of a sale or of a lease, either of the entire property or a part thereof, commences from the date of the death, resignation or removal of the transferor. But Mr. Jahagirdar, as we have already observed, contended that under Article 134-B the period of limitation, for the institution of a suit to set aside a transfer by a previous manager, of 12 years from the date of the death, resignation or removal of the transferor, applies to those cases where the transfer has been effected by the transferor of property as manager of the religious foundation and that where the property has been transferred on a claim made by the manager that the property belongs to him exclusively, Article 144 of the Limitation Act will apply; and in support of that contention Mr. Jahagirdar relied upon two judgments of the Calcutta High Court, TIcmanta Kumari Basu v. Sree Sree Ishwar Shridhar Jiu  2 Cal. 38 and Sri Sri Tswari Kalimnta Thakurani v. Manager, Bijli Raj Court of Wards Estate  2 Cal. 587. In Uemanta Kumari Baku's case it was held by the Calcutta High Court that possession of an alienee of endowed property from the manager becomes adverse from the very date of transfer when the transfer is void ab initio, but when it is only voidable at the instance of the succeeding manager, possession is not adverse until the office of the alienating manager ceases. Such transfer is void ab initio, firstly, when the alienation is not merely of certain items of the endowed property, but of the endowment as a whole and, secondly, when the act of alienation itself is adverse to the trust or endowment, e.g., transfer by the manager on assertion of his own personal interest in the same in denial of the trust or endowment. In that case, certain lands belonging to a Deity were mortgaged before the year 1905 by the then shebaits claiming that the properties belonged to them, to one Baburam Basu. The mortgagee filed a suit to enforce the mortgage, and, in execution of the mortgage decree properties were sold in 1908 and purchased by him. Thereafter the successors of the shebaits filed a suit in the year 1934 against the descendants of the mortgagee for possession of the endowed property. The suit was decreed and in execution of the decree an objection was raised by some persons interested in the property that the decree was not liable to be executed against them. The claim made was allowed. A suit was then instituted by the shebaits under Order XXI, Rule 103, of the Code of Civil Procedure for possession of the property described in the plaint on the plea that the property was endowed property. On behalf of defendant No. 1, who was the wife of one of the descendants of Baburam, two contentions were raised before the High Court : (1) That she and her predecessors were in possession of the property ever since the year 1908 adversely to the Deity and that the plaintiff's suit was barred by limitation, and (2) that as all the shebaits of the Deity had not joined as plaintiffs in the suit and there was no averment in the plaint that those who had been impleaded as pro forma defendants were not willing to come as plaintiffs, the suit as framed was not maintainable. On the first contention it was conceded by counsel for the plaintiff and the defendant that Articles 134-A to 134-C of the Indian Limitation Act, which were introduced by the amending Act I of 1929, had no application to the facts of the case and that the appropriate Article which governed the case was Article 144 of the Indian Limitation Act, and the question for determination was as to when the possession of the purchaser became adverse to the endowment. This case cannot obviously be an authority for the proposition that a suit filed by a manager for possession of property of a Hindu religious or charitable endowment, transferred by a previous manager is governed by Article 134-B only if the transfer has been effected by the manager in his capacity as manager of the property and not claiming the property to be his. In Hemanta Kumari Basu's case evidently the Court was not interpreting language used in Article 134-B and it cannot be said, that this case is an authority for the proposition that Article 144 of the Limitation Act applies to suits of the nature before us.
13. In Sri Sri Iswari Kalimata Thakurani v. Manager, Bijni Raj Court of Wards Estate, it was observed that:
There is all the difference between alienation of debattar property by the shebalt in his personal capacity asserting it to be his secular property and that by the shehait as such on the footing of the property being debattar but in excess of his powers. In the former case, the transaction will be void and not voidable vis-a-vis the Deity
and limitation under Article 144 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, will run from the date of such alienation and the possession of the transferee will become adverse to the Deity from the date he obtains the same on the basis of such alienation. In that case the original alienations which were in the nature of leases were made in 1893 and 1898 and the lessees went into possession some time at least before the year 1902. At the date of the suit for possession of the property one of the grantors was alive and the other grantor had died within 12 years before the proceedings for acquisition of the property under the Land Acquisition Act had commenced. It was held on those facts that the title of the Deity was held extinguished long before the acquisition proceedings for compulsory acquisition of the lands in suit had started and long before Article 134-B was put on the Statute book. Now, it is true that in that case the Court held that a suit for possession of property belonging to a religious endowment filed more than 12 years after the date of the alienation where the manager did alienate the property claiming that the property belonged to him, will be barred under Article 144 of the Limitation Act. But the Court in that case did not consider why the case did not fall within Article 134-B. Normally, the period of limitation for a suit is the period of limitation prescribed by law in force at the date of the trial of the suit and prima facie Article 134-B of the Limitation Act applied. There is nothing in the judgment relied upon which suggests that the Court interpreted the provisions of Article 134-B of the Limitation Act and came to the conclusion that where endowed property has been transferred by a manager claiming it as his own Article 134-B has no application. It is true that it was observed in that case that persons who happened to be shebaits of the Deity executed the leases, not as shebaits, but in their personal capacity, on an assertion that the properties were their personal properties, and that, in the opinion of the Court 'made all the difference and the possession of the lessee became adverse to the Deity from the date of the leases or, to put it accurately, when the lessees obtained possession on the strength of the leases'. Evidently, Article 144 of the Limitation Act being a residuary Article can only apply where there is no other period of limitation provided by another Article in the Schedule, and if Article 134-B applied, the provision of Article 144 could not be attracted. No reasons were given as to why to the suit Article 134-B was inapplicable. We are unable to hold that Sri Sri Iswari Kalimata Thakurani's case can be regarded as an authority for the interpretation of that Article.
14. The principle of the Calcutta cases appears to be inconsistent with the view taken by the Madras High Court. In Venkateswara v. Venkatesa  Mad. 599 , it was held that a suit instituted on April 12, 1934, for recovery of possession of the properties of a math, alienated by the predecessor in office of the plaintiff in and before 1910 was governed by Article 134-B and not by Article 144 of the Indian Limitation Act. In Sri Laxshminarayanaperumalswami v. Kasthuri  Mad. 253, it was held that where an alienation of immoveable property belonging to a Hindu religious endowment is made by a trustee within twelve years before the amendment in 1929 introducing Articles 134-A and 134-B into the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, a suit by a succeeding trustee filed subsequent to the amendment to set aside the alienation or to recover possession of the immoveable property comprised in it is governed by Articles 134-A and 134-B respectively. In that case, the properties were mortgaged on May 12, 1928, and it was recited in the deed of mortgage that the properties belonged to the mortgagor though in fact the properties belonged to a religious endowment. In a suit instituted on July 31, 1940, by the plaintiff, who had taken over the office of a trustee from the original trustee who had mortgaged the properties, it was held that the suit was governed by Article 134-B of the Limitation Act. The principle of this case appears clearly to be against the view of the Calcutta High Court that a suit by a manager who purports to transfer the property claiming that the property is his own property is governed by Article 144 of the Limitation Act.
15. In our view, for reasons already set out earlier, in all cases where a suit is instituted by a manager for possession of property transferred for consideration by a former manager of a Hindu religious or charitable endowment, the suit is governed by Article 134-B of the Limitation Act. On the view taken by us the third contention raised by Mr. Jahagirdar cannot be sustained.
16. Evidently, the transfer was made by Waman claiming that the property was his own property. It may be that a part of the consideration was taken for the ostensible purpose of using it for re-constructing the temple building. But on that account we are unable to hold that defendants Nos. 1 and 2 are entitled to claim that the amount spent for reconstructing the temple should be refunded to them.
17. On the view taken by us, the appeal filed by defendants Nos. 1 and 2, namely First Appeal No. 819 of 1952, must fail and is ordered to be dismissed with costs. Costs in favour of the plaintiff.
18. Reverting now to First Appeal No. 185 of 1953, it is evident that the first alienation took place before the year 1863. It is true that under that alienation the alienor reserved a right to receive Rs. 45 per annum. If Article 134-B of the Limitation Act applies to this alienation, the period of limitation commenced on the death of Chimnaji, the transferor. The learned Government Pleader, who appears on behalf of the original plaintiff, contends that even, after the death of Chimnaji, Waman continued to receive the amount of Rs. 45 per annum, year after year till 1944, and when Waman accepted the amount of Rs. 45 stipulated to be under the original transaction, a fresh Mirashi lease or permanent lease came into existence and the plaintiff is entitled to sue for possession of the lands which were alienated before the year 1863. In support of that contention reliance has been placed upon certain observations made at page 327 in Vidya Varuthi Thirtha v. Balusami Ayyar (1921) 48 I.A. 302 : 24 Bom. L.R. 629. In that case, the plaintiffs who were permanent lessees from a previous Mahant had filed a suit for possession of the properties from the successors of the transferors and their tenants and they relied upon Articles 134 and 144 of the Schedule and Section 28(1) of the Limitation Act. Their Lordships held that Article 134 of the Limitation Act could, not apply to claims made for restoration of property of the endowment of a Hindu math, and inasmuch as the successor of the original Mahant had continued to receive the rent even after the death of the original Mahant, the possession of the plaintiffs could not be regarded as adverse. It was observed that if the possession of the lessees was assented to by the succeeding head, that consent could be referable only to a new tenancy created by him and there was no adverse possession until his death, and on that view the plaintiffs' suit for restoration after the death of the succeeding head could not be decreed either under Article 134 or Article 144 of the Limitation Act. Now, as we have already observed, to this suit Article 134-B applies; and if Article 134-B applies the period of limitation must be deemed to have commenced to run from the date when the original transferor died and he having died many years ago, the plaintiffs' suit for possession of lands S. Nos. 240-A and 242 is barred by the law of limitation.
19. In that view of the case, First Appeal No. 185 of 1953 also fails and is dismissed with costs