1. The petitioner-landlord filed an application before the Rent Controller, under S. 15 of the Hyderabad Houses (rent, Eviction and Lease) Control Act, 1954, hereinafter referred to as the Act, for possession of the suit premises on three grounds viz. (1) that the tenant is in wilful default of the payment of rent. (2) that the landlord requires the premises in possession of the tenant as additional accommodation for the purposes of his business s and, (3) that the landlord requires the premises for reconstruction of the building. The Deputy Collector and the Rent Controller, Amberjogai, in Beed district vide his order dt. 30th August, 1975 came to the conclusion that the tenant is a wilful defaulter in payment of rent and, therefore, ordered eviction of the respondenttenant. On other two counts he recorded a finding against the landlord.
2. Being aggrieved by this order the respondent-tenant filed an appeal before the learned District and Sessions Judge, Bhir. The learned District Judge came to the conclusion that the respondent tenant
was not a wilful defaulter and, therefore, set aside the order passed by the Rent Controller. The learned District Judge confirmed the finding recorded by the Rent Controller that the landlord does not require the suit premises for the purposes of business s which he is carrying on, nor he requires it for reconstruction. Being aggrieved by this appellate order the petitioner-landlord has filed this revision application.
3. It appears from the record that it was contended by the landlord that he wanted additional premises for purposes of carrying on his business s in fertilizer and insecticides, which he is carrying on in a rented premises. It is an admitted position of the landlord are not used by him for this business s. It is also an admitted position that the business s of fertilizer and insecticides is being carried on by him in a separate rented house and not in the premises belonging to him. It is contended by Shri Abhyankar learned counsel appearing for the landlord that in these circumstances he is entitled to claim possession of the suit premises under S. 15 (2) cl. (C) of the Act, He also contended that the tenant was a wilful defaulter because the deposit of rent in the Court of the Rent Controller cannot be equated with the payment of rent or its tender, with in the meaning of S. 15 (2) (I) of the Act read with the proviso. It is also not possible for me to accept these contentions.
4. So far as the contention based on S. 15 (2) (I) read with the proviso is concerned, it is an admitted position that the rent was deposited by the tenant in Court of the Rent Controller in the proceeding under S. 9 of the Act for payment to the landlord. The Rent Controller as well as the learned District Judge have rightly come to the conclusion that the rules framed under S. 35 of the Act and particularly R. 4 thereof provide that the tenant can deposit the rent in the office of the Rent Controller, Therefore, such a deposit termed as rent paid within the meaning of S. 15 (1) of the Act. In this context a reference could usefully be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Sheo Narain v. Sher Singh AIR 1960 SC 138, Therefore, there is no substance in this contention.
5. So far as the account contention based on construction of S. 15 (2) (a) (iii) and (c) of the Act is concerned, in my opinion there is no substance in this contention also. The relevant provisions which are relied upon by the learned counsel in support of his contention read as under:-
(3) (a) .....................
(iii) in case it is any other non-residential house, if the landlord is not occupying for purpose of a business s which he is carrying on, a non-residential house in the city, town or village concerned which is his own or to the possession of which he is entitled...............................
(C) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a house, whether residential or non-residential may notwithstanding anything contained in cl. (A) apply to the Controller for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the house to put the landlord in possession accommodation for residential purposes or for the purposes of a business s which he is carrying no, as the case may be..............................'
6. According to Shri Abhyankar, the term and expression used in sub-sec. (Iii) 'business s which he is carrying on' as used in the said sub-section being identical with the term and expression as used in Cl. (C) it must be construed and interpreted to have the same meaning and, therefore, it is not necessary that the additional accommodation should be claimed for the purpose of business s which the landlord is carrying on. In support of this contention Shri Abhyankar has placed reliance upon a decision of this Court in Madanlal Ranglal Daga v. Gurunath Laxman Patange (1968) 70 Bom LR 578.
7. On the other hand it is contended by Shri Chapalgaonkar, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent-tenant that these two sub-sections are mutually exclusive and that the petitioner is not entitled to additional accommodation, unless it is established that he wants accommodation for the purpose of business s, which he is carrying on in other part of the premises concerned. In support of this contention shri Chapalgaonkar has placed reliance upon a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Pyari Bai v. Tadaka Gowrama, : AIR1971AP411 .
8. It cannot be forgotten that S. 15 of the Act deals with eviction of tenant. From the preamble fo the Act it is quite clear that this Act was enacted for making provisions for the better control of rent of houses and to prevent unreasonable eviction of tenants therefrom and for regulation of leasing of houses etc. This Act has been enacted to protect tenants against unreasonable evictions and therefore it will have to be construed strictly against unreasonable evictions and therefore it will have to be construed strictly against the landlord so as to cut as little as possible into the the protection afforded to the tenant. The Scheme of the Act is to prevent unreasonable eviction of tenants by landlords and to provide for eviction on specified grounds only. As observed by the Supreme Court in Mohammad Shafi v. Addi, District & Sessions, Judge. : 2SCR464 , if any of the sections is susceptible of two interpretations, the interpretation which enlarges the protection of the tenant will have to be preferred rather then the one which restricts it. Therefore, S. 15 (c) of the Act will have to be construed bearing in mind this principle of interpretation. The section provides for grounds for eviction of tenant. It is divided into various sub-sections. Therefore, all these subsections will have to be read harmoniously as every sub-section throws light upon another. To seek the legislative intent all the constituent parts of the provisions will have to be construed totether, considering every part thereof in the light of general purpose and object of the Act. An effort will have to be made to make every part effective, harmonious and sensible. This is a well settled rule of construction. Section 15(3)(iii) deals with the requirement of the Landlord regarding a non-residential house, if he is is not occupying in the city or town any non-residential house for the purpose of business s which he is carrying on. Thus the area and field covered by this sub-section is wholly different. This Court in Madanlal v. Gurunath Patange (1968) 70 Bom LR 578, had an occasion to consider this sub-section only and was not concerned with Cl. (C) which covers different area and the field. Sub-sec. (C) with which we are concerned in this petition deals with the claim of the landlord for additional accommodation, when he is occupying a part of the houses, whether residential or non-residential. This clause applies and takes is its import special types of cases i.e. building which is partly occupied by the landlord and partly occupies by the landlord and partly by tenant and the landlord is in need of additional accommocation. It involves the principle of 'live and lettive' If the landlord is already occupying a part of the house and wants additional accommodation, then sub-sec (c) enjoins upon him to prove that he requires this additional accommodation for the purpose of business s which he is carrying on. Thus from the bare reading of sub-sec. (3) (Iii) and (c) it is clear that they are mutually exclusive. A construction cannot be put upon these sub-sec which will make one of them redundant or surplusage, more so as the area and the field covered by these two sub-clauses is distinct and different. It is well settle principle of interpretation of statute that it will have to be presumed that the Legislature enacted different sub-sec with definite purpose and intention and itis the legislative mandate that every part of the statutes should have its own effect. Legislature is deemed not to waste its words or say something in vain. Therefore in my opinion the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Pyari bai v. Tadaka. : AIR1971AP411 , was right in coming to the conclusion that these sub-sec are mutually exclusive and, therefore, Cl (c) is a applicable only when the additional accommodation is required by the landlord for the purpose of business s which he is carrying on. In this view of the matter the authorities below wee right in coming to the conclusion that the petitioner-landlord had not made out a case under sub-cl. (C) of S. 15 of the Act.
9. So far as the ground based on requirement of reconstruction of the building is concerned, it appears from the order passed by the learned District Judge that it was already given up before him and is also not pressed before me.
10. In the result, therefore, there is no substance in this petition. Hence rule is discharged. However, in the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.
11. Petition dismissed.