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The Goverment Pleader Vs. Bhagubhai Dayabhai - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
CourtMumbai
Decided On
Judge
Reported in16Ind.Cas.788
AppellantThe Goverment Pleader
RespondentBhagubhai Dayabhai
Excerpt:
bombay regulation (ii of 1827), sections 50, 53, 56 - pleader's duty towards client--clients with conflicting interests, whether can be represented by same pleader--pleader insulting district judge--jurisdiction of high court. - indian penal code, 1860 [c.a. no. 45/1860].sections 124-a, 153-a, 153-b, 292, 293 & 295a; [f.i. rebello, smt v.k. tahilramani & a.s. oka, jj] declaration as to forfeiture of book held, the power can be exercised only if the government forms opinion that said publication contains matter which is an offence under either of sections 124-a, 153-a, 153-b, 292, 293, 295a of i.p.c., .....to order that his sanad be retained for a period of six months from this date, and that he do pay the costs of this application.heaton, j.7. i concur. i would only add this that apparently the form of the order we made has been looked upon, at any rate, by mr. bhagubhai himself, as expressing some idea that as soon as an apology was made, he would be allowed to continue to practice as a pleader. but the true meaning of the order was that until an apology was made, we were not prepared to consider that he should ever be allowed to practice as a pleader. as soon as the apology was made and the ground cleared in that way, then we were prepared to consider for how long we should suspend him from practice and i quite agree with my learned colleague that the period of six months is one that.....
Judgment:
ORDER

1. We have heard this application by the Pleader Mr. Bhagubhai, who petitions the Court that as he has now made the apology, which by our previous order he was directed to make, the Court should restore to him his sanad as a Pleader.

2. We observe that in the apologies, which Mr. Bhagubhai has seen fit to submit in deference to our order, he has taken care to insert words apparently of justification to the effect that the insulting statements used by him towards the Judicial Officer whom he maligned were used in 'excitement and on the spur of the moment.'

3. The record of the case shows that these words are not true and that, so far from the insulting statements having been once uttered in an exess of excitement or under a sudden impulse, the fact is that they were repeated on diverse occasions after Mr. Bhagubhai's attention had been drawn to them, and indeed after he had once expressed regret for them. Even now, Mr. Bhagubhai's main contention before us has been that the insulting imputations were made by him under a mistaken notion that he was, as of right, entitled to make them and that is a totally different defence from the defence suggested; by the use of the phrase as to excitement or the spur of the moment.

4. Mr. Bhagubhai, however, expresses his consent to the deletion of these words to which we have objected, and I am, therefore, prepared to accept these apologies with the offending words deleted, as a sufficient compliance with our previous order.

5. I must, however, express my inability to follow Mr. Bhagubhai when he supposes that a tepid and ungracious apology such as this is sufficient entirely to remove the effects of the reiterated insults which he lodged at high Judicial Officers. There was nothing in our pervious order to lead him to suppose that any apology, still less such an apology as he has tendered, would be an end of the matter and would have the immediate effect of restoring him to his status as a practising Pleader. It appears to me that the recovery of that status must still be deferred and that this Court must mark by a proper penalty its sense of the grave and scandalous misconduct of which Mr. Bhagubhai has unfortunately rendered himself guilty.

6. I think it no excessive penalty to order that his sanad be retained for a period of six months from this date, and that he do pay the costs of this application.

Heaton, J.

7. I concur. I would only add this that apparently the form of the order we made has been looked upon, at any rate, by Mr. Bhagubhai himself, as expressing some idea that as soon as an apology was made, he would be allowed to continue to practice as a Pleader. But the true meaning of the order was that until an apology was made, we were not prepared to consider that he should ever be allowed to practice as a Pleader. As soon as the apology was made and the ground cleared in that way, then we were prepared to consider for how long we should suspend him from practice and I quite agree with my learned colleague that the period of six months is one that does not err on the side of severity.


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