1 TO 4
(After stating facts, not material to the report. His Lordship proceeded).
5. The appellate bench below negatived the case of the petitioner on two grounds. The appellate bench held that the application of condonation of delay was not presented along with the appeal memo and inder the provisions of Order 41, Rule 3A. Civil P. C. an appeal could not be entertained if it is not accompanied by an application for condonation of delay. Secondly, on merits also the appellate bench found that the petitioner had failed to establish that there was sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within time by proving that he was induced by the advice to prefer an appeal belatedly. It is against this order of the appellate bench that the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution has been preferred.
6. Mr. Deshmukh, the learned advocate appearing in support of this petition, has contended that the view of the appellate bench below that the provisions of Order 41, Rule 3A of the Code insist that an application for condonation of delay must accompany appeal memo is erroneous. Though the language of Order 41, Rule 3A of the Code is mandatory it must be interpreted to mean that no appeal could be entertained to mean that no appeal could be entertained unless on an application made for condonation of delay the delay is condoned. I am inclined to agree with Mr. Deshmukh. It Act 104 of 1976) that when an appeal is presented after the expiry of the period of limitation specified therefor the appeal must be accompanied by an application making out a case for condonation of delay. In my opinion, this does not preclude the appellant from presenting an application for condonation of delay when it is brought to his notice that the appeal has been filed beyond time. I am also of the opinion that despite the apparently peremptory language of Rule 3A or Order 41 of the Code the appeal preferred after the expiry of period of limitation cannot be dismissed summarily on the ground that the application for condonation of delay does not accompany the memo of aooeal. The obvious object of making such a provision is to see that the appeal will not be heard unless delay in the filling of the said appeal is condoned after proper notice to the respondent. This is evident from the provisions contained in sub-rule (2) of O. 41, Rule 3A of the OCde. This sub-rule provides that where the Court does not reject the application for condonation of delay summarily notice of the said application should be issued to the respondent and it is only after the said application is finally decided that the Court can proceed to dismiss or admit the appeal under the provisions of Rule 11 or Rule 13 respectively of Order 41 of the Code. This must be so because several times it might be the aces of the appellant that there is no delay at all and in such a case after examination of the papers if the office of the appeal Court finds that there is delay then an application for condonation of delay then an application for condonation of delay may legitimately be presented by the appellant. A proper construction of the procedural rule like this must take into account contingency such as this. I am, therefore of the opinion that under the provisions of Order 41 Rule 3A an appeal presented after the expiry of the period ground that the application for condonation of delay does not accompany the memo of appeal. (The rest of the judgment is not relevant for his report-Ed.)
7. Petition dismissed.