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Ramesh S/O Ramprasad Yadav Vs. State of Maharashtra - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectLimitation;Criminal
CourtMumbai High Court
Decided On
Case NumberCriminal Application No. 1114 of 1982
Judge
Reported in1984(1)BomCR151
ActsLimitation Act, 1963 - Schedule - Article 115
AppellantRamesh S/O Ramprasad Yadav
RespondentState of Maharashtra
Appellant AdvocateR.S. Bhosale and ;V.R. Bhosale, Advs.
Respondent AdvocateManju Rao, Adv.
Excerpt:
- - rao, the learned public prosecutor, contended that if one peruses the application for condonation of delay and the affidavit in support of the same, one is convinced that the petitioner has really made out no good ground for the condonation of the delay. 3. the order refusing to condone delay is, therefore, hereby quashed and set aside and the entire matter is sent back to the sessions court for disposal of the application for condonation of delay as well as the appeal in accordance with the provisions of law......he filed an appeal and applied for condonation of delay. on the said application, order was passed by the learned addl. session judge on 4-9-1982 as follows :'the p.p. to notices.'it is difficult to make out the meaning of this order. evidently it has been a typographical error and probably what it means is that notice were to issue to the public prosecutor. mr. bhosale, the learned counsel for the petitioner, however, pointed out that no returnable date was mentioned in the said order. when the application came up for hearing on 7-9-1982, an order was passed rejecting the application. but the order states that the counsel for the applicant was absent when the application was called out for hearing. what is stated further is as follows :'the application and affidavit is support of.....
Judgment:

Sharad Manohar, J.

1. I do not propose to deliver a detailed judgment in this petition which is filed against the order of the learned Addl. Sessions Judge refusing to condone 61 days delay on the part of the petitioner in filling the appeal to that Court against the order of his conviction and sentence. Admittedly there was a delay of 61 days in filling the appeal. Further admittedly the appeal was filed against the order of conviction passed after the petitioner/accused entered a plea of guilt. All the same, it does appear that the accused has some grievance about the order of conviction and sentence. He filed an appeal and applied for condonation of delay. On the said application, order was passed by the learned Addl. Session Judge on 4-9-1982 as follows :

'The P.P. to notices.'

It is difficult to make out the meaning of this order. Evidently it has been a typographical error and probably what it means is that notice were to issue to the Public Prosecutor. Mr. Bhosale, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, however, pointed out that no returnable date was mentioned in the said order. When the application came up for hearing on 7-9-1982, an order was passed rejecting the application. But the order states that the Counsel for the applicant was absent when the application was called out for hearing. What is stated further is as follows :

'The application and affidavit is support of it is convinced.' (sic)

It is difficult to find out the meaning even of this expression. Evidently this is another typographical error What the learned Judge probably meant was that the application and the affidavit in support of it were perused by him. Point, however, is that the learned Judge heard the Public prosecutor on the question as to why delay should not be condoned; but the petitioner was not heard on that question. It would be a different thing if there was anything on record to show that the petitioner or his Advocate was aware of the when the application for condonation of delay was to be taken up for final hearing. But my attention was not invited to anything on record which would should that any particular date was specified, by any order for final hearing of the application. By and large it can be said that the order rejecting the application for condonation of delay has been passed behind the petitioner's back.

2. Mrs. Rao, the learned Public Prosecutor, contended that if one peruses the application for condonation of delay and the affidavit in support of the same, one is convinced that the petitioner has really made out no good ground for the condonation of the delay. She may be right on this point. But before passing the impugned order, it is necessary that the petitioner should be appropriately heard.

Mr. Bhosale strenuously contended that the order passed by the trial Court itself suffers from grave procedural errors and it was necessary for the appeal Court to take that aspect of the matter into account while considering even the question of condonation of delay. I do find that the copies of the relevant papers including the charge-sheet etc., were supplied to the petitioner on the same date i.e. 3-6-1982. The charge-sheet was framed against him on the same date and the accused was required to state whether he was pleading guilty or not, on the same date. It does not appear that this procedure is somewhat unusual. But I wish to express no particular opinion on the correctness of this procedure at the stage. It will be open for the Sessions Court, Pune to consider whether this aspect of the case had any bearing upon the question to be decided by the Court.

3. The order refusing to condone delay is, therefore, hereby quashed and set aside and the entire matter is sent back to the Sessions Court for disposal of the application for condonation of delay as well as the appeal in accordance with the provisions of law. Rule is made absolute.


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