1. This is a second appeal filed by the original plaintiffs against the judgment and decree passed by the District Court at Satara dismissing his appeal and thereby confirming the judgment and decree passed by the learned Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Satara dismissing the plaintiffs' suit for possession of the suit premises.
2. The plaintiff filed a suit for possession of the suit premises together with the arrears of rent and costs of the suit. According to the plaintiffs the suit property was proposed by Deu Krishna Sonavane, who was then a minor by his guardian mother Rahi vice the registered sale deed dated 11th June 1921 and all the plaintiffs had joint interest in the suit property. The plaintiffs then stated that the suit plot is being used for manufacturing oven bricks since the last several years and was leased out to different tenants on a monthly basis. The plaintiffs also stated that the bricks are manufactured into ovens installed over the suit property since the beginning. It is their case that the defendants were given the suit plot on lease only for 11 months. According to the plaintiffs they terminated the tenancy of the defendants by notice dated 9th February 1970, served on defendant No. 1 as manager of the joint family of the defendants. According to them as the lease of the defendants was lawfully terminated, they were entitled to recover arrears of rent as well as for possession of the property.
3. The defendants contested the suit and raised various contentions. The main contention raised by the defendants was that the notice given was illegal. According to them as the lease was for manufacturing purposes it is to be deemed to be a lease from year to year terminable by six months' notice, which was admittedly not given in the present case. After appreciating all the evidence on record, the learned Judge of the trial Court came to the conclusion that since the lease was for manufacturing purposes, it is deemed to be a yearly lease and hence the notice given by the plaintiffs was illegal. In this view of the matter, the plaintiffs' suit for possession was dismissed, though their suit for arrears of rent was decreed.
4. Being aggrieved by the Judgment and decree the plaintiffs filed an appeal before the District Court and the learned District Judge, Satara, by his judgment dated 22nd July, 1974, also came to the conclusion that the property was leased out for manufacturing bricks, which amounted to a lease for manufacturing purposes and hence the notice given was bad in law. In this view of the matter, he dismissed the appeal filed by the plaintiffs and as already observed it is this finding recorded by the trial Court and confirmed by the appeal Court which is challenged in this second appeal.
5. Shri Akuljkar, learned Counsel appearing for the plaintiffs has contended before me that the lease of an open plot of land for manufacturing bricks is not a lease for manufacturing purposes within the meaning of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. According to him in making bricks out of clay no manufacturing process is involved and therefore the learned Judges of both the Courts below have committed an error in coming to the conclusion that the lease granted by the plaintiffs was not for manufacturing purposes within the meaning of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is not possible for me to accept this contention. It is no doubt true that the expression 'manufacturing purposes' is not denned in the Transfer of Property Act. However, connotation of the said word is by now well settled and obviously the said expression will have to be understood in its popular sense, It is not necessary to deal with this question in detail in view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Allenburry Engineers Pvt. Ltd. v. Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia, : 2SCR257 . The expression 'manufacturing purposes' as used in Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act fell for consideration of the Supreme Court in the said decision. After making a reference to an earlier decision in para 8 the Supreme Court observed as under
'In all these cases the statute or the notification concerned did not furnish any artificial meaning to the expression 'manufacture' and the Court applied, therefore, the ordinary meaning as commonly understood to that expression, The expression 'manufacturing purposes' in Section 106, thus, means purposes for making or fabricating articles or materials by physical labour, or skill or by mechanical power, vendible and useful as such making or fabricating does not mean merely a change in an already existing article or materials but transforming it into a different article or material having a distinctive name, character or use or fabricating of previously known article by novel process.'
The view taken by the Supreme Court in Allenburry's case is reaffirmed in a recent decision in P. C. Cheriyan v. Barfi Devi, : 1979(4)ELT593(SC) . After making a reference to the earlier decision including the one in Allenburry's case, the Supreme Court ultimately came to the conclusion that:--
'The broad test for determining whether a process is a manufacturing process is whether it brings out a complete transformation of the old components so as to produce a commercially different article or commodity'.
6. If the facts and circumstances brought on record in the present case are tested on this touchstone, it is quite clear that the plot was leased out for making bricks from clay. What was leased out was an open plot of land which was to be used for manufacturing bricks. In the plaint itself the plaintiffs have stated that the suit property was leased out for manufacturing bricks. Further it is well known that the bricks' are made out of clay which is a raw material. The very process of making bricks involves a transformation of clay into bricks which is commercially different article or commodity. It not only involves a change in the already existing raw material but it results in transformation of the Old component into a different article having a distinctive name, character and use, Therefore, in my opinion, the Courts below were right in coming to the conclusion that the lease granted for manufacturing bricks is a lease for 'manufacturing purposes' within the meaning of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.
7. This Court had an occasion to consider though in a somewhat different context, in State of Maharashtra v. Nihalchand, 1973 Mah LJ 568: 1974 Lab IC 203, whether a lease given for manufacturing bricks amounts to running a factory within the meaning of Section 2(m)(1) of the Factories Act. After making a reference to the earlier decision in Sadiqbhai v. State of Maharashtra 1969 Mah LJ 35, it was held in the said decision that the operation of making bricks conducted in the leased plot amounted to working a factory, since it involves manufacturing process of making bricks from clay. Hence both Courts were right in coming to the conclusion that the open plot was leased out for manufacturing bricks, which is a lease for 'manufacturing purposes' within the meaning of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.
8. In the result, therefore, there is no substance in this appeal. The appeal fails and is dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.
9. Appeal dismissed.