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Dadarao Umaji Kelode Vs. Maharashtra Road Transport Corporation Ltd. and anr. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectInsurance;Motor Vehicles
CourtMumbai High Court
Decided On
Judge
Reported in1(1985)ACC65
AppellantDadarao Umaji Kelode
RespondentMaharashtra Road Transport Corporation Ltd. and anr.
Excerpt:
- code of criminal procedure, 1973 [c.a. no. 2/1974]. section 41: [ swatanter kumar, cj, smt ranjana desai & d.b. bhosale, jj] arrest of accused - held, a police officer or a person empowered to arrest may arrest a person without intervention of the court subject to the limitations specified under the provisions of the code. the provisions of section 41 of the code provides for arrest by a police officer without an order from a magistrate and without a warrant. a distinct and different power under section 44 of the code empowers the magistrate to arrest or order any person to arrest the offender. under section 44 of the code, that power is vested in the court of the magistrate when an offence is committed in his presence. if the legislature has taken care of providing such specific power..........and died on the spot. on 4-5-1979 the applicant preferred a claim before the motor accidents claims tribunal at buldana under section 110 of the motor vehicles act, 1939. since he did not prefer the claim within a period of six months as prescribed sub-section (3) of section 110-a of the said act, he filed a separate application for condoning the delay of 7 months and 3 days in preferring the claim. in this application he averred that because of sudden death of his son he was in a confused state of mind and hence he did not prefer the claim within time. this application was opposed by non-applicant no. 1. it put on record some letters which the applicant had written to it prior to his preferring the claim before the tribunal and demanding compensation for the death of his son. the.....
Judgment:

A.A. Ginwala, J.

1. Son of the applicant by name Vishwanath was crushed under the wheels of a bus owned by non-applicant No. 1 on 20-4-1978 and died on the spot. On 4-5-1979 the applicant preferred a claim before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal at Buldana under Section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Since he did not prefer the claim within a period of six months as prescribed Sub-section (3) of Section 110-A of the said Act, he filed a separate application for condoning the delay of 7 months and 3 days in preferring the claim. In this application he averred that because of sudden death of his son he was in a confused state of mind and hence he did not prefer the claim within time. This application was opposed by non-applicant No. 1. It put on record some letters which the applicant had written to it prior to his preferring the claim before the Tribunal and demanding compensation for the death of his son. The applicant had supported his averments in the application by an affidavit. The Tribunal by its order passed on 4-7-1980 rejected the application for condonation of delay on the ground that the letters which had been written by the applicant to non-applicant No. 1 on 25-9-1978 and 2-10-1978 showed that he was aware of his right to claim compensation for the death of his son and his assertion in the affidavit that he was utterly confused was belied. It is against this order that the present revision application has been preferred by the applicant.

2. Mr. B.N. Mohta, the learned Counsel for the applicant, submits that the Tribunal has taken too technical a view in holding that the applicant had not established any sufficient cause for condoning the delay. He further submits that though the applicant had supported his averments by an affidavit, there was no counter affidavit filed by non-applicant No. 1 and that the Tribunal had relied on the two letters referred to hereinabove without these letters having been proved.

3. I do not find any substance in any of these contentions urged by Shri Mohta. It is not contended in the revision application before me that the letters at Exhs 30 and 31 were admitted in evidence by the Tribunal without proper proof. It seems that no objection had been taken by the applicant before the Tribunal for admitting these two letters in evidence, since they are exhibited. There is no averment to the contrary in the revision application. There is no reason why the Tribunal could not have taken these two letters into consideration for deciding whether the applicant was prevented from preferring the claim within time because of his confused state of mind. The burden to prove that the applicant was prevented from sufficient cause in preferring the claim in time before the Tribunal lay on the applicant and if the same was rebutted by non-applicant No. 1 by producing the above two letters, which do not seem to be disputed, there was no reason why the Tribunal should not have rejected the ground urged in the application for condoning the delay. It is difficult to see how the rejection of the application could be said to be too technical a ground as urged by Mr. Mohta.

4. At any rate the question whether the applicant was prevented from making the application for claim within time due to sufficient cause would be a question of fact and in this revision application finding on the question of fact cannot be disturbed even if it is erroneous.

5. In the result, therefore, I do not see any substance in this revision application and it stands dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.


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