1. Heard Smt. Hemalatha Mahishi for the complainant.
Contempt complained of in this case is that the accused have violated the order made by the Division Bench in Writ Appeal No. 1382 of 1982, in which the Division Bench reversing the interim order made by the learned single Judge, substituted an interlocutory order, which reads thus :
'In the result, we allow this appeal, reverse the order of the learned single Judge and make an interim order directing that neither the Police nor the Revenue should assist either of the parties to dispossess the party who may be in possession of the disputed land, pending disposal of the writ petition.'
2. It is now complained of by Smt. Hemalatha Mahishi that the Revenue and the Police authorities have notwithstanding the above order, taken the liberty of assisting accused 1 to 4 to harvest the standing-crop and are thereby guilty of a wilful disobedience of the order of this court.
Whatever might be the other remedies complainant might consider himself entitled to, these proceedings in contempt are clearly unsupportable. In the writ appeal the Division Bench did not record any finding even prima facie, as to which of the parties was in possession. The order cannot also be understood to mean that if one of the parties was found to be in possession of the land, the authorities should not assist him in maintaining or protecting that possession. Having regard to the terms of the order made by the Division Bench, it is difficult to subscribe to the contention of the learned counsel of the complainant. Essentially, contempt of court is a matter which concerns the administration of justice and the dignity and authority of judicial tribunals. The jurisdiction to make an order for contempt is, per se, neither civil or criminal but is sui generis, though when a person is sought to be punished, proceedings attract principles of penal policy requiring the establishment of the ingredients of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt.
We, however, think no proceedings for contempt could be initiated on the averments made in this case. No proceedings can be founded on the alleged violation of an order which is not specific and which, by its own terms, is of a contingent character, its directions being dependent on other facts which are left undetermined in the order.
3. In the circumstances, it is neither appropriate nor expedient to initiate any proceedings on this complaint. The complaint is accordingly dismissed.
4. Complaint dismissed.