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Gangadhar Shivalingappa Nagmoti Vs. State of Mysore - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectLabour and Industrial
CourtKarnataka High Court
Decided On
Case NumberWrit Petition No. 1313 of 1965
Judge
Reported in(1966)IILLJ268Kant; (1965)2MysLJ347
ActsMysore Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules - Rule 9(1)
AppellantGangadhar Shivalingappa Nagmoti
RespondentState of Mysore
Excerpt:
- code of criminal procedure, 1973 [c.a. no. 2/1974]. section 468: [dr. k. bhakthavatsala, j] offence under section 406 of i.p.c., - bar to take cognizance, after lapse of more than 14 years on facts, held, the complainant is not claiming exclusion of time in computing the period of limitation under section 470 cr.p.c. further, the trial court has not passed any order under section 473 cr.p.c. regarding extension of period of limitation. hence, taking cognizance for the offence punishable under section 406 of ipc against the accused by the magistrate is bad in law. impugned order was quashed. .....we have also been taken through all the material proportions of the report made by the specially empowered authority and our attentions has been invited to many salient points set out in the petitioner's affidavit. 2. after careful consideration of the arguments and reference to the materials placed before us, we are unable to agree with his contentions that the findings of the specially empowered authority are either based on surmise, or that it is based on no evidence. we are unable to agree that this case is one of the type of goel case : (1964)illj38sc . 3. in our view, there is sufficient evidence on which the conclusions arrived at by the specially empowered authority, could be properly based. 4. we find no force in the argument that the reasonable opportunity contemplated by.....
Judgment:
ORDER

Sadasivayya, J.

1. We have heard the learned advocate for the petitioner at great length. We have also been taken through all the material proportions of the report made by the specially empowered authority and our attentions has been invited to many salient points set out in the petitioner's affidavit.

2. After careful consideration of the arguments and reference to the materials placed before us, we are unable to agree with his contentions that the findings of the specially empowered authority are either based on surmise, or that it is based on no evidence. We are unable to agree that this case is one of the type of Goel case : (1964)ILLJ38SC .

3. In our view, there is sufficient evidence on which the conclusions arrived at by the specially empowered authority, could be properly based.

4. We find no force in the argument that the reasonable opportunity contemplated by Art. 311 was denied by the fact of the non examination of one Shivappa. This person had not been cited as a witness in support of the charge. Therefore, the petitioner had no justification to except that Shivappa would be examined as a witness in support of the charge. If the petitioner thought that Shivappa was a material witness, nothing prevented the petitioner from praying before the specially empowered authority for the examination of Shivappa, even as a Court witness, if need be. Having kept quiet without making any such effort at that stage, he cannot be heard to say now, that the non-examination of Shivappa has resulted in a denial of reasonable opportunity.

5. The contention that the punishment of compulsory retirement is one which could be imposed only by the High Court and not by the Governor, in our opinion, has no substance. Under the Mysore Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules (made by the Governor under the proviso to Art. 309) this is not one of those punishments which the High Court can impose. But the Governor can impose it under rule 9(1). The argument of Sri Malimath is that the Conferment of power on the Governor to impose this punishment, impairs the control which is vested in the High Court under Art. 235 and also that it is opposed to the view of this Court in the Writ Petitions No. 887 of 1965 to the effect that power of the Governor is confined to three things, viz., removal from service, dismissal and reduction in rank. This argument overlooks two important factors. One is, that the latter part of Art. 235 enjoins that the High Court should not deal with the persons (belonging to the Judicial Service of the State and holding any post inferior to that of District Judge), otherwise than in accordance with the conditions of their service. That second is that there is no conflict between the power exercised by the Governor in this case and what has been observed in Writ Petition No. 887 of 1965; because, as we understand it, the punishment of compulsory retirement is included in the penalty of removal from service and as such could be exercised only by the appointing authority consistently with Art. 311(1).

6. We see no merit in this writ petition and we dismiss the same.


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