Jagannatha Shetty, J.
1. The complainant is one of the persons who has filed a writ petition in this court. The writ petition concerns with the validity of a resolution passed by the Executive Committee of the workers union of which the complainant is one of the members. Under the rules governing the union the said resolution was binding on every member of the union.
2. The writ petition is pending in this Court. The President of the Union issued a notice calling upon the complainant to explain how he could become a party to the writ petition when the matter pertains thereto was considered and approved by the Executive Committee and the action challenging it amounts to an act subversive of discipline. The complainant was also furnished with the rules of the union.
3. The complainant by his reply, inter alia, contended that he had opposed the said resolution in the meeting of the Executive Committee, but his opposition was rendered ineffective due to lack of 'majority' on his side. He has approached the High Court challenging the resolution to safeguard the interest of his fellow workmen and not with any intention to violate the rules of the union. He has asserted :
'I have approached the High Court at the instance of all the monthly rated employees of the company in general and the monthly rated employees of my group in particular. I am bound to protect the interests of my group .........'
4. The Executive Committee of the union in its meeting considered the reply given by the complainant and found it unacceptable. It decided to take disciplinary action against him for acting in a manner detrimental to the interests of the union and for an act subversive of discipline. Pending disciplinary proceedings, the Executive Committee suspended the complainant from primary membership of the union.
5. The action taken by the Executive Committee of the Union is now assailed as a criminal contempt of this Court in as much as it is a case of gross interference with the administration of justice by intimidating the complainant who is a party to the writ petition.
6. The question raised is of considerable importance. It involves on one side the need to curb interference with administration of justice and on the other, the necessity to maintain internal discipline in the collective bargaining. The process of contempt of court, looking at it broadly, is designed to secure proper administration of justice or it is a procedure by which the court condemns any conduct of interference with the administration of justice. In re : Shri S. Mulgaonkar (AIR 1978 SC 727) the Supreme Court suggested :
'a normative guideline for the Judges to observe in this jurisdiction was not to be hypersensitive where distortions and criticism overstep the limits, but to deflate vulgar denunciation by dignified bearing, condescending indifference and repudiation by judicial rectitude.'
In Advocate General, Bihar v. M. P. Khair Industries : 1980CriLJ684 the Supreme Court observed :
'The Court has the duty of protecting the interest of the public in the due administration of justice and, so it is entrusted with power to commit for contempt of Court, not in order to protect the dignity of the court against insult or injury as the expression 'contempt of court' may seem to suggest, but to protect and to vindicate the right of the public that the administration of justice shall not be prevented, prejudiced, obstructed or interfered with. It is a mode of vindicating the majesty of law, in its active manifestation against obstruction and outrage. The law should not be seen to sit by limply, while those who defy it go free, and those who seek its protection lose hope.'
In Asharam M. Jain v. A. T. Gupta : 1983CriLJ1499 the Supreme Court again indicated :
'There is never any risk of judicial hypersensitivity. The very nature of the judicial function makes judges sympathetic and responsive. Their very training blesses them with 'insensitivity' as opposed to hypersensitivity. Judges are always seeking good reasons to explain wrong conduct. They know there are always two sides to a coin. They neither give nor take offence because they deal with persons and situations impersonally, though with understanding. Judges more than others realise the foibles, the frustrations, the under-currents and the tensions of litigants and litigation. But, as elsewhere, lines have to be drawn.'
7. These then are the principles which must govern the jurisdiction of the Contempt of Court. Can we say, in the present case, that the action taken against the complainant by the Executive Committee of the union amounts to contempt of court. Is there any threat held out against the complainant to withdraw the writ petition or not to prosecute it. We do not find any such thing in this case. All that is alleged against the complainant is that he has acted subversive of the discipline which is required to be maintained by every member of the union. If the complainant is of the opinion that he is not bound by the resolution of the Executive Committee and he could be a party to the writ petition in which that resolution has been challenged, he could establish his right in the enquiry to be held against him. The action taken by the Executive Committee is intended for the purpose of preserving the integrity of the union and maintaining the internal discipline. We cannot hold such action as an interference with the administration of justice.
We, therefore, see no reason to issue notice to the respondents. The case is accordingly rejected.
8. Petition dismissed.