1. The petitioner is accused 2 in Sessions Case No. 9/49-60 who, as accused 3 in Sessions Case No. 8 of 43-50, stood charged for an offence under Section 467, Penal Code. Separate charges were also framed against the second and third accused (in Sessions Case No. 8/49-50) under Section 82, Mysore Registration Act. On a motion by the Public Prosecutor, the charge for the offence under Section 82, Registration Act was kept by for a separate trial, as a joint trial for the offences both under the Penal Code and the Registration Act was considered by the Sessions Judge to be irregular. After trial, the petitioner was acquitted of the offence under Section 467, Penal Code. The charge under Section 82, Registration Act was then taken up for trial in Sessions case No. 9/49-50. The petitioner filed an application under Section 403, Criminal P. C., objecting to the trial on the principle of autrefois acquit, The learned Sessions Judge held that the acquittal under Section 467, Penal Code is no bar for trial of an offence under Section 82, Registration Act. This revision petition ia filed against that order.
2. Sri V. K. Govindarajulu, the learned counsel, on behalf of the petitioner urged that the offences complained of having arisen out of the same transaction, and the facts to be proved in both the cases remaining same, the second trial is against public policy involved in the scheme of legislation, He relied upon the decision in Saing Maung v. Emperor, AIR (11) 1924 Rang. 213: (25 Cr.L.j. 191) which held that:
'When an accused hag been tried and acquitted under sections of Penal Code of offences of forgery and abetment thereof, his subsequent trial for offences under the Registration Act on the same facts is barred under Section 403, Criminal P. C.'
The same High Court in Mc Tok v. Emperor, AIR (14) 1927 Rang. 303: (28 Cr. L. J. 908) had laid down that where a person executed a mortgage and registered it and was tried and acquitted under the Penal Code, the subsequent trial under Section 82, Registration Act was not barred as he committed two entirely distinct offences; one was cheating by personation and the other for personation under the Registration Act. The learned Judge declined to follow Suing Maung v. Emperor, AIR (11) 1924 Rang. 213 : (25 cr. L. J. 191) with an observation that ''the facts of the case have not been stated in the judgment.' In Abdul Hamid v. Emperor, AIR (23) 1936 Rang. 174: (37 Cr.L.J. 492), the case in Saing Maung v. Emperor, A.I.R. (11) 1924 Rang. 213: (25 Cr.D.J. 191) came up for consideration and was not followed. It was laid down in the latter case that swearing a false affidavit and using that false affidavit are two distinct offences even though they are parts of the same transaction and the accused can be tried for both the offences of perjury and cheating at the same trial. Section 403 (1), Criminal P. C. states that if a person has been tried and acquitted of an offence, be shall not be liable to be tried again foe the same offence nor on the same facts for another offence for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made against him under Section 236, Criminal P. C. Section 236 deals with the procedure where it is doubtful which of the offences that are committed.
3. Section 403 (2) states that a person acquitted or convicted of any offence may be afterwards tried for any distinct offence for which a separate charge might have been made against him on a former trial under Section 235 (1), Criminal P. C. Section 385 (1) provides for the trial of offences committed in the same transaction, and if more offences than one are committed by a person he may under that section be tried at one trial for every such offence.
4. The cases under reference arose from a complaint that the accused had forged a sale deed and some of them impersonated before the Sub-Registrar for getting the document registered. Impersonation before the Sub-Registrar may be committed without committing forgery, The first trial concerned with forgery and the present trial for impersonation. Though both may be considered acts arising out of the same transaction, it cannot be said that they are not distinct offences. In fact in the present case charges were framed for both the offences; one was tried and disposed of at first, the other now under enquiry is but the continuation of the same trial for the offence for which a charge was originally made. The later decisions of Rangoon High Court are conclusive that the offences concerned in these cases are distinct. The case is thus governed by Section 235 (l) which attracts the provisions of Section 403 (2), Criminal P. C., and a subsequent trial for a district offence is not barred. There is thus no substance in the contention that the present trial is barred.
5. The petition therefore fails and is dismissed.