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G.R. Nanjundaswami Vs. the Mysore State Transport Appellate Tribunal and ors. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectMotor Vehicles
CourtKarnataka High Court
Decided On
Case NumberWrit Petn. No. 803 of 1971
Judge
Reported inAIR1972Kant6; AIR1972Mys6; (1971)2MysLJ315
ActsMotor Vehicles Act, 1939 - Sections 16, 35, 47(3), 57(2) and 64A; Income Tax Act - Sections 33A; Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Rules - Rule 134; Constitution of India - Article 226
AppellantG.R. Nanjundaswami
RespondentThe Mysore State Transport Appellate Tribunal and ors.
Appellant AdvocateM.R. Venkatanarasimhachar, Adv.
Respondent AdvocateK.S. Puttaswamy, ;M. Rangaswamy and ;S.V. Krishnaswamy, Advs.
DispositionPetition dismissed
Excerpt:
.....impugned order was quashed. - .the above view of the supreme court is clearly contrary to the decision of this court in shantanna's case. is 22-1-1970. if computation of time is made from that date, the revision petition filed by the petitioner before the tribunal is clearly barred by time......a person is given a right to resort to a remedy to get rid of an adverse order within a prescribed time limitation should not be computed from a date earlier than that on which the party aggrieved actually knew of the order, or had an opportunity of knowing the order and therefore must be presumed to have had knowledge of the order.'this court, therefore, held that the date of knowledge of the order passed by the r. t. a. was the date on which the period of limitation prescribed under section 64-a of the act would commence to run aa against a party. the above view of this court however according to us now stands impliedly overruled by the decision of the supreme court in municipal board, pushkar v. state transport authority : air1965sc458 . in that case, the supreme court was dealing.....
Judgment:

Venkataramiah, J.

1. In this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has questioned the correctness of an Order passed by the Mysore State Transport Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal).

2. The few facts leading to this writ petition are these: The petitioner is a person who is engaged in the business of running stage carriage services between Kollegal and Nanjangud and on some other routes in the District of Mysore. The Regional Transport Authority, Mysore (hereinafter referred to as the H. T. A.), published a notification calling for representations from interested persons with regard to the fixation of the number of services on the various routes in Mysore District u/s. 47 (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The petitioner was one of the persons who made representations to the R. T. A. stating that there was no need to grant permits for additional stage carriage services on some of the routes. By its resolution dated 22-1-1970 on Special Subject No. 2 of 1969, the R. T. A. fixed the number of permits that could be issued to ply stage carriage services on the various routes within its region. Thereafter the R. T. A. called for applications Under Section 57 (2) of the Act from persons intending to ply stage carriage services on the various routes referred to in its notification dated 26-5-1970 which was published in the Mysore Gazette dated 11-6-1970. According to the petitioner, he had no notice of the resolution passed by the R. T. A. on 22-1-1970 fixing the number of permits that could be issued on the various routes until 23-5-1970. On that day it is stated by the petitioner, he had gone to the Office of the R. T. A. for some other purpose and then came to know about the resolution passed Under Section 47 (3) of the Act on 22-1-1970. Immediately he filed an application for a certified copy of the resolution and the same was made available to him on 1-6-1970. Thereafter, the petitioner who was aggrieved by the resolution of the R. T. A., filed a revision petition under Section 64-A of the Act before the Tribunal on 30-6-1970 in Revision Petition No. 95 of 1970.

3. When the above revision petition came up for hearing before the Tribunal, the question whether the revision petition had been filed in time or not was raised by the Tribunal and it heard the petitioner's counsel on the said question. After hearing the petitioner and some others who were similarly placed, the Tribunal passed a common order which is produced before this Court as Annexure 'B' to the petition. In the course of its order, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that in so far as the case of the petitioner was concerned, the revision petition was out of time holding that the computation of the period of thirty days, which way the prescribed period Under Section 64-A of the Act, had to be made from the date of the resolution of the R. T. A., namely, 22-1-1970. In that view of the matter, the Tribunal dismissed the revision petition filed by the petitioner.

4. Aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal, the Petitioner has approached this Court with this writ petition.

5. Sri. M. R. Venkatanarasimhachar, the learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that the petitioner had no notice of the passing of the resolution dated 22-1-1970 until he went to the office of the R. T. A. on 23-5-1970, and, therefore, it must be held that so far as the petitioner was concerned, 23-5-1970 should be taken as the date on which the period of limitation prescribed under the first proviso to Section 64-A of the Act would run as against him. He further contended that the petitioner haying made the application for a certified copy on the same day, was entitled to the deduction of the period occupied by the preparation and delivery of the certified copy. He, therefore, urged that the revision petition filed by the petitioner on 30-6-1970 was in time if time was calculated from 23-5-1970 and the period occupied by the preparation and delivery of certified copy was deducted therefrom. If as Sri 'Achar contends the period of limitation in this case commenced on 23-5-1970, it may be that the petitioner's revision petition would be in time. It is unnecessary to go into the question whether the petitioner is entitled to the deduction of the period occupied by the preparation and delivery of the certified copy on account of view we are going to take in this case.

6. In support of his contention Sri Achar relied on a decision of this Court in H. M. Shanthanna v. State Transport Authority in Mysore, AIR 1960 Mys 141. It was held by this Court in that case that Under Section 64-A of the Act, the period of limitation for revision petition against the order of the R. T. A. to the State Transport Authority (now to the Tribunal as it obtains in the State of Mysore) began from the date on which the aggrieved party had notice of the order of the R. T. A. and not from the date on which the order was made. This decision no doubt supports the contention of Sri Achar. While coming to the above conclusion, this Court observed as follows:

'The learned counsel for the petitioner has also brought to our notice two decisions, one of the Bombay High Court and another of the Madras High Court dealing with limitation applicable to revisions u/s. 33A of the Income-Tax Act. In the former. : [1959]37ITR264(Bom) . Chagla. C. J. observed that:

'If the Legislature gave the right of revision to the assessee under Section 33A it was an effective right and if the Legislature provided a period of limitation that period must equally be an effective period. When we sav 'effective' what we mean is that the whole period must be permitted to the person affected by the order within which he can prefer the application for revision. The Assessee should know that he has a year's time within which to make up his mind whether he should apply for revision or not.'

In the latter case, Muthiah Chettiar v. Commr. of Income-tax, Madras, 1951-19 ITR 402; (AIR 1951 Mad 2041 Raia-mannar, C. J. pointed out that the rule stated above is based upon salutary and just principle, viz. that if a person is given a right to resort to a remedy to get rid of an adverse order within a prescribed time limitation should not be computed from a date earlier than that on which the party aggrieved actually knew of the order, or had an opportunity of knowing the order and therefore must be presumed to have had knowledge of the order.'

This Court, therefore, held that the date of knowledge of the order passed by the R. T. A. was the date on which the period of limitation prescribed Under Section 64-A of the Act would commence to run aa against a party. The above view of this court however according to us now stands impliedly overruled by the decision of the Supreme Court in Municipal Board, Pushkar v. State Transport Authority : AIR1965SC458 . In that case, the Supreme Court was dealing with a question arising under Section 64-A of the Act. The point for determination was whether a revision petition filed within thirty days from the date on which a notification issued under Rule 134 of the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Rules, was in time or not. The relevant part of the Judgment of the Supreme Court is extracted below:

'we agree therefore that the words 'date of the order' should not be read 'as from the date of knowledge of the order' in the absence of clear indication to that effect. In this connection the learned Attorney-General has drawn our attention to several sections of the Motor Vehicles Act to show that where the Legislature in prescribing the period of limitation intended that time should run from some other date than the date when the order was given. Thus Section 13 in providing for an appeal from an order made refusing or revoking a driving licence says that an aggrieved person may appeal 'within 30 days of the service on him of the order'. Section 16 which provides for an appeal from an order of the licencing authority disqualifying a person from holding a driving licence lays down that an aggrieved person may appeal 'within 30 days of the receipt of the order.' Section 16 which provides for an appeal against certain orders of the Regional Transport Authority says that the aggrieved person may appeal 'within 30 days of the receipt of intimation of such order.' Section 35 which is another section providing for appeal says that the appeal may be made 'within 30 days of the date of the receipt of notice of the order.' There is considerable force therefore in the argument that if the Legislature had intended that an application for revision Under Section 64-A may be made within 30 days from the date of intimation or knowledge of the order to the aggrieved person it would have said so; and in the absence of any such thing the court is bound to hold that the application will be barred unless made within 30 days from the date of the order by which the person is aggrieved. . . '

The above view of the Supreme Court is clearly contrary to the decision of this Court in Shantanna's case. AIR 1960 Mys 141. The date on which an aggrieved party comes to know of the order against which he proposes to file a petition Under Section 64-A of the Act is not relevant at all to determine the time when the period of limitation commences to run against him. The relevant date, according, to the Supreme Court, is the date of the Order itself. In, the instant case, the date of resolution of the R. T. A. is 22-1-1970. If computation of time is made from that date, the revision petition filed by the petitioner before the Tribunal is clearly barred by time.

7. Sri. Achar however relied on another part of the very decision of the Supreme Court in support of his contention, wherein the Supreme Court had come to the conclusion that the relevant date for purpose of calculation of period of limitation was the date on which the notification was issued by the R. T. A., but not an earlier date on which it had taken a decision to issue such a notification. The Supreme Court further observed that it was the making of an effective order which gave rise to the grievance to an aggrieved party to go up in revision before a higher authority. The bus operators concerned in that case felt aggrieved only by the notification by which alone the fixation of the new bus stand and the discontinuance of the old bus stand could be brought about. If that was so, the Supreme Court held, the relevant date was the date of the notification, because that was the relevant order which was liable to be questioned in revision. In the instant case, there is no such requirement that an order passed Under Section 47 (3) of the Act should be published in the form of a notification by the R. T. A. for it to be effective. In the absence of any such requirement, the resolution of the R. T. A. would be effective immediately it is passed. We, therefore, find no substance in the above contention of Sri Achar.

8. In the result, we are of the opinion that the decision of the Tribunal holding that the revision petition filed by the petitioner as barred by time, under Section 64-A of the Act must be upheld. This writ petition, therefore, fails and is dismissed. No costs.


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