D.M. Chandrashekhar, J.
1. This Revision Petition under Section 50 of the Mysore Rent Control Act. 1961, (hereinafter referred to as the Act), is by a tenant against whom a decree for eviction was made by the Munsiff at Bellary and affirmed by the District Judge at Bellary. The petitioner and the respondents will hereinafter be referred to respectively as the tenant and the landlords.
2. The premises are occupied bythe tenant for his residence. Though the landlords sought for eviction of the tenant on three grounds, the decree for eviction has been only on the ground specified in Clause (h) of Sub-section (1) of Section 21, namely, the premises being reasonably and bona fide required by the landlords for their occupation. The landlords claimed that the premises were required to provide additional accommodation for their business of manufacturing ready-made garments.
3. Mr. P. G. C. Chengappa. learned counsel for the petitioner, urged the following contentions in this petition.
(1) There was no valid notice determining the tenancy;
(ii) The landlords had not established that they required the premises reasonably and bona fide for their occupation;
(iii) Greater hardship would be caused to the tenant by granting a decree for eviction than the hardship that might be caused to the landlords by refusing such decree; and
(iv) The decree for eviction could not be made as the landlords had not obtained the permission of the Controller for conviction of the residential building for non-residential use.
4. It is common ground that the landlords had sent on 14-4-1967, by registered post, a notice addressed to the tenant determining the tenancy, that that notice was returned to them with an endorsement that the tenant had 'left the place without intimation' and that subsequently on 5-5-1967, the landlords again sent by registered post another notice which reached the tenant on 17-5-1967. The landlords have alleged that on 5-5-1967 they sent to the tenant, by ordinary post with a certificate of posting a copy of the notice sent by registered post. The certificate of posting has been produced and marked as Ex. P-4.
5. Both the Courts below have held that the notice sent by ordinary post with a certificate of posting, must be presumed to have reached the tenant within a day or two and that such notice was sufficient to determine the tenancy.
6. However, Mr. Changappa contended that a notice sent by ordinary post could not be regarded as one contemplated in Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and that the notice sent by registered post did not reach the tenant 15 clear days before the end of the month of the tenancy and that hence there was no valid notice determining the tenancy.
7. The question whether a notice sent by ordinary post is a valid one, isno longer res integra in view of the decision of this court in Achamma Thomas v. E. R. Fairman. 1969-2 Mys LJ 179 = (AIR 1970 Mys 77). wherein it was held that Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act does not provide that a notice of termination of the tenancy, should be sent by registered post, that such notice can also be sent by ordinary post and that where such notice is sent under a certificate of posting a presumption arises under Section 114 of the Evidence Act that there has been due service of such notice.
8. In the present case, the certificate of posting Ex. P-4, shows that the notice was sent by ordinary post on 5-5-1967. A presumption arises that it must have reached the tenant who was residing in the same place, namely, Bellary City. on the following day or at any rate on 7-5-1967. Even though the notice sent by registered post reached the tenant on 17-5-1967, the notice sent by ordinary post which may be presumed to have reached the tenant on or before 7-5-1967, was sufficient notice to determine the tenancy. Hence, I am unable to accept the contention of Mr. Chengappa that there was no valid notice terminating the tenancy.
9. Mr. Chengappa next urged that the landlords have not produced any satisfactory evidence to prove that they required the premises reasonably and bona fide for their occupation. Besides the evidence of one of the landlords, there is also the evidence of one of their employees. Both of them deposed that in the premises in which the landlords have been carrying on business in ready-made garments, the accommodation was inadequate and that they needed the premises occupied by the tenant to provide additional accommodation to their workmen and to stock their goods. The tenant has not produced any evidence to rebut the evidence adduced by the landlords on this point.
10. However, Mr. Chengappa submitted that the landlords' evidence was self-serving and that the other witness who was their employee, was also an interested witness. On the question whether the landlords require the additional accommodation for their business it is difficult to expect any witness other than that the landlords themselves and their employees to know the conditions of their business and the extent of accommodation needed for that business. Moreover, as pointed out by this court in Wadhva v. Chandrashekhariah, ((1969) 2 Mys LJ 564), in ordinary circumstances when the owner says that he requires his premises for his own use and occupation, the court must start with a presumption that the claim of the requirement of premises by the landlord for his personal use and occupation is true and the mere statement of the tenant that the case of the landlord is false, is not sufficient. Both the courts below have considered the evidence and held that the landlords reasonably and bona fide require the premises for their own occupation. I see no reason to differ from the view taken by the courts below on this point.
11. It was next contended by Mr. Chengappa that greater hardship would be caused to the tenant by granting the decree for eviction than the hardship that might be caused to landlords by the refusal of such decree. The courts below have noticed that the tenant produced no evidence in support of his plea that it was not possible for him to secure alternative accommodation for his residence in Bellary City. It may be, that he would be put to the trouble of finding out an alternative house for his residence and to the inconvenience of shifting his residence from the present place. He may have to pay a higher rent for such alternative accommodation. As pointed out by this court in Malai Kolandai Mudaliar v. Swaminathan. (1970 (1) Mvs LJ 244), such trouble, inconvenience and difficulties are inevitable in practically every case of eviction of a tenant from the premises he has been occupying and on that score the landlord cannot be denied possession of his premises for his own use. where his requirement is reasonable and bona fide.
12. Lastly, it was contended by Mr. Chengappa that the courts below should not have granted a decree for eviction until the landlords had obtained the permission of the Controller to convert the premises for non-residential use. Mr. Chengappa referred to Sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the Act which reads:--
11. Conversion of residential building--. (1) Save as otherwise provided in this Act. no residential building shall be converted into a non-residential building except with the permission in writing .....Controller.'
13. The learned District Judge took the view that where the landlord wants to use for his non-residential purpose, his premises occupied by the tenant for his residence, the landlord obtaining the permission of the Controller under Section 11, is not a condition precedent for granting a decree for eviction and that it is open to the landlord to obtain such permission after obtaining the decree for eviction.
14. Section 21 of the Act does not expressly provide that before making an application for eviction of tenant from residential premises on the ground that such premises are required for non residential use of the landlord, he (the landlord) should obtain permission of the Controller under Section 11. Nor does Section 21 expressly provide that the courts should not pass a decree for eviction in such circumstances unless the landlord has obtained such permission of the Controller. Nor does it follow by necessary implication that obtaining such permission of the Controller, is a condition precedent either for making an application. for eviction or making a decree for eviction. If the landlord obtained such permission of the Controller after a decree for eviction is passed and before he occupied such premises for non-residential purpose, there will in our opinion, be sufficient compliance with the requirement of Section 11. I agree with the view taken by the learned District Judge on this point.
15. All the contentions of the petitioner fail and the petition is dismissed. The tenant is given four months' time from to-day for vacating the premises subject to the conditions that he shall pay to the landlords all arrears of rent and shall continue to pay the rent accruing thereafter. If the tenant does not fulfil such conditions, the landlords shall be at liberty to take out execution of the decree for eviction, even before the expiry of the said period of four months.
16. In the view I have taken, it becomes unnecessary to make anv order on A. I. III filed by the landlords for stopping further proceedings in this revision petition on the ground of the tenant having defaulted in paying the rent during the pendency of his petition.
17. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs in this petition.