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Athni Municipality (by Its President) Vs. Shetteppa Laxman Pattan and ors. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectLabour and Industrial
CourtKarnataka High Court
Decided On
Case NumberWrit Petition Nos. 2177, 2178 and 2179 of 1963
Judge
Reported in(1965)IILLJ307Kant; (1965)1MysLJ749
ActsIndustrial Disputes Act, 1947 - Sections 2, 33C and 33C(2); Minimum Wages Act, 1948 - Sections 2, 13, 13(1), 14, 20, 20(1) and 20(2)
AppellantAthni Municipality (by Its President)
RespondentShetteppa Laxman Pattan and ors.
Excerpt:
- karnataka value added tax act, 2003 [k.a. no. 30/2005] section 35 (1): [d.v.shylendra kumar,j] failure to file periodic return and the tax within the permitted time stipulated under penalty levied under section 72 (1) challenge as to - declaration sought to declare that the provision of sub-section (1) of section 72 of the act is unconstitutional, being violative of articles 14 and 19 of the constitution of india and also beyond the legislative competence of the state legislature to make laws with reference to entry 54 of list ii of the seventh schedule to the constitution - held, when the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 72 of the act are tested on the touchstone of articles 14 and 19 of the constitution of india, it is seen that the provision fails both the tests of.....orderhombe gowda, c.j.1. the president, athni municipality, has, in these three petitions, filed under arts. 226 and 227 of the constitution of india, prayed for the issue of a writ of certiorari for quashing the order dated 25 september, 1963 passed by the authority appointed under the minimum wages act, 1948, for the athni area in miscellaneous applications nos. 3, 4 and 5 of 1961 directing the petitioner to pay wages for the work turned out by the respondents during the weekly holidays or rest days for the years 1955 to 1960. all the three petitions filed by the respondents before the authority appointed under the minimum wages act, 1948, for the athni area were tried and disposed of by a common order dated 25 september, 1963 by agreement of parties. miscellaneous application no. 2 of.....
Judgment:
ORDER

Hombe Gowda, C.J.

1. The President, Athni Municipality, has, in these three petitions, filed under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, prayed for the issue of a writ of certiorari for quashing the order dated 25 September, 1963 passed by the authority appointed under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, for the Athni area in Miscellaneous Applications Nos. 3, 4 and 5 of 1961 directing the petitioner to pay wages for the work turned out by the respondents during the weekly holidays or rest days for the years 1955 to 1960. All the three petitions filed by the respondents before the authority appointed under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, for the Athni area were tried and disposed of by a common order dated 25 September, 1963 by agreement of parties. Miscellaneous Application No. 2 of 1961 was also tried along with these petitions. But the said application was dismissed by the authority and the same has not been challenged by the petitioners in that application. The present petitioner, who was the respondent in Miscellaneous Applications Nos. 3, 4 and 5, has filed these petitions challenging the legality of the order passed by the authority and has prayed for the issue of appropriate writs quashing the same. Since all these petitions are directed against the common order and involved common questions of law, they are heard together and are disposed by this common order.

2. The facts that led to the filing of these writ petitions briefly narrated are as under : The respondents are working in the several departments under the control of the petitioner municipality. They filed three separate applications claiming wages for the work turned out by them during the weekly holidays or rest days from 1 April, 1955 to 4 March, 1961. They had also claimed compensation from the petitioner but during the trial they filed memos abandoning that claim. The applications Nos. 3, 4 and 5 were filed before the authority appointed under the minimum Wages Act, 1948, for Athni area on 4 and 14 March, 1961 respectively. These applications were admittedly filed beyond six months from the date on with the minimum wages or other amount became payable to the applicants. Hence the respondents filed separate applications for condonation of the delay and admitting their petitions, setting out the cause for not making the applications within the period prescribed under the proviso to S. 20(2) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. The authority issued notices to the present petitioner to show cause why the applications filed by the workmen for condonation of the delay should not be allowed and their applications registered and posted for trial. The petitioner appeared before the authority and filed his objections and after hearing the petitioner and also the workmen the authority allowed the applications filed by the workmen for condonation of the delay in presenting the applications on the ground that they had shown sufficient grounds for not making the applications within the period prescribed under the Act. The authority passed an order on 24 September, 1961. Against the said order the petitioner preferred Writ Petition No. 125 of 1962 and three other writ petitions to this Court for quashing the order. This Court dismissed those three petitions at the stage of admission. Thereafter Miscellaneous Applications Nos. 3, 4 and 5 of 1961 were clubbed together at the request of the parties and common evidence was recorded in all the cases. The authority appointed under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, for the Athni area, as already stated, accepted the claim of the workmen for wages for the work turned out by them during the weekly holidays or days of rest and fixed the wages at overtime rate by its order dated 25 September, 1963. Being aggrieved by this order the petitioner has filed these three writ petitions. It is not disputed that the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act, 1946, are made applicable to the Athni Municipality and that the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Athni, is the authority appointed under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, for the Athni area. It is not also disputed that the respondents were all workmen employed by the petitioner and were working in the several departments under its control at the appropriate time. But two of them had ceased to be under the employment of the petitioner on the date on which the applications for payment of the wages for the work done by them during weekly holidays or days of rest are filed. The appointed authority has held that the petitioner had not given any weekly holidays or days of rest for the respondents during the relevant period and had extracted work from these employees during the relevant period. The authority rejected the contention of the petitioner that the application filed by the workmen claiming wages for the work turned out by them during weekly holidays or days of rest at the rate not less than overtime rate was not maintainable, It also rejected the contention of the petitioner that the salary paid to the respondents who are monthly rated staff, included in it the wages for the weekly holidays also and as such they are not entitled to claim any wages at a rate not less than the overtime rate. On the basis of these findings the authority calculated the amount due to the several applications (respondents), and it calculated the amounts due to the applicants (respondents) on the basis of the rates shown in the schedule to the notification No. 146/48-1, dated 30 October, 1937, issued by the appropriate authority and directed the petitioner to pay the said amounts to the respondents. The authority directed the parties to bear their own costs. Sri Srinivasa Ayyar, learned counsel who argued these petitions for the petitioner before us, raised the following contentions :

(1) That the claim of the respondents for wages for work done on weekly holidays or rest days is untenable under S. 20 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. The authority had no jurisdiction to direct wages being paid for the work turned out by the respondents on weekly holidays or rest days under S. 20 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948.

(2) Even if the authority had such a power to decide the claims of the respondents in respect of the remuneration for the days of rest, it could only award such wages only from 17 September, 1957, the date on which S. 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, was amended by Act 30 of 1957 by inserting the words

'or in respect of the payment of remuneration for the days of rest or for the work done on such days under Cls. (b) and (c) to Sub-section (1) of S. 13 or of wages at the overtime rate under S. 14.' (3) The claim of the respondents for wages in respect of the payment of remuneration for days of rest or work done during days of rest was barred by limitation inasmuch as they had not presented their applications within six months from the date on which such wages became payable to them and that the authority was entirely wrong in condoning the inordinate delay in presenting the claim application and that the authority has not exercised the discretion vested in it under the province to S. 20(2) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, in condoning the delays.

(4) Since the State has not prescribed any wages for overtime work turned out on days of rest by any rule under the authority conferred under S. 13(1)(c) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, the authority had no right to award remuneration for days of rest to the respondents. In other words, the claim of the respondents for remuneration for days of rest in the absence of any rule prescribing the rate at which they had to be paid for the work turned out by them on days of rest is untenable.

(5) The calculations made by the authority are wrong.

(6) The authority erred gravely in considering the claims of two of the respondents who were not in the employment of the petitioner on the date on which the application for remuneration for days of rest or for work done on such days were presented on behalf of the workmen before the authority. In other words, it is urged that it is only those persons that were in the employment of the petitioner on the date on which the applications under S. 20 of the Minimum Wages Act were filed before the authority that are entitled to claim wages for days of rest or compensation for the work done on such days under S. 20 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, and the claim of the employees who had ceased to be in employment was liable to be rejected.

3. Before we proceed to consider the several contentions raised by Sri. K. S. Srinivasa Ayyar, we feel that it is necessary to set out the necessary provisions of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. Section 20 of the Act reads as follows :

'20. (1) The appropriate Government may, by notification in the official gazette, appoint (any Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation or any officer of the Central Government exercising functions as a Labour Commissioner for any region, or any officer of the State Government not below the rank of Labour Commissioner or any) other officer with experience as a Judge of a civil Court or as a stipendiary magistrate to be the authority to hear and decide for any specified area all claims arising out of payment of less than the minimum rates of wages (or in respect of the payment of remuneration for days of rest or for work done on such days under Cls. (b) or (c), Sub-section (1), of S. 13 or of wages at the overtime rate under S. 14) to employees employed or paid in that area.

(2) When an employee has any claim of the nature referred to in Sub-section (1), the employee himself or any legal practitioner or any official of a registered trade union authorised in writing to act on his behalf or any inspector or any person acting with the permission of the authority appointed under Sub-section (1) may apply to such authority for a direction under Sub-section (3). Provided that every such application shall be presented within six months from the date on which the minimum wages (or other amount) became payable :

Provided further that any application may be admitted after the said period of six months when the applicant satisfies the authority that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period. (3) When any application under Sub-section (2) is entertained, the authority shall hear the applicant and the employer or give them an opportunity of being heard and after such further inquiry, if any, as it may consider necessary, may, without prejudice to any other penalty to which the employer may be liable under this Act, direct ...'

The other sub-sections are not necessary for our purpose. Section 13 of the Act reads as follows :

'13. (1) In regard to any scheduled employment minimum rates of wages in respect of which have been fixed under this Act, the appropriate Government may -

(a) fix the number of hours of work which shall constitute a normal working day, inclusive of one or more specified intervals;

(b) provide for a day of rest in every period of seven days which shall be allowed to all employees or to any species class of employees and for the payment of remuneration in respect of such days of rest;

(c) provide for payment for work on a day of rest at a rate not less than the overtime rate'.

(The rest of the section is not necessary for four purpose)

4. As already stated, it is undisputed that the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, are made applicable to Athni Municipality. It is also undisputed that the respondents were in the employment of the petitioner during the period for which they advanced their claims for the remuneration for the work done by them during the weekly holidays or days of rest. The rules framed by the Bombay Government under the Minimum Wages Act merely provided for the day of rest, and no provision in them is made as regards the rate of wages payable to the employees who had made to work on the day of rest. The rules framed by the Government of Mysore under the Minimum Wages Act which came into force on 14 May, 1959 have not also fixed any rate of wages payable to the employees who work on the day of rest. It was, therefore, contended, for the petition that under S. 20 of the Minimum Wages Act the authority had no jurisdiction to hear and decide the claim for remuneration for the work turned out by the employees on weekly holidays or rest days. Sri Srinivasa Ayyar sought to derive support for his contention from the fact that S. 20 of the Act was amended by Act 30 in the year 1957 by specifically conferring jurisdiction on the authority to hear and decide all claims arising out of payment of remuneration for days of rest or for work done on such days under Clause (b) or (c) of Sub-section (1) of S. 13 or of wages at the overtime rate under S. 14. At one stage of his arguments Sri Srinivasa Ayyar contended that so long as there is no rule framed by the State Government prescribing the rate of wages payable to an employee who is made to work on a holiday, the workman is not at all entitled to claim any wages for the work turned out by him on weekly holidays or rest days. In other words, he contended that if an employee is made to work on a weekly holiday or on a day of rest, he is not at all entitled to claim any remuneration as there is no rule framed prescribing the rate of wages to be paid to him for such work. When we pointed out to him that S. 13 of the Act which provided for a weekly holiday or a day of rest and had also prescribed a minimum wage payable for a day of work, he abandoned that line of argument. But he strenuously contended that under S. 20 of the Act the authority had no right to decide the dispute relating to the payment of remuneration for the days of rest. The clear wordings of S. 20 of the Act quoted above make it abundantly clear that this contention is untenable.

5. The authority has, under S. 20 as it stood before amendment, power to decide all claims arising out of payment of less than the minimum rates of wages to employees employed by the petitioner. We have, therefore, no hesitation to reject the first contention of Sri Srinivasa Ayyar. Similarly we feel that there is no substance in the second contention of Sri Srinivasa Ayyar that the respondents became (sic) to claim remuneration for the work turned out by them on weekly holidays or days of rest only from the year 1957, that is, after S. 20 of the Act was amended by Act 30 of 1957 by inserting it in the words

'decide the dispute in respect of the payment of remuneration for the days of rest or for the work done on such days under Cls. (b) and (c) to Sub-section (1) of S. 13 or of wages at the overtime rate under S. 14.'

That this argument is without substance is clear from the decision of the Bombay High Court in Bahadursingh Birsing and others V. C. P. Fernandez and others (1956 - I L.L.J. 563), which was rendered even before the amendment. An argument similar to the one that is advanced before us to the effect that in the absence of any specific power conferred on the authority under S. 20 of the Act the employees were not entitled to claim any wages for the work turned out by them on weekly holidays or days of rest was negatived by their lordships and their lordships held that S. 20 in terms authorized the arising out of payment of less than the minimum rates of wages to employee, and in exercise of that jurisdiction the authority is also entitled to decide whether the applicant has worked overtime and also to decide the overtime rate fixed under the Act or under any other low for the time being in force and to award the higher rate.

6. The following observations of their lordships make it clear that the contention of Sri Srinivas Ayyar is untenable :

'Sub-section (3), S. contemplates an inquiry to be made wherein opportunity is to be given to the parties likely to be affected by the order of being heard. If the only thing which the authority appointed under the Minimum Wages Act is required to do is ascertain the minimum rate fixed for a normal working day, it is difficult to appreciate why the legislature should have provided for appointment of an officer which judicial experience and should have made provision for a formal inquiry and for an opportunity of being heard to persons likely to be affected thereby.

Evidently the minimum rate of wages for normal working hours must be fixed by the Government under the rules with regard to each scheduled employment and if the view which has appealed to the authority is correct, the authority would merely have to look at the rules to find out the amount payable to the employee who makes an application under S. 20 and to direct payment thereof.

But there appears to be no warrant for assuming that the jurisdiction conferred by S. 20 to hear and decide all claims arising out of payment of less than the minimum rates of wages is intended notwithstanding the amplitude of the words used to be so circumscribed that the authority has in exercise of that jurisdiction merely to find out of the amount prescribed by the rules in respect of a scheduled employment and to direct payment thereof.

Section 20 in terms authorizes the authority to hear and decide all claims arising out of payment of less than the minimum rate of wages to employees employed or paid in the area in which he functions. The authority has in our view jurisdiction to decide to which class of scheduled employment the applicant belongs, what are the minimum rate prescribed for that employment, which minimum rate applies to him, whether payment has been made of less than the minimum rates and whether the employer was justified in not making payment at the rate demanded by the employee. In exercise of that jurisdiction the authority is also entitled to decide whether the applicant has worked overtime and to decide the overtime rate fixed under the Act or under any other low of the appropriate Government for the time being in force and to award the higher rate. Acceptance of the view which has appealed to the authority involves the assumption that the legislature authorized the appropriate Government to prescribe overtime rates under the Act or under any other low in force and imposed an obligation upon the employer to make payment accordingly and then failed to provide machinery for recovery if the employer defaulted in honouring his obligation. In view of the scheme of the Act and the amplitude of the jurisdiction such an assumption cannot be made.'

7. In Associated Cement Companies, Ltd., Madukkarai Cement Works, Madukkarai v. Labour Inspector (Central), Coimbatore, and another [1960 - I L.L.J. 192]. Rajgopala Ayyangar, J. (as he then was), rejected the contention that the authority had no jurisdiction to decide matters arising out of payment of wages less than the minimum wages to an employee under S. 20(1) of the Act if it related to a period prior to Central Act 30 of 1957. His lordship observed as follows;

'Two points were urged by Sri Nambiar, the learned counsel for the petitioner, in support of the petition. The first was that the period in regard to which there was a complaint of failure to pay wages covered March, 1956 to June, 1956 and that the authority constituted under S. 20 the Minimum Wages Act had, on the low as it is stood on those dates, no jurisdiction to make a direction in regard to the wages for weekly holidays. Section 20 as it was originally enacted in 1948 vested 'the authority' with jurisdiction to hear and decide matters arising out of the 'payment of wages less than the minimum rates of wages to employees employed or paid in that area' [S. 20(1)]. This subsection was amended by Central Act X X of 957 (which received the assent of the President on 17 September, 1957) by the introduction of the words

'or in respect of the payment of remuneration for days of rest or for work done on such days under Clause (b) or wages at the overtime rate under S. 14'.

Even the petition filed by the labour inspector was before the date of this amendment. This question that was raised before the tribunal was whether the tribunal had any jurisdiction to entertain an application relating to a failure to make a payment in respect of remuneration for days of rest before the amendment came into force and that since on the date covered by the complaint as also the date when the petition was filed the amendment had not come into force, the tribunal could only exercise the powers under the unamended S. 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act. The tribunal overruled this objection by stating that the amendment was declaratory and was therefore retrospective.

8. The learned counsel for the petitioner urged that this reasoning was unsound and that the tribunal had assumed jurisdiction on the erroneous interpretation of the statute. The decision on this point would primarily depend upon the meaning of the expression 'wages' occurring in Sub-section (1) of S. 20. It is coming ground that the tribunal had jurisdiction to entertain claims where payment was made at less than the 'minimum wage' If 'wages' included the remuneration payable for days of rest, the jurisdiction of the authority under S. 20(1) would naturally extend to entertain a claim as regards that species of remuneration.

'Wages' are defined in the Act by S. 2(h) to mean

'all remuneration capable of being expressed in terms of money which would, if the terms of the contract of employment express or implied, were fulfilled, be payable to a person employed in respect of this employment or of work done in such employment'.

This is followed by certain items which are not to be treated as wages and the payment of remuneration in respect of days of rest is not one of the items so excluded. Section 13 of the Act enables the appropriate Government to provide for a day of rest in every period of seven days which shall be allowed to all employees or to any specified class of employees and for the payment of remuneration in respect of such days of rest; as also to provide for payment for work for a day of rest at a rate not less than the overtime rate.

9. The payment of remuneration for a day of rest would, therefore, be 'wages payable to a person employed in respect of his employment' within the definition of S. 2(h). If such a payment constituted remuneration and therefore wages, it appears to me that even on S. 20(1) as it originally stood a payment for a day of rest would fall within the scope of S. 20(1) of the Act. In this view the interpretation placed by the tribunal on the purpose of the amendment effected to S. 20(1) by Central Act XXX of 1957 would appear to be well-founded'.

10. We are in respectful agreement with the above observations. The two contentions of Sri Srinivasa Ayyar, learned counsel for the petitioner, should, therefore, be rejected.

11. The next contention to the question of limitation. It is strenuously urged by Sri Srinivasa Ayyar, learned counsel for the petitioner that the learned authority erred gravely in condoning the inordinate delay in presenting the petitions. As already stated, the Miscellaneous Petitions Nos. 3, 4 and 5 were presented to the authority on 4 and 14 March, 1961 respectively. Admittedly these petitions were all clearly out of time as they included in them claim for wages for the work turned out by the respondents on weekly holidays or rest days from the year 1954 onwards. The workmen filed separate applications for condonation of the delay setting out the ground for the delay. The authority issued notices to the petitioner to show cause as to why the petitions for condonation of the delay should not be allowed and the petitions entertained and disposed of on merits. The petitioner filed his objections and also addressed arguments opposing the condonation. The main ground of attack was that the workmen had failed to show sufficient cause for the condonation of the inordinate delay in presenting the petitions. The tribunal, in an exhaustive order passed on 25 September, 1963 condoned the delay. Sri Srinivasa Ayyar took us through the order passed by the tribunal in this regard and he was unable to convince us that the authority has not exercised its discretion properly in condoning the delay. Several acts of commission and omission on the part of the petitioner to which a detailed reference has been made in the course of the order make it clear that the authority was perfectly justified in allowing the petitions filed by the respondents for condoning the delay and admitting the petitions. The petitioner as already stated, filed, three separate petitions for quashing the order passed by the tribunal condoning the delay in presenting these petitions. This court rejected those petitions at the time of admission. In these circumstance, we are of the opinion that the contention of Sri Srinivasa Ayyar, learned counsel for the petitioner, that the authority has not exercised its discretion properly in allowing the petitions filed by the respondents for condonation of the delay is untenable and should be rejected.

12. The next contention urged by Sri Srinivasa Ayyar, learned counsel for the petitioner, is that so long as the state has not prescribed the rate of wages payable for work turned out by workmen on a weekly holiday or rest day under the authority conferred on it under S. 13(c) of the Act, the respondents were not entitled to claim any remuneration. At one stage it was urged that the respondents were not entitled to claim any remuneration for the work turned out by them on a weekly holiday or rest day as they belonged to monthly rated staff and the salary paid to them included in it the wages for the holiday also. There is no substance in any one of the contentions. It is no doubt true that the state has not prescribed the rate of wages payable to workmen for the work done by them on a weekly holiday or rest day. But S. 13(1)(c) prescribes a minimum wage payable for such work when it provides that it should be at a rate not less than the overtime rate. It is on the basis of this provision that the authority has ordered that the petitioner should pay wages for the respondents for the work turned out by them on a day of rest at the overtime rate. Hence this contention should fail. As regards the fifth contention, Sri Srinivasa Ayyar, learned counsel for the petitioner was unable to demonstrate, how the calculations made by the authority are wrong. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the calculations were ( ?) made by the authority on the basis of the memorandum of calculations filed by the pleaders appearing for the parties and they were scrutinized before they were incorporated in the order. At any rate, there is no basis to hold that the calculations made by the authority as found in the order are wrong.

13. It was lastly contended by Sri Srinivasa Ayyar, learned counsel for the petitioner, that the order passed by the authority directing the petitioner to pay wages at the overtime rate for the work turned out by the workmen who were not in the employment of the petitioner on the date of the presentation of the petition is untenable and is without jurisdiction and is liable to be quashed. He strongly relied upon a decision of Justice Sri Balakrishna Ayyar in Wakefield Estate by proprietor, Hitachi Gowder v. P. L. Perumal, President, Neelamali plantation Workers' Union [1959 - I L.L.J. 397], wherein his lordship has held that the word 'employee' as defined in S. 2(1) of the Minimum Wages Act meant a person who is 'employed' and it does not include past employees, and that the summary remedy provided by S. 20 of the Minimum Wages Act cannot be availed of by past employees. This view was not accepted by Ramchandra Ayyar, J. (as he then was), in Murugan Transports Cuddalore v. P. Rathakrishnan and others (1961 - I L.L.J. 283). His lordship held that S. 20 was intended to give a summary remedy to any person who having been an employee complains that he had not been paid the minimum wage and having regard to the context and the objects of the Act, a discharged employee must be held to be an employee within the provisions of S. 20 and a claim by such an employee under S. 20(2) would be cognizable by the authority under S. 20(1) of the Act. In rejecting a contention similar to the one that was put forward before us, his lordship observed as follows :

'Recently I had to consider a similar question in Tiruchi Srirangam Transport Company (Private), Ltd. v. Labour Court, Madurai, and another - Writ Petition No. 658 of 1959 (1961 - I L.L.J. 729), a case arising under S. 33C of the Industrial Disputes Act. There was a claim by a discharged worker. It was contended that the claim being not an industrial dispute, the definition of the term 'workman' contained in S. 2 of that Act contemplated only a workman in actual employment and that a discharged workman could not apply to the labour court under the provisions of S. 33C(2).

I held that although the definition of the term 'workman', if strictly construed, would only cover a case of a person in actual employment, the claim of a discharged worker could be entertained under S. 33C(2). I am therefore unable, though with regret, to agree with the view of Balakrishna Ayyar, J., in 1959 - I L.L.J. 397. In my opinion, a claim under S. 20(2) of the Minimum Wages Act by a discharged worker would be cognizable by the authority under Sub-section (1) of that provision.'

We are in respectful agreement with the view expressed by Ramchandra Ayyar, J. (as he then was). Accordingly we reject this contention of Sri Srinivasa Ayyar, learned counsel for the petitioner.

No other point was pressed before us.

14. In the result, therefore, for the reasons stated above, these petitions should fail and are accordingly dismissed with costs. We allow only one set of costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 200.


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