1. This appeal arises from a suit filed by the appellant under Section 77 of the Registration Act for a decree directing the registration of a document purporting to be a sale deed in favour of the appellant. Various questions arose for consideration, but the learned Munsif dismissed the suit on the ground that it had been filed beyond 30 days from the date of the order of the District Registrar refusing registration.
The Civil Judge, Hassan, has confirmed the decision on the same ground as also on the ground that the appeal preferred by the plaintiff (appellant) before the District Registrar was not an appeal filed in accordance with law arid was itself barred by limitation. In this matter he took a view contrary to that of the learned Munsif. He has, however, vouchsafed no reasons in support of his view.
As regards the suit itself it is seen that the order of the District Registrar refusing registration purports to have been made on 13-8-1956. The suit was filed on 15-9-1956. The plaintiff's contention was that the endorsement issued by the District Registrar intimating his refusal to register the document reached the appellant's advocate on 16-8-1956, and the suit having been filed within 30 days from that date it was in time.
2. The learned Advocate for the appellant relies upon the decisions reported in Thammayya v. Surappa, 22 Mys CCR 39. The brief judgment in that case states:
'As there is nothing to show that the District Registrar pronounced the order in open court after the notice to the party of such date, the date of communication of the order to the opponent must be taken as the date of announcement of his order and the Munsiff's order supported by Abdul Ali v. Mirja Khan, ILR 28 Bom 8, is therefore correct.'
The Bombay case referred to in that decision lays down that
'An order does not become an order unless and until steps are taken by the Officer passing it to bring it to the consciousness and knowledge of the party against whom it is passed. If the party affected by the order acts in such a way as to prevent the officer from communicating it to him within reasonable time after he has written it, it may he that the date of the order would be the date when it could have been brought to the knowledge of the party within a reasonable period ..... We think that the words 'themaking of an order' must mean not merely recording it in writing, but communicating it to the party concerned so as to bind him by it.'
3. The learned Advocate for the appellant has also relied upon a case reported in Swaminathan v. Lakashmanan Chettiar AIR 1930 Mad 490. It is observed by Venkatasubba Rao J., in that decision:
'Apart from authority it seems to me that there could be no valid order unless it is made after notice to the parties affected by it, or, it is communicated to them in the absence of such notice. To take a contrary view seems opposed to reason and principle ..... The essenceof the rule is that the decision should be passed in such circumstances that the parties should have reasonable notice of it. If when a petition is presented or a case is heard, the order is then and there made in the presence of the parties, no further question arises; if the making of the order is postponed, the parties should be given notice-of the adjourned date, so that they may be present and hear the decision when passed. If, in these two cases, the party owing to his own fault, does not become aware of the order, it nevertheless takes effect at once. If an order is made without previous notice it does not become operative until it is communicated, These, in my opinion, are rules which are in conformity with justice and common sense.'
4. It will be noticed that in none of the three cases referred to is it laid down without qualification that the order becomes effective only when it is communicated to the party concerned, If the party had notice of the date when the order was to be made or pronounced and he fails to acquaint himself with the order on that date he cannot still say that he is entitled to regard the date on which he received the communication informing him of the order or the date on which he came to know of the order as the date on which the order became effective.
5. In the present case the order sheet of the proceedings before the District Registrar shows that the case had been posted to 23-7-1956 for orders and that as the order was not ready on that date the case was adjourned to 13-8-1956 on which date the order was made. That the District Registrar also added that an intimation of the order should be sent to the party docs not take away the fact that the appellant had previous notice of the date on which the order would be made and was actually made. The courts below were therefore right in holding that the period of 30 days had to be reckoned from 13-8-1956 and that as the suit was filed beyond 30 days it was barred.
6. There is therefore no reason to admit this second appeal and it is accordingly rejected.
7. Appeal dismissed.