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Tata Keshavaiah Setty Vs. M. Ramayya Setty and ors. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectArbitration
CourtKarnataka High Court
Decided On
Case NumberCivil Revn. Petn. No. 1044 of 1968
Judge
Reported in(1969)2MysLJ94
ActsArbitration Act - Sections 14(2); Arbitration Act, 1940; Indian Limitation (Amendment) Act, 1963 - Article 119
AppellantTata Keshavaiah Setty
RespondentM. Ramayya Setty and ors.
Excerpt:
- code of civil procedure, 1908. section 100: [d.v. shylendra kumar, j] substantial question of law - regular second appeal suit for recovery of possession acceptance of report of court commissioner that there was no encroachment by the defendant into property of the plaintiff judgment and decree appealed against held, substantial question of law should be with reference to the legal position as emerges from the judgments and decrees of courts below for admitting an appeal under section100 c.p.c., the question of law which is vague, general in nature and not with reference to the particular case cannot be considered as substantial question of law. on facts, held, the question of law as framed at the time of admission does not necessarily indicate as to what aspect of legal..........to be read with article 119(a) which reads:third division-applicationdescription of application. period of limitation. time from which period begins to run. part i. application in specified cases. ** ** ** ** 119. under the arbitration act 1940 (10 of 1940) for the filing in court of an award. thirty days the date of service of the notice of the making of the award. ** ** ** ** the language of this part of art. 119 makes it clear that the period of limitation which it prescribes does not govern the production of an award by the arbitrator or the umpire as the case may be but governs only an application made to the court by a person other than the arbitrator or the umpire for a direction that the arbitrator or the umpire should produce the award. but, the production of the award by the.....
Judgment:
ORDER

1. In respect of a controversy between the members of a Hindu Joint Family who submitted their disputes to the arbitrators appointed by them so that they might make an award, an award was made on April 18, 1964, and respondent 9 in this revision petition instituted a suit in the court of the Civil Judge Tumkur in Original Suit No. 40 of 1964 for the enforcement of the award. But he withdrew from that suit, the umpire produced the copy of the award before the Civil Judge on June 15, 1966 under Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act. The copy was produced since the original award had already been produced in Original Suit No. 40 of 1964 when a summons had been issued by the court for the production of the original award at the instance of respondent 9 in this revision petition.

2. In the proceedings which commenced with the production of the copy of the award by the umpire a contention was raised by the petitioner in this revision petition that the production of the copy of the award by the umpire as late as on June 15, 1966, was affected Article 119(a) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 which prescribes a period of thirty days for 'application for the filling in court of an award' under the Arbitration Act of 1940.

3. The view taken by the Civil Judge who overrules the plea of limitation was that that Article of the Limitation Act was applicable only to an application by a person for a direction that the arbitrators should produce the award in court and that it did not control the production of the award by the arbitrators themselves.

4. In this revision petition Mr. Lakshminarayana Rao appearing for the petitioner contends that that view taken by the Civil Judge does not fit into the language of Article 119(a) of the Limitation Act, 1963. It was maintained by him that even an arbitrator who wishes to produce his award in court under Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act must do so within the period of thirty days prescribed by Article 119(a) and that the production of the copy by the umpire after the expiry of that period of thirty days was not permissible.

5. I do not agree.

6. Article 119(a) governs only an application by a person who seeks the direction of the court under Section 14(2) that the arbitrators or the umpire as the case may be should produce the award in court. That that is so is clear from the words 'Application in specified cases' appearing on the top of Part I of the Third Division of the Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 which have to be read with Article 119(a) which reads:

THIRD DIVISION-APPLICATION

Description of Application. Period of Limitation. Time from which period begins to run.

PART I. APPLICATION IN SPECIFIED CASES.

** ** ** ** 119. Under the Arbitration Act 1940 (10 of 1940) for the filing in Court of an award. Thirty days The date of service of the notice of the making of the award. ** ** ** **

The language of this part of Art. 119 makes it clear that the period of limitation which it prescribes does not govern the production of an award by the arbitrator or the umpire as the case may be but governs only an application made to the court by a person other than the arbitrator or the umpire for a direction that the arbitrator or the umpire should produce the award. But, the production of the award by the arbitrator or the umpire as the case may be is not within that Article of the Limitation Act and there is no period of limitation prescribed by the Act for such production.

7. The view that I take received support from the decision of the High Court of Patna in Mohd. Hasan v. Mohd. Anwar, : AIR1968Pat82 with the enunciation made in which I respectfully agree.

8. But Mr. Lakshminarayana Rao maintained that the provisions of Article 119 became applicable by reason of the fact that, as stated by the umpire, he produced the award at the instance of the parties. The fact that he did so does not in my opinion make any difference so long as the production was by the umpire and there was no application by the parties to the submission that he should be called upon to produce the award in court.

9. I dismiss this revision petition. The costs of this revision petition will be costs in the cause and will abide the eventual result.

10. Petition dismissed.


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