1. The petitioner in all these Writ Petitions is the Mysore State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation). These writ petitions are directed against several orders of the Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal), allowing the appeals filed by Respondent-1 in each of these Writ Petitions against the orders of the Mysore State Transport Authority (hereinafter referred to as M. S. T. A.) renewing the permits to ply the stage carriages concerned, under Section 58 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, for a period of 3 years only, even though the first respondent in each of these petitions had applied for renewal of such permits for a period of 5 years.
2. The ground on which the Corporation has filed these Writ Petitions is that no appeal was maintainable against the orders of M. S. T. A. renewing a permit, even though the period specified in each case was 3 years as against the period of 5 years prayed for by respondent-1 in each case, in view of the language of Section 64 (e) of Motor Vehicles Act. The relevant part of Section 64 reads as follows:--
'64. Any person.....
(a) xxx(b) xxxxxx(d xxx (e) aggrieved by the refusal of renewal of a permit, or
(i)xxx(g) xxx(h) xxx(i) x x x may. within the prescribed time andIn the prescribed manner, appeal to theprescribed authority who shall give suchperson and the original authority anopportunity of being heard.'The prescribed Appellate Authority tohear appeals filed under Section 64against the order of M. S. T. A. is theTribunal. It may be mentioned here thatthe M. S. T. A. is empowered to exercisethe power of a regional transport authority in respect of grant or renewal ofstage carriage permits when the routesin question are inter-State routes. In allthese cases, we are concerned with interstate routes. In W. P- No. 2240/70, however, the order renewing the permit wasgranted by the Regional Transport Authority (hereinafter referred to as the R.T. A.) since it had the jurisdiction togrant such renewal at the relevant pointof time even though the route in questionwas an inter-State route. Against theorder of renewal granted by the R. T. A.the first respondent preferred an appealbefore the State Transport AppellateTribunal which dismissed it. Againstthat appellate order the first respondentfiled an appeal under Section 64 (2) ofthe Act before the Tribunal in respect ofthe identical question, namely the periodfor which the renewal had been granted.The question for consideration in W. P.2240/70 is also therefore one arising underSection 64 of the Act which is extractedabove. Since all these petitions havegiven rise to common questions of law,we have heard all of them together andare disposing of them by this commonorder. Sri C. S. Shanthamallappa hastaken notice on behalf of Sri BarikullaKhan who is impleaded as respondent inW. Ps. 2102 and 4872 of 1970.
3. Sri Appa Rao, learned counsel for the Corporation, the petitioner herein, argued that on a true construction of Clause (e) of Section 64 of the Act. it would not be possible to hold that an appeal lay to the prescribed appellate authority against an order granting a renewal of a permit even though a modification had been made by the authority granting such renewal with regard to the period during which the said permit had to be in force after such renewal, A reading of Section 64 of Motor Vehicles Act would show that the right to prefer an appeal against an order or resolution of a R. T. A. is not granted to the parties in an unqualified way. In every one of the Clauses (a) to (h) the right of appeal of a party is hedged in by limitations and unless a party is able to show that his case falls specifically under any one of them, he would not be entitled to maintain an appeal against an order of the R. T. A. or the M. S. T. A. In this case we are concerned with the meaning of the expression 'aggrieved by the refusal of renewal of a permit' which occurs in Clause (e) of Section 64. It is argued by the contesting respondents --grantees of permits--that when on an application made for the renewal of a permit for a period of 5 years, the renewal is granted by the concerned authority for a period of less than 5 years, it should be deemed that to the extent to which the authority reduced the period from 5 years, there was a refusal of renewal, if it is so construed according to the grantees of permits, their appeals were maintainable before the Tribunal. In order to appreciate the rival contentions of the parties, it may be necessary to refer to certain other provisions of the Act where the expression 'refusal of a permit' has been used. Section 48 (1) deals with the power of the R. T. A. to grant a stage carriage permit on an application made to it under Section 46. Section 48 (1) reads:--
'48 (1). Subject to the provisions of Section 47, a Regional Transport Authority may, on an application made to it under Section 46. grant a stage carriage permit in accordance with the application or with such modifications as it deems fit or refuse to grant such a permit:
Provided that no such permit shall be granted in respect of any route or area not specified in the application.' Section 51 (1) reads as follows:
'Subject to the provisions of Section 50. a Regional Transport Authority may. on an application made to it under Section 49. grant a contract carriage permit in accordance with the application or with such modifications as it deems fit or refuse to grant such a permit;
Provided that no such permit shall be granted in respect of any area not specified in the application.' Section 56 (1) reads as follows:--
'Subject to the provisions of Section 55. a Regional Transport Authority may, on an application made to it under Section 54, grant a public carrier's permit in accordance with the application or with such modifications as it deems fit or refuse to grant such a permit;
Provided that no such permit shall be granted in respect of any area or route not specified in the application.' From the three provisions of the Act extracted above, it would be clear that either the grant of the permit in accordance with an application or the grant of a permit with such modifications, as the! authority may deem fit, would not come within the scope of expression refusal to grant such a permit. We have, therefore, to examine in these cases whether what has been done by the R. T. A. or the M. S. T. A. is one of granting a renewal with modifications or of refusal to grant the renewal.
4. The duration of the permit which has to be mentioned in accordance with Section 58 of the Act is not a condition of a permit. It does not fall either under Sub-section (3) of Section 48 or under Section 59 of the Act. This question has been dealt with by the Supreme Court in its decision in Maharashtra State Road Transport Corpn. v. Balwant Regular Motor Service, Amravati, : 1SCR808 . In that case, the question for consideration before the Supreme Court was whether when the R. T. A. had granted a permit on an application made to it for a'period of 5 years without specifying the period during which the permit had to be in force the order was a valid one. The court held that it should be assumed that the permit had been granted without any modification and it should be deemed that the permit had been granted for 5 years as per the application of the applicant. In para 8 of the said judgment, this is what the Supreme Court observed:
'It is true that Section 58 (1) (a) provides that the duration of the permit should be not less than three years and not more than five years as the R. T. A. may specify in the permit. But there is nothing in Section 48 (1) of the Act which states that the R. T. A. is required to specify expressly in the order of the grant of the permit as to for what period the permit is to be effective. It is manifest, however, in the present case that the period of validity of the permit should be deemed to be five years because the order of the R. T. A. should be construed as an order of grant of a stage carriage permit in accordance with the application under Section 48 (1) of the Act. In other words, the order of the R. T. A. dated May 10, 1965 should be construed in the context of the language of Section 48 (1) of the Act which empowers the R. T. A. to grant a stage carriage permit 'in accordance with the application' or 'with such modifications as it deems fit or to refuse to grant such a permit'. In the present case, the R. T. A. did not make any modification and it must therefore be deemed that the grant of the permit was made in accordance with the an application of the appellant which expressly derives the period of validity of the permit applied for to be of five years (See the application of the appellant printed at page 205 of Vol. II of the Paper book). 5. It is clear from the observations of the Supreme Court extracted above
that when an application for a permit is granted for a period less than the period for which the application had been made, the order would be one of grant of a permit with modification. Whatever applies to the grant of a permit, applies to renewal of a permit also in view of Sub-section (2) of Section 58 of the Act. We are, therefore, of the opinion that in the present cases what was done by the M.S.T.A. or the R.T.A. as the case may be, was the renewal of permit with modification. Whenever in a statute we find certain expressions used one by the side of the other in order to convey different meanings, it should be held that the legislative authority intended that any one of them would not include the other. If that be so, a refusal to grant a permit or to renew a permit cannot be equated with the grant or renewal of a permit with a modification. (Vide Sections 48 (1), 50 (1) and 58 (1) of the Act). We are, therefore, of the opinion that under Clause (e) of Section 64 no appeal was maintainable against any of the orders against which the first respondent in each of these cases preferred appeals either before the Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal or before the Mysore State Transport Appellate Tribunal and thereafter before the Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal. It should, therefore, be eld that all the appeals and the impugned orders passed in such appeals were without jurisdiction and they are liable to be quashed in these proceedings.
6. They are accordingly quashed.
7. Whatever may have stated already does not, however, conclude these matters. Jt is brought to our notice that in view of the impugned orders passed in appeals by the Tribunal, the first respondent in each of these cases was under an impression that bis permit was valid for a period of 5 years since it had been renewed for a period of 5 years by the impugned orders and hence there was no need to make an application for further renewal until the appropriate date arrived in each of those cases. It appears that in many of the cases before us, the period of 3 years for which the renewal was granted by the R.T.A. or the M.S.T.A. has elapsed hut the period of 5 years has not yet elapsed. But we are told that according to the amended provisions of the Act, application for renewal of a permit will have to be filed not less than 120 days before the expiry of the period for which the permit had been renewed. The power of the R.T.A. or the M.S.T.A. to condone the delay in filing fresh applications for renewal would also be of no avail in view of the situation in which the first respondent in each of these cases has been placed. The permit holders could not think of making an-applications far renewal in accord finer with law in view of the impugned orders being in their favour and the time for applying for renewal having not yet arrived in each case. In these cases, we therefore feel that it is appropriate that we must direct the M.S.T.A. to entertain applications for renewal of permits which are the subject-matters of these proceedings, if applications are made before it within 30 days from today, in cases where the period of 3 years has already elapsed or where in view of the provisions of the Act they are not able to make their applications in time. The learned counsel for the petitioner did not also question the issue of such a direction. We order accordingly.
8. There is one other contention raised by Sri K. S. Puttaswamy, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the first respondent in W.P. 3732/70 peculiar to that case which has to be disposed of. He contended that in the resolution passed by the M.S.T.A. in that case no reference was made regarding the period for which the permit stood renewed. He further contended that the application of the grantee in this case was for a period of 5 years and if M.S.T.A. did not specifically mention in the course of its resolution that the permit was renewed for any period less than 5 years, it should be presumed that the permit had been renewed for a period of 5 years as observed by the Supreme Court in Maharashtra Slate Road Transport Corporation's case referred to above. We are, however, told that in the permit issued to the first respondent in that case, the period of 3 years has been mentioned. We do not propose to express any opinion on the validity of the contention raised by Sri Putfaswamy in this behalf. It is open to the first respondent in that case,. if he is so advised, to take appropriate action permissible in law to get the matter ratified. But it is also open to the first respondent in that case to make an application within a period of 30 days from today before the M. S. T. A. without asserting his rights on the basis of the contention referred to herein.
9. If the first respondent in each of these cases whose application for renewal is barred by time, makes an application as directed above within 30 days from today, the M.S.T.A. will entertain them as already directed and dispose of them without reference to the question of limitation prescribed under Section 58 of the Act.
10. Subject to the directions Issued to the M.S.T.A. the writ petitions are allowed and the impugned orders are set aside. There will be. no order as to costs.