1. The Hassan Co-operative Society Ltd., who is the appellant in this second appeal, obtained an award for some monies due to it in the Court of the Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies at Hassan and after getting the necessary certificate on 26-10-1943 sought execution of it in the Court of the Munsiff of Hassan in Ex. Case No. 605 of 43-44. The decree was partly satisfied and the execution was dismissed on 2-6-44. The decree-holder then filed the present application, Ex. No. 1035 of 46-47 and applied for arrest of judgment-debtor 2 who pleaded that the execution application was. barred by limitation. The Munsiff rejected that plea. On appeal, the Additional Subordinate Judge at Hassan upheld that plea and dismissed the execution application. Hence this second appeal.
2. As the matter involved an important question of limitation which might affect the execution of a large number of awards passed by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies and his assistants, the Advocate-General was notified and he has also addressed arguments. He has brought to my notice Section 65 of the Mysore Co-operative Societies Act, No. LII of 1948, and urged that whatever may have been the rulings of this Court or other Courts with regard to the article of limitation applicable to such executions in the past the legislature has now expressly provided that Article 182 of the first schedule to the Limitation Act is applicable to such executions.
3. That Act came into force on 23-7-1948 and Section 65 provides that the Registrar or any person empowered by him in this behalf, shall be deemed, when exercising any powers under that Act for the recovery of any amount by the attachment or by the sale of any property or when passing any orders on any application made to him for such recovery or to take some step-in-aid of such recovery, to be a Civil Court for the purposes of Article 182 of the first schedule to the Mysore Limitation Act, 1911. In view of that section the first column in Article 182 would have to be read as follows:
'For the execution of a decree or order of any Civil Court or the Registrar or any person empowered by him when exercising powers under Act 52 of 1948 for the recovery of the amount etc.....'
and under the third column
'Time would begin to run from the date of the dismissal of the previous execution.'
An execution application like the present would, therefore, now be clearly within time.
4. It is, however, contended by Mr. R. V. Sreenivasaiya. learned Counsel for the 1st respondent, that the decisions of this Court have laid down that Article 181 is applicable to such executions; see '44 Mys HCR 528'; '44 Mys HCR 538' and '47 Mys HCR 230', where it has been held that an application for execution in a Civil Court of a decision under the Co-operative Societies Act is governed by Article 181 and not by Article 182 of the Limitation Act and is in time if preferred within three years from the date of the certificate of the Registrar or Deputy Registrar under Sec. 43 (c) of the Mysore Co-operative Societies Act, VII of 1918. But in view of Section 65 of the more recent Co-operative Societies Act by which the earlier Act has been repealed those decisions so far as they applied Article 181 to the first application for execution in the Civil Court may continue to be fully binding on the Courts in the State; but any observations made in those decisions with regard to the application of Article 182 would not have the same force. It is also to be observed that those cases related to the first applications for execution after the issue of the certificate by the Registrar.
5. It is next contended by Mr. Sreenivasaiya that Section 65 applies only under certain circumstances. According to that section:
'The Registrar or any person empowered by him in this behalf, shall be deemed, when exercising any powers under this Act for the recovery of any amount by the attachment or by the sale of any property, or when passing any orders on any application made to him for such recovery or to take some step-in-aid of such recovery, to be a Civil Court for the purposes of Article 182 of the first schedule to the Mysore Limitation Act, 1911.'
It is argued that it is only when an application is made before the Registrar for the recovery of any amount by the attachment or sale of any property that he should be deemed to be a Civil Court and not when recovery is sought by any other process in execution, such as arrest or attachment of moveables. The use cf the words 'for such recovery' in the latter portion of that section can, it is argued, only mean what is envisaged in the earlier part of that section. That argument cannot be accepted, If 'such recovery' meant only recovery by the means contemplated already in the earlier part of the section, a plain reading of the section would make the latter portion of the section completely superfluous as the earlier portion already provides for the exercise of the powers under the Act for the recovery of any amount by the attachment or sale of any property and would include passing of orders or taking steps-in-aid.
It is a well-known rule of interpretation of statutes that no part of a statute should be ordinarily rejected. As observed by the learned Chief Justice in 'P. T. CHICKNARASAPPA v. B. GOVINDAPPA', 20 Mys LJ 377, 'We are certainly not entitled to regard any section of the Act as superfluous unless we can give it no reasonable interpretation whatever otherwise.' To my mind, the words 'for such recovery' mean merely for the recovery of any amount sought to be recovered and is not to be confined to method of recovery by attachment or by sale of any property only. When the Registrar or any person empowered by him, therefore, passes any order on an application made to him for the recovery of any amount due under an award or to take some step-in-aid of such recovery like issuing a certificate to enable the creditor to apply for execution in the Civil Court he must be deemed to be a Civil Court for the purposes of Article 182.
6. Mr. Sreenivasaiya next contends that as Act LII of 1948 was passed only after the three years period originally available to the decree-holder after the issue of the certificate according to the previous decisions had run out, the present execution application is barred by time. He urges that Section 65 cannot be given any retrospective operation, and for that position he has relied on a case reported in 'KADUR KALAPPA v. KAREGOWDA', 9 Mys LJ 328. In that case it has been held that the Limitation enactment which belongs to the domain of adjective law applicable to a case is the one actually in operation on the date of its institution though the enactment will have to be enforced retrospectively, that it does not create or take away any rights and that, therefore, unless the new statute expressly says so, if a remedy is already barred under the existing law it will not be revived by the amending or repealing Act.
But Mr. Gopivallabha Iyengar, learned Counsel for the appellant, urges that the effect of Section 72 of Act LII of 1948, is to expressly make applicable the provisions of Section 65 retrospectively. Section 72 (2) reads as follows :
'All appointments made, rules and orders made, notifications and notices issued and suits and proceedings instituted under the said Acts shall, so far as may be, be deemed to have been respectively made, issued and instituted under this Act.'
It is argued that if the order made by the Assistant Registrar granting a certificate in the present case in 1943 under Section 43 (e) of the earlier Mysore Co-operative Societies Act of 1918 should be deemed to have been made under the corresponding Section 54 (1) of the present Act, Section 65 would apply to such orders.
7. There is no doubt that the uniform practice in all the Courts in the State has throughout been to treat awards passed by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies as if they were decrees of Civil Courts once they are brought into execution in the Civil Court. Section 65 was apparently enacted to avoid an objection like the present which became possible after this Court had laid down that Article 181 applied to applications for execution of such awards.
8. It is also represented for the Appellant that if Section 65 is not applied with retrospective effect a large number of such awards would get barred by limitation. If the law was very clear I would not have hesitated to apply it even if it had such an effect. But I think that the specific provisions of Section 72 (2) clearly permit, if not provide, for retrospective operation of Section 65. There is apparently nothing wrong in principle in the application of a limitation enactment with such retrospective effect; see 'KADUR KALAPPA v. KAREGOWDA', 9 Mys LJ 328; 'SIDDA-LINGAMMA v. MUDDUMALLE GOWDA', 13 Mys LJ 79 and 'P. T. CHICKNARASAPPA v. B. GOVIKDAPPA', 20 Mys LJ 377. In '13 Mys LJ 79', Section 10 (2) (g) of the Hindu Law Women's Rights Act X of 1933 which defined stridhana was applied and given effect to though that Act was enacted and came into force even during the pendency of the appeal before the High Court. In '20 Mys LJ 377', the Hindu Law Women's Rights Act came into force while the suit was pending. Nevertheless, effect was given to Section 4 of that Act relating to succession of Hindu male who had died intestate before that Act came into force. Sir D'Arcy Reilly, C. J. observed that though it was certainly in accordance with one of the cardinal principles of interpreting the statutes to start with the assumption that it is not intended to be retrospective except where the provisions of the Act itself make it clear, he relied on the wordings of Section 4 to come to the conclusion that retrospective effect should be given to that section.
9. In the result this appeal is allowed, theorder of the learned Subordinate Judge is setaside and that of the learned Munsiff restored.The parties will bear their own costs of thisappeal.
10. Appeal allowed.