Skip to content


D. Rudriah and anr. Vs. the Chancellor, University of Agricultural Sciences, Bangalore and ors. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectConstitution
CourtKarnataka High Court
Decided On
Case NumberWrit Petn. Nos. 2181 and 2537 of 1970
Judge
Reported inAIR1971Kant84; AIR1971Mys84; (1971)1MysLJ328
Acts(Mysore) University of Agricultural Sciences Act, 1963 - Sections 12(2), 24, 25, 39, 40, 40(1), 44 and 46; Constitution of India - Articles 245 and 226
AppellantD. Rudriah and anr.
RespondentThe Chancellor, University of Agricultural Sciences, Bangalore and ors.
Appellant AdvocateM.K. Nambiar and ;B.S. Patil, Advs.
Respondent AdvocateN. Venkatachala, ;T. Krishna Rao and ;V.K. Govindaraju, Advs., ;R.N. Byra Reddy, Govt. Adv. and ;S.G. Sundaraswamy, Adv. General by special request
DispositionPetitions dismissed
Excerpt:
- labour & servicesappointment on compassionate grounds: [p.d.dinakaran, c.j. & v.g.sabhahit,j] karnataka civil services (appointment on compassionate grounds) rules, 1966, rule 6(4) - compassionate appointment - claim for higher post authorities overlooked qualification of applicant already possessed at time of his appointment and also ignored representation of applicant held, merely because authorities have passed an appointment order to a lower post, it will not take away the right of petitioner to claim the higher post. rule 6(4) is not attracted. - hanumanthappa who was merely placed in additional charge of the duties of the director of agriculture, could not participate in the said meeting of the committee and hence the appointment of respondent 5 as the vice-chancellor out of.....chandrashekhar, j.1. in these two petitions under article 226 of the constitution, the validity of the appointment of respondent 5 (in both these petitions) as the vice-chancellor of the university of agricultural sciences in mysore (hereinafter referred to as the university), has been challenged.2. by the notification dated 5-6 1970, the chancellor of the university, in exercise of the powers vested in him under sub-section (2) of section 12 of the university of agricultural sciences act, 1963 (mysore act 22 of 1963) (hereinafter referred to as the act), appointed respondent 5 (in both these petitions) as the vice-chancellor of the university for a period of three years with effect from 12-6-1970.3. the petitioner in w. p. no. 2181 of 1970 is holding the office of the director of animal.....
Judgment:

Chandrashekhar, J.

1. In these two petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution, the validity of the appointment of respondent 5 (in both these petitions) as the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Agricultural Sciences in Mysore (hereinafter referred to as the University), has been challenged.

2. By the notification dated 5-6 1970, the Chancellor of the University, in exercise of the powers vested in him under Sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the University of Agricultural Sciences Act, 1963 (Mysore Act 22 of 1963) (hereinafter referred to as the Act), appointed respondent 5 (in both these petitions) as the Vice-Chancellor of the University for a period of three years with effect from 12-6-1970.

3. The petitioner in W. P. No. 2181 of 1970 is holding the office of the Director of Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Services in Mysore. He is a graduate in Agriculture and also holds a Master's degree in Dairy.

4. The petitioner in W. P. No. 2537 of 1970 claims to be a journalist.

5. It is common ground that a meeting of the Committee consisting of the Pro-Chancellor as Ex-Officio Chairman and the members of the Board of Regents of the University other than the Vice-Chancellor, (hereinafter referred to as the Committee), was held on 27-4-1970 to recommend a panel of three persons, to the Chancellor for appointment of the Vice-Chancellor and that the Committee sent a panel of three persons consisting of the petitioner in W. P. No. 2181 of 1970, respondent 5 and one Dr. M. H. Mari Gowda.

6. It is also common ground that by the Notification of the Government dated 17-4-1970, the Governor placed Mr. V. Hanumanthappa, I. A. S., Joint Secretary to the Government and ex-officio Director of Agricultural Planning, Soil Agriculture and Forest Department in additional charge of the duties of the Director of Agriculture, vice Dr. H. R. Arakeri on deputation, and that Mr. V. Hanumanthappa participated in that meeting of the Committee on 27-4-1970 in his purported capacity as the Director of Agriculture in Mysore. It is also not in dispute that respondent 5 has been the Vice-Chancellor of the University since the inception of the University.

7. Mr. M. K. Nambiar, learned counsel for the petitioner in W. P. No.2181 of 1970, urged the following two grounds in assailing the appointment of respondent 5 as the Vice-Chancellor in June, 1970:

(i) The statute providing for qualifications for the office of the Vice-chancellor is invalid on account of impermissible delegation or abdication of powers and hence the appointment of the Vice-Chancellor on the basis of the qualifications prescribed by the Chancellor is invalid; and

(ii) Mr. V. Hanumanthappa who was merely placed in additional charge of the duties of the Director of Agriculture, could not participate in the said meeting of the Committee and hence the appointment of respondent 5 as the Vice-Chancellor out of the panel recommended in that meeting, is invalid.

8. Mr. B. S. Patil, learned counsel for the petitioner in W. P. No. 2537 of 1970, adopted the aforesaid two grounds and supplemented the argument of Mr. Nambiar on these grounds. Mr. Patil also urged certain additional grounds which shall be set out later.

9. We may now look at the relevant statutory provisions. The Act came into force on 24-4-1964. Under Section 2 (6) 'prescribed' means prescribed by the Statutes of the University.

10. Section 3 of the Act under which the University is incorporated, provides, inter alia, that the University shall consist of a Chancellor, a Pro-Chancellor, a Vice-Chancellor, a Dean, a Board of Regents and an Academic Council.

10A. Section 9 of the Act specifies the officers of the University. Among these Officers are the Chancellor, the Pro-Chancellor, and the Vice-Chancellor.

11. Section 10 provides, inter alia that the Governor of the State of Mysore shall, by virtue of his office, be the Chancellor of the University, and that the Chancellor shall be the head of the University.

12. Section 11 provides, inter alia that the Minister for Agriculture for the State of Mysore shall, by virtue of his office, be the Pro-Chancellor of the University.

13. Sub-section (1) of Section 12 states that the Vice-Chancellor shall be a whole time officer of the University.

14. Sub-section (2) of Section 12 which provides for the mode of appointment of the Vice-Chancellor, states, inter alia, that the Chancellor shall appoint the Vice-Chancellor from panel of three persons recommended by a Committee consisting of the Pro-Chancellor as ex-Officio Chairman, and the members of the Board other than the Vice-Chancellor.

15. Sub-section (3) of Section 12 provides, inter alia, that if the Committee fails to submit a panel within the period so specified, the Chancellor may appoint any person whom he deems fit to be the Vice-Chancellor.

16. Sub-section (4) of Section 12 provides that the term of office of the Vice-Chancellor shall be for a period of three years which may be extended bv not more than 6 months in the aggregate. 17. Section 24 of the Act reads:

24. Authorities of the University: --

The following shall be the authorities of the University, namely: --

(1) The Board of Regents,

(2) The Academic Council,

(3) The Board of Studies, and

(4) Such other bodies of the University as may be declared by the Statutes to be the authorities of the University.

18. Section 25 sets out the Constitution of the Board of Regents (hereinafter referred to as the Board). It shall consist of the Vice-Chancellor and six ex officio members including the Director of Agriculture in Mysore and the Director of Animal Husbandry in Mysore and 13 other members.

19. The material part of Section 39 which deals with statutes of the University (hereinafter referred to as the Statutes) reads : --

39, Statutes: -- Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Statutes may provide for any matter and, shall in particular, provide for the following : --

(a)*** ** ****** ** *** (s) the number, qualifications, emoluments and other conditions of service of officers, teachers and other employees of the University, and the preparation and the maintenance of records if their services and activities; *** ** *

20. Sub-section, (1) of Section 40 provides that the first Statutes with regard to matters set out in Section 39 shall be made by the Vice-Chancellor with the approval of the Chancellor.

21. Sub-section (2) of Section 40 provides that the Board may from time to time, make new or additional Statutes and may amend or repeal the Statutes in the manner provided in this Section.

22. Sub-section (6) of Section 40 provides that a new Statute or addition to the Statutes or any amendment or repeal of a Statute shall require the previous approval of the Chancellor who may sanction, disallow or remit it for further consideration.

23. Section 44 of the Act which saves the validity of acts and proceedings reads :

44. Savings of validity of acts and proceedings.--No act done or proceedings taken under this Act shall be questioned merely on the ground,--

(a) of any vacancy or defect in the Constitution of any Authority, or

(b) of any defect or irregularity in such act or. proceeding not affecting the merits of the case.

24. Section 45 provides, inter alia, that if any question arises whether any person has been duly appointed or is entitled to be member of any authority of the University, the matter may be referred to him and that his decision on such question shall be final.

25. Section 46 of the Act which enables delegation of certain powers, reads:

46. Delegation of powers.-- The Board may, by Statutes, delegate to any officer or authority of the University and of the powers conferred on it by this Act or by the Statutes to be exercised subject to such restrictions and conditions as may be prescribed.

26. In exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-section (1) of Section 40 of the Act, the Vice-Chancellor made the first Statutes with the approval of the Chancellor in the year 1964.

27. Statute 17 which provides for the qualification of the Vice-Chancellor reads :

17. Vice-Chancellor: Qualifications. --The qualifications to be possessed by a person for appointment as Vice-Chancellor shall except in the case of the first Vice-Chancellor, be prescribed by the Chancellor, regard being had to academic and research experience and accomplishments in agriculture and related sciences.

28. In exercise of the powers purported to have been conferred on him under Statute 17, the Chancellor prescribed the following qualifications to be possessed by a person for appointment as Vice-Chancellor:

(1) He should be a person of proved integrity and character and of high reputation;

(2) He should preferably be a person who has adequate background of work in agriculture and allied fields; and

(3) He should possess academic and research experience and accomplishment in agriculture and allied sicences.

29. The arguments of Mr. Nambiar elaborating his first ground of attack, were thus :

Section 39 enjoins that Statutes shall provide for matters specified in clauses (a) to (z). Under Clause (s) of this Section, qualifications of officers of the University is one of the matters which should be provided by the Statutes. The Vice-Chancellor being one of the officers of the University, Statute 17 purports to provide for the qualifications of the Vice-Chancellor. But instead of itself prescribing such qualifications, this Statute delegated to the Chancellor the function of prescribing them when the Act has delegated to. the Statute making authority the power to prescribe such qualifications, it is not competent for that authority to abdicate its powers and to make further delegation of such power to the Chancellor. On account of such abdication or further delegation, Statute 17 is invalid. As providing for such qualifications by Statutes is not discretionary but obligatory under Section 39, the intendment of the Act is that the appointment of the Vice-Chancellor (other than the first Vice-Chancellor) should be done only after prescribing such qualifications. When the Act has laid down the manner in which the power to appoint the Vice-Chancellor has to be exercised, it (the Act) prohibits such power being exercised in any other manner.

30. Mr. Nambiar strongly relied on the following observations of the Supreme Court in State of U. P. v. Singhara Singh, : [1964]4SCR485 :

'The rule adopted in Taylor v. Tay-lor, (1876) 1 Ch D 426, is well recognised and is founded on sound principle. Its result is that if a Statute has conferred a power to do an act and has laid down the method in which that power has to be exercised, it necessarily prohibits the doing of that act in any other manner than it has been prescribed. The principle behind the rule is that if this were riot so, the statutory provision might as well not have been enacted.....'

31. Learned counsel for respondents and the learned Advocate General (to whom notice had been issued as the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Act had been challenged) advanced diverse arguments to meet the above contentions of Mr. Nambiar.

32. The learned Advocate General contended that:

(i) Clause (s) of Section 39 has no application to the Vice-Chancellor;

(ii) Even if that clause applies to the Vice-Chancellor, there is no impermissible delegation of any power to the Chancellor under Statute 17; and

(iii) Even if Statute 17 is invalid, there is no impediment for the Chancellor exercising his power under Section 12 (2) to appoint the Vice-Chancellor.

33. Mr. T. Krishna Rao, learned counsel for Respondent 5, contended that-

(i) There is no mandate in the Act to prescribe qualifications for the office of the Vice-Chancellor; and

(ii) Even if such qualifications had to be prescribed, delegation of such power is permissible under Section 46 read with Clause (z) of Section 39.

34. The learned Government Advocate who appeared for respondents 2 and 6, emphasised the distinction between the terms 'provide for' and 'prescribe' and contended that there was neither delegation nor abdication of power.

35. Mr. N. Venkatachala learned counsel for respondents 1, 4 and 7, contended that--

(i) Clause (s) of Section 39 has no application to the Vice-Chancellor; and

(ii) Even if Statute 17 delegated certain powers to the Chancellor, such delegation was provided by the Act.

36. Besides the above contentions learned counsel for respondents pleaded that the conduct of the petitioner in W. P. No. 2181 of 1970, was such as to disentitle him to invoke the jurisdiction of this court under Article 226.

37. We shall now set out in

greater detail the above contentions and the reply of Mr. Nambiar and Mr. Patil to these contentions. We do not consider it necessary to express our conclusions on all these contentions as even some of thorn are sufficient to reject the first ground urged by Mr. Nambiar.

38. Mr. Krishna Rao contended that Section 12 of the Act is a complete code in itself, dealing with the appointment, the term of office, emoluments and conditions of service, of the Vice-Chancellor, that Sub-section (2) of that Section confers on the Chancellor the power to appoint the Vice-Chancellor, that the only limitation placed on the exercise of such powers, is that such appointment should be out of the panel of three names recommended by the Committee, and that there is no limitation in Section 12 that the appointment as the Vice-Chancellor should be of a person who possesses the qualifications that may be prescribed by any Statute made under Section 39, Clause (s).

39. Mr. Krishna Rao also referred to Sub-section (3) of Section 12 which provides that if the Committee fails to submit the panel within the period specified by the Chancellor, he may appoint any person whom he deems fit to be the Vice-Chancellor. Mr, Krishna Rao argued that the words 'any person whom he deems fit', would indicate that prescription of any qualifications for the office of the Vice-Chancellor is not contemplated by the Act.

40. It was also argued by Mr. Krishna Rao that Section 39 opens with the words 'subject to the provisions of this Act' and that hence the powers to make Statutes under Section 39, should also be read as being subject to the powers conferred on the Chancellor under Section 12 to appoint the Vice-Chancellor and that if Section 39 is so read, the Vice-Chancellor would be outside the purview of Clause (s) of Section 39.

41. In reply to the above contentions of Mr. Krishna Rao Mr. Nambiar argued that if Section 12 is to be regarded as a complete code relating to the appointment of the Vice-Chancellor, each of Sections 14 to 20 which deal with the appointments of the Dean, the Comptroller, the Registrar, the Librarian and the Director of Extension respectively, should also be regarded as a complete code regarding the appointment to each of those posts respectively, and that . such a construction would be inconsistent with Section 39 which requires the Statutes to provide for qualifications, emoluments and other conditions of service of such officers. Mr. Nambiar added that the powers of the Chancellor under Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 12 to appoint the Vice-Chancellor, should be read as being subject to the condition that the person to be so appointed, should possess the qualifications provided by Statutes made under Clause (s) of Section 39.

42. The learned Advocate General submitted that as Section 3 of the Act provides that the University shall consist of the Chancellor, a Pro-Chancellor, a Vice-Chancellor, a Dean, a Board of Regents and an Academic Council the Vice-Chancellor must be regarded as a constituent part of the University and not' as an officer of the University and that Clause (s) of Section 39 which provides for the qualifications of officers, teachers and employees of the University has no application at all to the Vice-Chancellor.

43. A cognate contention of Mr. Venkatachala was that Clause (s) of Section 39 does not apply to the Vice-Chancellor, because the expression 'other employees of the University' following the words 'officers and teachers' in that clause, would show that that clause speaks of only officers who are employees of the University and that the Vice-Chancellor who is a constituent part the University, cannot be said to be an employee of the University.

44. Mr. Venkatachala drew our attention to the occurrence of the same expression, 'officers, teachers and other employees of the University', in Clause (e) of Section 26, and Clauses (b), (e); (f) and (s) of Section 39. Mr. Venkatachala submitted that this expression occurring in different parts of the Act should receive the same meaning. Mr. Venkatachala invited our attention to the following observations of the Supreme Court in Raghubans Narain v. Govt. of U. P., AIR 1967 SC 465 at p. 469 that where the legislature uses the same expression in the same statute at two places or more, then the same interpretation should be given to that expression unless the context otherwise requires.'

45. Mr. Venkatachala pointed out that Clause (e) of Section 26 which speaks of the power of the Board to appoint officers, teachers and employees of the University, cannot obviously apply to the Vice-Chancellor who is appointed by the Chancellor under Section 12. Likewise, Mr. Venkatachala pointed out that Clauses (b), (e) and (f) of Section 39 which refer to statutes for providing for appointment, powers and duties, pension, gratuity and provident fund of officers, teachers and other employees of the University, cannot also apply to the Vice-Chancellor because the appointment of the Vice-Chancellor, his powers and duties and his conditions of service, are all specifically provided for in Sections 12 and 13 of the Act and are outside the powers of the Board.

46. Mr. Venkatachala also pointed out that Clause (s) of Section 39 refers also to emoluments and conditions of services of officers, whereas the emoluments and conditions of service of the Vice-Chancellor have to be determined by the Chancellor under Sub-section (7) of Section 12. Mr. Venkatachala argued that this would also demonstrate that the Vice-Chancellor is outside the ambit of Clause (s) of Section 39.

47. The learned Government Advocate argued that when the power to recommend the panel of three names, is entrusted to the Committee which consists of the members of the Board (except the Vice-Chancellor) and when the power to appoint the Vice-Chancellor is conferred on such a high authority as the Chancellor, it could not have been the intention of the Legislature that the Board (or the first Vice-Chancellor) should prescribe qualifications for that high office of the Vice-Chancellor.

48. As against these arguments, Mr. Nambiar contended that when the Vice-Chancellor is one of the officers of the University expressly specified in Section 9 there is absolutely no reason to construe the expression 'Officer' occurring in Clause (s) of Section 39, as not including the Vice-Chancellor. That emoluments and other conditions of service mentioned in that clause, do not apply to the Vice-Chancellor, would not, Mr. Nambiar contended be a ground for holding that qualifications referred to in that Clause, also have no application to the Vice-Chancellor because Section 39 begins with the words 'subject to the provisions of this Act' and that there is nothing in the rest of the Act which would exclude prescription of qualifications for the office of the Vice-Chancellor.

49. We think the use of the same expression 'Officers, and teachers and other employees', in Clause (e) of Section 26 and in Clauses (b), (e), (f) and (s) of Section 39, coupled with the circumstances that the legislature has not thought it necessary to provide for any qualifications for the office of the Vice-Chancellor while empowering the Chancellor under the second proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 12 to appoint the first Vice-Chancellor on the recommendation of the Government, would lead to the conclusion that the expression 'Officer' in Clause (s) of Section 39 does not include the Vice-Chancellor and that Section does not make it obligatory that Statutes should provide for qualifications for the office of the Vice-Chancellor.

50. Section 39 comprehends matters which the Statutes may provide for, as well as matters which the Statutes shall provide for. In other words, the Section includes obligatory as well as discretionary matters to be provided for by Statutes. Even though the qualifications of the office of the Vice-Chancellor are not matters which the Statutes should necessarily provide for, the question still is whether such qualifications are matters which the Statutes may provide for.

51. The matters which the Statutes may provide for, have not been expressly stated in Section 39 and they can only be implied from the powers and duties of the Board which is the authority empowered to make Statutes (the first Vice-Chancellor being merely empowered to make Statutes before the Board is constituted). A power to make Statutes in respect of matters outside the sphere of duties and power of the Board, cannot reasonably be implied. The powers and duties of the Board are set out in Clauses (a) to (k) of Section 26. None of these Clauses relate to the appointment of the Vice-Chancellor. Hence it cannot be said that providing for qualifications for the office of the Vice-Chancellor is one of the matters that may be provided for by Statutes.

52. Thus, providing for qualifications for the office of the Vice-Chancellor does not, in our opinion, come either in the obligatory or discretionary ambit of Statutes.

53. The circumstances that the appointment of the Vice-Chancellor is made by the Chancellor from a panel of three persons recommended by the Committee consisting of the Pro-Chancellor and the members of the Board (except the Vice-Chancellor), also lends support to the conclusion that it could not have been intended by the legislature that any qualifications for the office of the Vice-Chancellor should be provided by Statutes.

54. However, Mr. Patil contended that unless qualifications for the office of the Vice-Chancellor, are provided by Statutes, the power of the Chancellor to appoint the Vice-Chancellor would be unguided and capable of being used arbitrarily and capriciously.

55. We are unable to accept this contention of Mr. Patil. The power to make such appointment is conferred on a high authority, namely, the Chancellor, who is guided by the recommendation of the Committee. If in any particular case that power is used arbitrarily or capriciously, such exercise of power in that particular case, may be challenged in a court; but the conferment of such power cannot be said to be invalid on the ground of a mere possibility of abuse.

56. Though the first Vice-Chancellor purported to make Statute 17 as providing for the qualifications for the office of the Vice-Chancellor and in pursuance of that Statute, the Chancellor purported to prescribe the qualifications for that office, neither Statute 17 nor the purported prescription of qualifications by the Chancellor, has, in our opinion, any legal sanction. Hence, the question whether Statute 17 suffers from the infirmity of abdication of power or sub-delegation of power does not arise at all.

57. Assuming for the sake of arguments, that the qualifications for the office of the Vice-Chancellor are required to be provided for, by Statutes, we shall now examine whether Statute 17 is invalid on the ground of sub-delegation.

58. Elaborating his contention that there is no delegation in Statute 17, the learned Advocate General pointed out that Sub-section (1) of Section 40 provides that the first Statutes made by the Vice-Chancellor should have the approval of the Chancellor and that likewise Sub-section (6) of that Section provides that any new Statute or addition to the Statutes, or any amendment or repeal of a Statute, should have the previous approval of the Chancellor who may sanction, disallow or remit it for the further consideration. The learned Advocate General argued that the Chancellor is thus an integral part of the authority for making Statutes and that when Statute 17 provides that the qualifications to be possessed by a person for appointment as Vice-Chancellor, should be prescribed by the Chancellor, there is no delegation of power to any outside authority the Chancellor being a part of the same authority empowered to make Statutes.

59. We are not impressed by the above arguments of the learned Advocate General. When the Act provides that the first Vice-Chancellor or the Board should exercise the power to make statutes which should receive the approval of the Chancellor, if the first Vice-Chancellor or the Board does not exercise such power but leaves it to be exercised by the Chancellor, it cannot be said that there is no abdication of power by the first Vice-Chancellor or the Board.

60. It was also contended by the learned Advocate General that even if Statute 17 is held to be invalid on the ground of sub-delegation or abdication of powers, there was no impediment for the Chancellor exercising his power to appoint the Vice-Chancellor because the exercise of the power under Section 12 (2) is not Conditional upon a Statute having been made prescribing qualifications for the office of the Vice-Chancellor. The learned Advocate General added that Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 12 which deal with the power of the Chancellor to appoint, the Vice-Chancellor, do not contain any such limitation for the exercise of such power.

61. In Support of this contention, the learned Advocate General relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Mysore State Road Transport Corporation v. Gopinath Gundachar. : (1968)IILLJ144SC . Section 14(1) of the Road Transport Corporations Act. 1950, empowers the Corporation to appoint officers and servants; Section 45 of that Act provides that the Corporation may, with the previous sanction of the State Government, make regulations providing for the conditions of appointment and service and the scales of pay of officers of the Corporation. No regulations had been made by the Mysore State Road Transport Corporation prescribing the conditions of appointment. The question that arose for decision before the Supreme Court was whether it was competent to the Corporation to appoint officers until such regulations were framed. The Supreme Court held that there must necessarily be a time lag between the formation of the Corporation and the framing of regulations and that in the absence of clear words, it is difficult to impute to the legislature the intention that the Corporation should have no power to appoint officers to carry on the administration during such interregnum.

62. But Mr. Nambiar argued that the above decision of the Supreme Court has no application to the present case, because Section 45 of the Road Transport Corporations Act states that the Corporation may make regulations regarding the conditions of appointment whereas Section 39 of the Act states that Statutes shall be made providing for qualifications.

63. We think there is considerable force in the contention of Mr. Nambiar that if Clause (s) of Section 39 were to be held to apply to the Vice-Chancellor also, then it is not open to the Chancellor to exercise his power under Section 12 (2) to appoint the Vice-Chancellor (other than the first Vice-Chancellor) except in accordance with the qualifications provided by a valid Statute and that until a valid Statute is made prescribing such qualifications, the power under Section 12 (2) cannot be exercised (except in regard to the first Vice-Chancellor.) But, we have already held, that Clause (s) of Section 39 has no application to the office of the Vice-Chancellor.

64. Mr. Venkatachala contended that sub-delegation by an authority on whom statutory powers are conferred to another authority, is not invalid where such sub-delegation is authorised by the statute itself. This proposition of law no longer admits of any doubt in view of the observations of the Supreme Court in Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Board, : [1967]1SCR898 to the effect that the maxim delegatus non potest delegare, sets out what is merely a rule of construction, and that sub-delegation can be sustained if permitted by an express provision or necessary implication. The question is whether the Act has authorised sub-delega-tion.

65. Mr. Krishna Rao contended that even if Clause (s) of Section 39 is construed as providing for qualifications for the office of the Vice-Chancellor, Section 46 permits the Board to delegate by Statutes, to the Chancellor its power to provide for such qualifications subject to such restrictions and conditions as may be prescribed by Statutes and that Clause (z) of Section 39 which reads 'all other matters which by this Act are to be or may be provided for by the Statutes', is wide enough to include a Statute delegating powers of the Board. It was also contended by Mr. Krishna Rao that under Section 40 (1), the Vice-Chancellor who made the first statutes, was competent to delegate such powers to the Chancellor by Statute 17.

66. It is true that Section 46 empowers the Board to delegate by Statutes, its powers, that Section 40 (1) of the Act empowers the Vice-Chancellor to make Statutes with regard to matters set out in Section 39 (which includes all matters which by the Act are to be or may be provided for the Statute) and that a Statute delegating powers of the Board under Section 46 is one of the Statutes that the Vice-Chancellor is competent to make under Section 40 (1). yet, since Section 46 specifies Board and not the Vice-Chancellor, as being competent to delegate powers by Statute, it is doubtful whether the Vice-Chancellor acting under Section 40 (1), can delegate any of the powers of the Board which the Board is competent to delegate under Section 46. However, we do not think it necessary to express any final opinion on this question.

67. The learned Government Advocate submitted that what Section 39 requires is that Statutes should provide for matters enumerated in Clauses (a) to (z) and that it is nowhere stated in that Section that Statutes should prescribe for those matters. He sought to make a distinction between the expression 'provide for' and the expression 'prescribe'. He pointed put that in certain Sections, like Sections 5 (1), 14 (2) and 17 (2) the expression 'prescribe' has been used in contradistinction to the expression 'provide for' in Section 39. He submitted that the Act itself has made a distinction between these two expressions. According to him, the expression 'prescribe' means that the concerned matter has to be determined or fixed by the Statutes themselves while the expression 'provide for' means arrange for, or secure a thing being done. He maintained that when the Act says that Statutes should provide for certain matters, it would be sufficient if the Statutes create an agency or a machinery to do those matters and entrusts to such agency or machinery to do such matters.

68. It was argued by the learned Government Advocate that Section 39 does not require the Statutes to prescribe the qualifications, emoluments and other conditions of service of officers, teachers and other employees of the University; that all that Section requires is that Statutes should provide for those matters, and that when Statute 17 says that the qualifications to be possessed by a person for being appointed as Vice-Chancellor should be prescribed by the Chancellor, it (the Statute) has provided for those qualifications inasmuch as it has created an agency to specify those qualifications. The learned Government Advocate argued that in Statute 17 there is no abdication or delegation of any function which the Statute itself is required to do.

69. The learned Government Advocate submitted that in Section 39 the legislature has advisedly used the term 'provide for' and not the term 'prescribed' because the authority which is empowered to make Statutes may not be in possession of all the materials and minute details for prescribing for various matters set out in Clauses (a) to (z) of Section 39 and that it may be necessary for such authority to leave it to several special agencies and bodies to go into details of those matters to regulate such matters,

70. We think the distinction pointed out by the learned Government Advocate between the expression 'provide for' and 'prescribe', is real and substantial. As contended by him, all that Section 39 requires is that Statutes should provide matters set out in Clause (a) to (z) including Clause (s). As Statute 17 has provided for qualifications being prescribed by the Chancellor and has stated the broad guidelines for prescribing such qualifications, that Statute cannot be said to be invalid on the ground of abdication of powers or sub-delegation, even assuming that such qualifications are required to be provided for the office of the Vice-Chancellor by Clause (s) of Section 39.

71. Thus, the contention on behalf of the petitioners that the appointment of respondent 5 as Vice-Chancellor is invalid on the ground that qualifications had not been validly prescribed for the office of the Vice-Chancellor, must be rejected.

72. Regarding the second ground on which the appointment of Respondent 5 as Vice-Chancellor, is impugned, the allegations in the petitioners' affidavits are briefly as follows: Mr. Hanumanthappa attended the meeting of the Committee on 27-4-1970. There was no discussion as such in that meeting about the merits and demerits, the qualifications possessed by persons to be proposed for inclusion in the panel (of three persons), and about their attainments, achievements and learning especially in Agriculture. Every member was asked to give any three names of persons in a chit (signed by the Registrar) for being included in the panel. In fact there was no list of eligible persons to be selected for being included in the panel. The panel of three persons was decided on the basis of votes secured by each of the persons proposed for inclusion in the panel. As a result of following such procedure, Dr. Mari Gowda, Director of Horticulture, the petitioner, respondent 5, Dr. N. P. Patil, Director of Research in the University, and Dr. Rangaswamy, Dean of the University were each supported by 9, 9, 7, 6 and 6 votes respectively. The participation of Mr. Hanumanthappa has enabled respondent 5 to get into the panel of three persons. If he had not participated, respondent 5 would not have secured 7 votes. There would have been equality of votes between respondent 5, Dr. Patil and Dr. Rangaswamy, and there is no knowing who would have been included in the panel.

73. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondents 1, 4 and 7, there is no specific denial of the petitioners' averments as to what transpired at the meeting of the Committee and in particular, of the averment about the support secured by the petitioner. Dr. Mari Gowda, respondent 5, Dr. Patil, and Dr. Rangaswamy, as a result of the members writing on chits the names of persons proposed for inclusion in the panel. But it has been pleaded in the additional counter-affidavit that as to what transpired in that meeting before a final decision was taken in the matter, cannot be made the subject-matter of an enquiry in a writ proceeding, as otherwise the privacy of the deliberations, which is expected to be maintained bv the Committee, cannot be maintained. It has been pleaded in that additional counter-affidavit that all the seventeen members of the Committee had recommended the three names found in the panel and that even if it is assumed (without conceding) that Mr. Hanumanthappa had no power to recommend the names of persons in that panel the recommendation made by the Committee did not cease to be a recommendation of at least 16 other members of the Committee.

74. In support of the second ground of attack on the appointment of respondent 5, Mr. Nambiar submitted that Mr. Hanumanthappa who was not appointed as Director of Agriculture but was merely placed in additional charge of the duties of that post, by the notification of the Government dated 17-4-1970, could not be regarded as Director of Agriculture and could not be an ex-officio member of the Board, that he could not exercise any of the statutory powers conferred by the Act on the Director of Agriculture, that he was not entitled to be a member either of the Board or of the Committee and that his participation in the proceedings of the Committee on 27-4-1970 and his lending support to persons who were considered for being included in the panel of three persons, were all illegal, that such illegal participation of Mr. Hanumanthappa has materially affected the final decision of the Committee and has rendered the panel (of three persons) submitted by the Committee to the Chancellor, invalid and of no legal effect, and that the appointment as Vice-Chancellor of respondent 5 by the Chancellor on the basis of such panel, is also vitiated.

75. Mr. Nambiar submitted that the notification of the Government placing Mr. Hanumanthappa in additional charge of the duties of the post of Director of Agriculture was referable to Rule 32 of the Mysore Civil Services Rules, 1958, which reads:

32. Instead of appointing a Government servant to officiate, it is also permissible to appoint him to be in charge of the current duties of a vacant post. In such a case 'charge allowance' (additional pay) is payable as specified in Rule 68.

76. Mr. Nambiar invited our attention to the Official Memorandum No. FD 156 RFC 1962 dated 16-5-1963 (a copy of which is produced by the petitioner in W. P. No. 2181 of 1970 and marked Exhibit C) in which the position of officers in charge of current duties of posts, has been explained. Para 3 of this Official Memorandum reads:

'Such an officer cannot exercise statutory powers, conferred on the regular incumbents of the powers whether these powers are derived under any Act or rules, regulations, or bye-laws made thereunder, or under statutory rules made under the various articles of the Constitution of India (e.g.: Mysore Civil Services Rules, Mysore Civil Services Classification, Control and Appeal Rules, etc.)'

77. Mr. Nambiar also relied on the decision of this court in E. E. Gupta v. State of Mysore, 1962 Mys LJ (Supp) 555. There, the Commissioner of the Mysore Municipality had proceeded on leave. The Health Officer of that Municipality was placed in additional charge of the duties of the Commissioner. While he was in such additional charge, he purported to exercise certain statutory powers under the Mysore City Municipalities Act in holding the election to the Municipality. His competence to exercise such statutory powers was question ed. Upholding that objection, this is what Narayana Pai, J. who spoke for the Bench, said thus at p. 559:

'In our opinion, an appointment to a post, whether acting or permanent, imports the actual holding of that post by the appointee whether permanently or for a stated period. This flows directly from the normal meaning which one attaches to the word 'appoint'. On the other hand 'to be in charge of the duties of a post' merely means to discharge or perform those duties without necessarily holding the particular post to which the additional duties appertain. The person so put in additional charge of other duties already holds a post to which he had been formerly appointed. The imposition of new duties upon such an officer already appointed to a post does not, as pointed out in George W. Evans v. United States, (1913) 57 Law Ed 353, constitute a fresh appointment of that officer. This result stands to reason, because the duties of an office or post may vary from time to time without making any distinction or difference to the post itself. If the additional duties do not change the character of the post or convert it into a new post, the result cannot be different for reason only of the fact that the additional duties imposed are such as do not normally appertain to that post, for exigencies of administration may require the imposition temporarily or for a short period upon an officer, of certain duties which do not normally appertain to his office. So long as he continues to hold the office to which he had been originally appointed, the imposition of additional duties cannot therefore amount to either a fresh appointment of the officer or the appointment of the officer to another post.'

78. The above decision was followed by another Bench of this Court in M. Maridev (M. Mariappa) y. State of Mysore, (1968) 1 Mys LJ 325.

79. Some of learned counsel for the respondents contended that Rule 32 of the Mysore Civil Services Rules, has no application to the notification dated 17-4-1970 placing Mr. Hanumanthappa in such additional charge, because it has not been mentioned therein that he had been placed in charge of the current duties of any vacant post. It was also contended that when Mr. Hanumanthappa was appointed to perform the duties attached to the office of the Director of Agriculture, he must be regarded as the Director of Agriculture for the purpose of the Act and that he became an ex-officio member of the Board and was entitled to participate in the meeting of the Committee.

80. It is not necessary for the purpose of these petitions to consider whether placing of Mr. Hanumanthappa in such additional charge, is referable to Rule 32 of the Mysore Civil Services Rules and whether what is stated in para 3 of the Official Memorandum dated 16-5-1963 (Ex. C) is applicable to Mr. Hanumanthappa holding such additional charge.

81. The decision of this court in E. E. Gupta's case, 1962 Mys LJ (Supp) 555 is directly on the point. In that case also, the Health Officer was placed in additional charge of the duties of the Commissioner. In view of this decision it is no longer open to the respondents to contend that Mr. Hanumanthappa could exercise any of the statutory powers conferred on the Director of Agri-culture, when he was in such additional charge. The right of the Director of Agriculture to be an ex-officio member of the Board, arises under Section 25 of the Act and his right to be a member of the Committee arises under Section 12 (2) of the Act.

82. As stated earlier, the petitioners' averment that before taking a decision as to who should be included in the panel (of three persons), the views of the members were ascertained by asking each of them to write the names of three persons in a chit, has not been denied on behalf of the respondents. Though the petitioners' averment that the participation of Mr. Hanumanthappa enabled respondent 5 to secure the support of 7 members and that but for Mr. Hanumanthappa's participation, he (respondent 5) would have been on par with Dr. Patil and Dr. Rangaswamy, may not be supported by any factual data, the possibility of resultant position being, as stated by the petitioners, cannot be ruled out. At any rate, while determining whether the participation of any person who was not entitled to be present at a meeting, has materially influenced the final decision in such meeting, it is sufficient that there is a reasonable possibility of such member being able to influence such decision and it is not necessary to prove positively that such member has, in fact, influenced such decision of the meeting.

83. However, learned counsel for the respondents relied on Section 44 of the Act which saves the validity of certain acts and proceedings. As stated earlier, that Section provides, inter alia, that no act done or proceedings taken under the Act shall be questioned merely on the ground of any vacancy or defect in the constitution of any authority. Learned counsel for respondents argued that even if Mr. Hanumanthappa was not entitled to be a member of the Board by virtue of his being in such additional charge, his being a member of the Board would only amount to a defect in the constitution of the Board, that he was present at the meeting of the Committee by virtue of his purported membership of the Board, that any defect due to his participation in such committee, can only be regarded as a defect in the constitution of the Board which is an authority of the University under Section 24 of the Act and the protection given under Section 44 is available in regard to any defect in the constitution of the Committee also.

84. The effect of an analogous provision saving the validity of proceedings under the City of Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1949, was considered by the Supreme Court in Bangalore Woollen, Cotton and Silk Mills Ltd. v. Bangalore Corporation, : [1961]3SCR707 . Sub-section (1) of Section 38 of that Act reads:

38 (1). No. act done or proceedings taken under this Act shall be questioned merely on the ground--

(a) of any vacancy or defect in the constitution of the Corporation or of any standing committee; or

(b) of any defect or irregularity in such act or proceeding, not affecting the merits of the case.

85. Referring to Clause (b) of the above Section, Kapur, J., who spoke for the court, said that this Section validates all defects and irregularities in any act or proceeding which do not affect the merits of the case. We think that likewise Clause (a) of the above Section as well as Clause (a) of Section 44 of the University of Agricultural Science Act, validate all defects in the constitution of the respective bodies referred to in Clause (a) of each of these sections.

86. Both learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the word 'authority' occurring in Clause (a) of Section 44, should be understood as one of the Authorities of the University specified in Section 24, that the Committee referred to in Section 12 (2), is not one of the Authorities specified in Section 24, and that the immunity granted by Section 44, is not available to the acts and the proceedings of the Committee on the ground of any defect in the constitution of the Committee and that hence the proceedings of the Committee held on 27-4-70 and the panel (of three persons) recommended by that Committee, have not been protected under that Section.

87. The learned Government Advocate contended that the word 'Authority' has not been defined in the Act, that that word occurring in Clause (a) of Section 44, is not followed by the ,words 'of the University' and that hence there is no reason why the word 'Authority' in that clause should be construed to mean only one of the Authorities. 'Authority' should be given its ordinary meaning so as to include any body of persons exercising powers and that if that word is so construed, it would include the Committee also.

88. We are unable to accept this contention of the learned Government Advocate. It is true that the word 'Authority' is not followed by the words 'of the University' in Clause (a) of Section 44. But we think it is not necessary to repeat the words 'of the University' every time, after the word 'Authority' is employed in the Act. The use of the capital letter 'A' at the commencement of the word 'Authority' though not conclusive in itself, is a ground for construing that word 'Authority' as meaning only one of the Authorities specified in Section 24 and not for construing that word in a generic sense.

89. Even so, the question still is whether the mantle of protection under Section 44 extends to the acts and the proceedings of the Committee also. As seen earlier, the Committee consists of all the members of the Board except the Vice-Chancellor who is excluded from the Committee, presumably because the person who holds that office, is ordinarily eligible for being reappointed, and it would not be proper that he should participate in the proceedings in which the question whether his name should be included in the panel (of three persons) may arise for consideration by the Committee. Presumably because the Vice-Chancellor who is the Ex-officio Chairman of the Board under Section 13, is excluded from participating in the Committee, the next higher functionary of the University, namely, the Pro-Chancellor, is made the ex-officio of the Committee. Thus, the Constitution of the Committee is not materially different from that of the Board, all the members of the Committee (other than the Pro-Chancellor) being there by virtue of their being the members of the Board.

90. Thus, there is a very close statutory nexus between the Board (which is one of the authorities specified in Section 24 of the Act) and the Committee. Though the word 'Committee' has not been expressly stated in Clause (a) of Section 44, we think it is reasonable to hold that on account of this close statutory nexus, the mantle of protection afforded by that Section to the proceedings of the Board, should extend to the acts and the proceedings of the Committee also. To permit a challenge against the Constitution of the Committee would be to allow an indirect questioning of the validity of the constitution of the Board which would defeat the purpose of Section 44. Therefore, the validity of the proceedings of the Committee cannot be questioned on account of the mantle of protection provided by Section 44 of the Act, and consequently, the panel three persons submitted by the Committee to the Chancellor and the appointment of respondent 5 made out of that panel, cannot be challenged as being invalid on the ground of the defect arising out of Mr. Hanumanthappa's participation in the proceedings of the Committee.

91. It was also contended by Mr. Krishna Rao that if the petitioner in W.P. No. 2181 of 1970 wanted to question the right of Mr. Hanumanthappa to be a member of the Board or the Committee and to participate in the meeting of the Committee, he (the petitioner) should have asked such question being referred to the Chancellor, for bis decision as provided under Section 45 of the Act and that he (the petitioner) is not entitled to question the right of Mr. Hanumanthappa to be present in the meeting of the Committee or the validity of the proceedings thereof without first having raised that question before the Chancellor under Section 45.

92. In the view we have taken as to the validity of the proceedings of the Committee, it is not necessary to go into the question whether the petitioner in W. P. No. 2181 of 1970 should have, before coining to this Court, approached the Chancellor under Section 45 questioning the right of Mr. Hanumanthappa to be a member of the Committee and whether in view of such alternative remedy, we should or should not permit the petitioner to question in his petition the validity of the proceedings of the Committee.

93. The learned counsel for the respondents urged that the petitioner in W. P. No. 2181 of 1970 had acquiesced in the prescription by the Chancellor, of the qualifications for the office of the Vice-Chancellor and in Mr. Hanumanthappa's participation in the proceedings of the Committee and that his conduct was also such as to disentitle him to invoke the discretionary jurisdiction of this Court. It was said that those qualifications had been prescribed by the Chancellor as early as in the year 1967, that the petitioner who has been an ex-officio member of the Board and of the Committee, must have been aware of those qualifications, and that yet he did not choose to challenge the validity of such prescription of qualifications at any time before he filed this present petition. It was also said that he, being the Director of Animal Husbandry, must have been aware, well before the meeting of the Committee, of Mr. Hanumanthappa being placed in additional charge of the duties of the post of Director of Agriculture and that yet he did not raise any objection at the meeting of the Committee, to the presence of Mr. Hanumanthappa therein, nor did he complain to the Chancellor regarding the validity of the proceedings of that meeting, that he took the chance of being appointed as Vice-chancellor and that it was only when he was not so appointed, he challenged those proceedings in the present petition.

94. Learned counsel for the respondents argued that a person who sits on the fence and takes a chance of the decision being in his favour, cannot be permitted later to complain of the invalidity of the proceedings when such decision turns out to be against him, and that the discretionary jurisdiction of this court under Article 226, should not be exercised in favour of such a person.

95. In this additional reply-affida-vit. the petitioner in W. P. No. 2181 of 1970 has alleged that he was not aware of the invalidity of the prescription of qualifications by the Chancellor and of the legal position that Mr. Hanumanthappa was not entitled to be a member of the Committee, until he (the petitioner) came to know of the same during the course of his talk with his Advocate friend two days after the appointment of respondent 5 as the Vice-chancellor. Mr. Nambiar argued that when a person was not aware of the illegality of an act or proceeding, he cannot be said to have acquiesced in such illegal act or proceeding.

96. Having regard to the conclusions we have reached on the two grounds of attack on the appointment of respondent 5 as Vice-Chancellor, we think it unnecessary to express any opinion on the questions whether there has been acquiescence on the part of the petitioner in W. P. No. 2181 of 1970 and whether his conduct has been such as to disentitle him from invoking our jurisdiction under Article 226. Moreover, the validity of the appointment of respondent 5 has also been challenged in the connected petition, W. P. No. 2537 of 1970. The petitioner therein was not connected with the University and he is merely a private relator. Acquiescence or laches or the conduct of, sitting on the fence, cannot be attributed to him so as to bar his petition for a writ in the nature of quo-warranto. No doubt, it has been suggested in the counter-affidavits filed on behalf of the respondents that he has been set up by the petitioner in W. P. No. 2181 of 1970 in order to overcome the hurdles created by the latter's acquiescence and conduct. Apart from such bare suggestion, there is no material to infer that there is any collusion between these two petitioners or that the petitioner in W. P. No. 2537 of 1970 is an instrument of the other petitioner.

97. Mr. Patil sought to challenge the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Act on the ground of violation of Articles 14 and 16. He submitted that the procedure provided in Section 12 of the Act for the appointment of the Vice-Chancellor, deprives equality of opportunity to all persons who have the attainments and qualifications for being considered for such office, inasmuch as only those persons who catch the eyes of the members of the Committee, will be considered for that office and that such a procedure will lead to monopolistic tendencies.

98. The learned Advocate-General raised an objection that a person who is not an aspirant and eligible, for the office of the Vice-Chancellor but comes before Court only as a relator asking for issue of a writ in the nature of quo warranto, can only ask the court to examine whether the statutory provisions under which the holder of a public office is appointed or elected, have been complied with and that he (such petitioner) cannot question the' validity of the law under which such appointment is made or such election is held.

99. In support of his contention, the learned Advocate General relied on the decision in Queen v. Taylor, (1840) 9 LJQB 219. There, a Charter of incorporation had been granted to a borough under an Act of Parliament and a Coroner had been elected for the borough, under that Charter. A private party had asked for a rule for an information in the nature of quo warranto, questioning the validity of the Charter under which such election had taken place. While discharging the rule, this is what Lord Denman, C. J., said:

'The points discussed in this case, in fact involve the constitution of this borough; and the election of the Coroner is made the means of examining that question. This gentleman is in the possession of an office to which he has been appointed by virtue of a charter granted by the Crown, and his right to tile office must be questioned in some other manner'.

100. Littledale, J., who concurred with the learned Chief Justice, said :

'The effect of this application is to call in question the validity of the charter under which Mr. Taylor had been appointed. I am of opinion that that should not be done in this way.....'

101. The learned Advocate-General next referred to the decision ha Reg. v. Jones, (1863) 8 LT 503. There, one Mr. Jones was elected as Mayor of the Borough of Aberavon. A Charter of incorporation had been granted to that town by the Crown under the provisions of an Act of Parliament. A private citizen moved for a rule calling upon Mr. Jones to show cause why a quo warranto information should hot be filed against him for exercising the office of Mayor in Aberavon. In that petition, the legality of the Charter of Incorporation of Aberavon was questioned. Discharging the rules, Cockburn, C. J. said :

'You are seeking to repeal a charter not in question directed to the charter, but in a proceeding, against an individual.....'

102. The legal position has been summed up thus in Halsbury's Laws of England, (3rd Edition), Vol. 11, page 48, para 280:

'An information in the nature of a quo warranto would not have been permitted for the purpose of attacking the legality of a charter of incorporation granted to a town through an officer appointed thereunder. Accordingly, an information calling upon the defendant to show by what authority he claimed to be coroner of a borough on the ground that the borough charter had not been properly granted, was refused.'

103. The learned Advocate General argued that the same reasoning as in the above cases, should be applied when the validity of the statutory provisions under which a person is appointed or elected to a public office, has been challenged in a petition for a writ in the nature of quo warranto, and that such petitioner should not be permitted to question the validity of such statutory provisions.

104. We think the contention of the learned Advocate General is well founded : The reasoning adopted by the English Courts in the aforesaid two decisions, has equal application when the validity of the statutory provisions under which an appointment or election to a public office, has been made, is questioned in proceedings for quo warranto.

105. However, Mr. Patil contended that in order to assail the constitutionality of the Act under which respondent 5 had been appointed as Vice-Chancellor it is not necessary that the petitioner should be personally aggrieved by such appointment or should have any personal interest in such office. Mr. Patil sought to derive support for his contention from certain observations of the Supreme Court in Venkateshwara Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, : [1966]2SCR172 . There, the appellant had brought a petition before the Andhra Pradesh High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the order of the Government shifting the Primary Health Centre from his village to another village. He was the representative of the villagers who had deposited Rs. 10,000/- with the Block Development Committee and had also donated two acres of land for the purpose of locating the said Centre in that village and he had represented the village in the proceedings before the Government. It was contended that he had no locus standi to bring that petition. Repelling that contention, Subba Rao, J. (as he then was) said that ordinarily, the petitions who seeks to file a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, should be one who has a personal or individual right in the subject matter of the peti-tion, that personal right need not be in respect of a proprietary interest, that it can also relate to an interest of a trustee, and that, that apart, in exceptional cases a person who has been prejudicially affected by an Act or omission of an authority, can file a writ petition even though he has no proprietary or even fiduciary interest in the subject matter thereof.

106. We do not see how the above observations of the Supreme Court can be of any help to Mr. Patil. Apart from a bare assertion by Mr. Patil that the petitioner in W. P. No. 2537 of 1970 is interested in the development of agriculture in Mysore State and in the proper functioning of the agricultural University, it has not been shown that the petitioner has any special interest in the subject matter of the petition, so as to treat his case as an exceptional one and to depart from the general rule.

107. Lastly, it was urged by Mr. Patil that the procedure adopted by the Committee in deciding the panel of three persons, was violative of principles of natural justice inasmuch as persons who were included in such panel, had participated in the proceedings of the Committee and voted for themselves. This, according to Mr. Patil would amount to a person being judge in his own cause.

108. Assuming for the sake of arguments, that the procedure followed by the Committee while deciding the panel of names recommended to the Chancellor, was violative of principles of natural justice, a plea of violation of natural justice is not available where a statutory provision has authorised the procedure complained of Section 12 (2) of the Act does not provide that persons whose names are included or proposed to be included, in the panel of three persons to be sent to the Chancellor, should not be members of the Committee or should not participate in the proceedings of the Committee. Whether members whose names are included or proposed to be included in such panel, should or should not participate in such proceedings, is matter of propriety and not of legality. Hence, we are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Patil that the proceedings of the Committee were vitiated on account of the participation of members whose names were included or considered for inclusion in such panel.

109. All the grounds of attack on the appointment of respondent 5 as Vice-Chancellor, fail, and we dismiss these petitions. But in the circumstances of these cases, we direct the parties to bear their own costs in these petitions.

110. Before parting with these cases, we may observe that it is a matter for the Committee to consider whether it would not be desirable for the Committee to evolve a convention to the effect that a member whose name is proposed for inclusion in the panel of three persons to be sent to the Chancellor for appointment of the Vice-Chancellor, should withdraw from the discussion of the Committee and refrain from voting, unless he refuses the inclusion of his name in such panel. Such a convention will inspire public confidence in the recommendations of the Committee. The very reason for excluding from the Committee (which consists of the members of the Board), the Vice-chancellor who is the ex-officio Chairman of the Board, is that the person holding that office is ordinarily eligible for reappointment to that office, and it would not be appropriate for him to participate in the proceedings of the Committee. The same reasoning is equally applicable to the participation of other members of the Board if they are to be considered for being included in such panel.


Save Judgments// Add Notes // Store Search Result sets // Organizer Client Files //