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Sharmila Jewellery and ors. Vs. the Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Mysore and ors. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectCommercial
CourtKarnataka High Court
Decided On
Case NumberWrit Petn. Nos. 7508 to 7511 of 1969
Judge
Reported inAIR1972Kant132; AIR1972Mys132
ActsConstitution of India - Article 226; Gold Control Act, 1968 - Sections 27(5), 27(6), 80, 81 and 82; Gold Control Rules - Rule 2
AppellantSharmila Jewellery and ors.
RespondentThe Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Mysore and ors.
Appellant AdvocateG. Chander Kumar, Adv.
Respondent AdvocateM. Papanna, Jt. Standing Counsel for Central Government
DispositionPetition allowed
Excerpt:
.....to exhibit the palu patti in support of their case. -- code of civil procedure, 1908. order 41, rule 27: production of additional evidence production of a document exhibit d-15, being a registered sale deed - permission was granted to produce the document in evidence but, non-consideration of the said document of vital significance for the defendant in proving their case - held, when once the additional evidence had been permitted to be brought on record, it was the duty of the lower appellate court to have examine the effect of this evidence on the outcome of the suit. exhibit d-15 being a registered sale deed of the year 1935 and in respect of suit items 4,5,12, and 17 in a schedule and 1,2, and 3 of b schedule was a document of vital significance for the defendants in proving..........to as the act). their applica-tions were disposed of under section 27 (6) of the act read with rule 2 of the rules framed thereunder. in all these cases they were denied licences prayed for. the two reasons on the basis of which the applications were rejected can be gathered from the orders communicated to the applicants. it is sufficient for our purpose to set out that portion of the order contained in the letter dated 27-10-1969 addressed to the petitioner in w. p. 7508/69. the portion runs thus :--'(i) there are already three licensed gold dealers in the area, and taking into consideration the turnover for the past few years, it is felt that there is no justification for increasing the number of gold dealers in the area (rule 2 f); (ii) the applicants do not appear to have.....
Judgment:

Venkataswami, J.

1. In these four petitions common questions have arisen for consideration, and, therefore, they are disposed of together by this common order. The petitioners applied for the grant of Dealer's Licences presumably under Section 27 (5) of the Gold (Control) Act, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Their applica-tions were disposed of under Section 27 (6) of the Act read with Rule 2 of the Rules framed thereunder. In all these cases they were denied licences prayed for. The two reasons on the basis of which the applications were rejected can be gathered from the orders communicated to the applicants. It is sufficient for our purpose to set out that portion of the order contained in the letter dated 27-10-1969 addressed to the petitioner in W. P. 7508/69. The portion runs thus :--

'(i) There are already three licensed gold dealers in the area, and taking into consideration the turnover for the past few years, it is felt that there is no justification for increasing the number of gold dealers in the area (Rule 2 f);

(ii) The applicants do not appear to have adequate experience with regard to dealing in gold, making, manufacturing etc., of gold ornaments (Rule 2b) as they have been working only as salesmen or artisans or goldsmiths in M/s. Canara Jewellers.'

2. The tenor of the letters issued to the other petitioners before us is similar to the above.

3. Although several contentions have been raised in the writ petitions Sri G. Chandra Kumar, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in all these cases, put in the forefront of the submissions an argument bearing on the question of the sufficiency of the order in order to enable him to prefer an appeal or revision as provided under Sections 80 to 82 of the Act. In other words, his argument is that the orders are not 'Speaking Orders'. This argument of the learned counsel deserves to be accepted.

4. A speaking order, it seems to us. is one where the conclusions arrived at by the authority should be based on some material, a brief outline of which must be furnished as a part of that order. This is all the more so when a provision is made in the statute for an appeal or revision to be preferred against such an order. The purpose behind such requirement is that the appellate or revisional authority should have adequate material to consider the case of the appellant or petitioner in revision and also it is intended to provide an opportunity to such appellant or petitioner to raise grounds in regard to them. If an order suffers for want of details, this statutory opportunity afforded to a person who is aggrieved by it, should be deemed to have been denied.

5. In the instant case, although the first respondent in each of these cases has indicated that the cases of the applicants have been considered purpursuant to the provisions of Rule 2(b) and (f) of the relevant Rules, in our judgment what has been conveyed in the letters in question is only the conclusion arrived at for the purpose of rejecting their applications. The reasons in support of such conclusions, in our opinion, are not adequate enough to enable him to raise the grounds in regard to them. But the most important circumstance is that the authority has not furnished, even briefly, the particulars of material on the basis of which such conclusions were arrived at. When an order of this kind, which seeks to regulate a valuable right of the petitioners to carry on a trade of their choice, is made and especially when they are appealable and further revisable in accordance with the provisions under a special statute, an applicant should have been furnished however briefly the material facts which have been made the basis for the conclusions arrived at by such authority. It is not shown to us that any other order was communicated to the petitioners, wherein the authority concerned has dealt with in Section 27 (6) of the Act read in conjunction with Rule 2 of the Rules. In this state of affairs, we have no alternative but to quash the impugned orders in each of these writ petitions. We make an order accordingly.

6. In the result, the petitions are allowed. The first respondent will now proceed to dispose of the applications afresh in accordance with law. In this view of the matter, we do not express any view on the other questions raised in these petitions.

7. In the circumstances, we make no order as to costs.


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