Skip to content


Meenakshi Vs. Director of Public Instruction and ors. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectLabour and Industrial
CourtKarnataka High Court
Decided On
Case NumberWrit Petition No. 2515 of 1965
Judge
Reported in(1967)IILLJ151Kant; (1966)2MysLJ619
ActsMysore Village Panchayats and Taluk Boards Employees (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1962 - Rule 10; Mysore Village Panchayats and Local Boards Act, 1959 - Sections 210 and 210(1)
AppellantMeenakshi
RespondentDirector of Public Instruction and ors.
Excerpt:
.....of office was issued on basis of memorandum issued by deputy director of public instruction - taluk board should have declined to allow respondent no. 3 who have not been appointed by it to displace petitioner on basis of his appointment by director of public instructions - order of termination quashed - held, petitioner entitled to reisnattement. held see paras 11, 12 and 13. - motor vehicles act, 1988 [c.a. no. 59/1988]section 149; [ram mohan reddy, j] accident-claim - liability of the insurer of the offending vehicle to pay the compensation passenger in a goods carriage liability of the insurance company - statement made by the claimant/injured before the police authorities, in the course of investigation, that he was travelling in the goods vehicle as a gratuitous passenger..........on which we are asked to do so if that the appointing authority for the post of a headmaster in a taluk board high school is the taluk board, and not the director of public instruction or the deputy director of public instruction, and that in directing the petitioner to hand over charge of her office, on the basis of the memorandum issued by the deputy director of public instruction, the taluk board abdicated its power and acted without the authority of law. 2. it is seen that the papers produced before us that the petitioner was in service in the district board elementary school in south kanara between the years 1945 and 1951 and that she served in the south kanara district board high school as a graduate assistant from june 2, 1956 till july 13, 1963. it is also seen that when she was.....
Judgment:

Per Somnath Ayyar, J.

1. Srimati Meenakshi was appointed temporarily as a headmistress in the taluk development board girls' high school, Mudigere, on July 9, 1963. This appointment was made by the concerned taluk development board. On January 28, 1964 she was instructed by the chief executive officer of the taluk development board to hand over charge of the institution to Sri Y. M. Mahabala Rao. The memorandum issued to Smt. Meenakshi stated that Sri Y. M. Mahabala Rao had been newly posted as headmaster in accordance with the memorandum issued by the Deputy Director of Public Instruction of January 14, 1964. Srimati Meenakshi is the petitioner and Sri Mahabala Rao is respondent 3. The petitioner asks us in this writ petition to quash the order by which her services were terminated, and, the main ground on which we are asked to do so if that the appointing authority for the post of a headmaster in a taluk board high school is the taluk board, and not the Director of Public Instruction or the Deputy Director of Public Instruction, and that in directing the petitioner to hand over charge of her office, on the basis of the memorandum issued by the Deputy Director of Public Instruction, the taluk board abdicated its power and acted without the authority of law.

2. It is seen that the papers produced before us that the petitioner was in service in the district board elementary school in South Kanara between the years 1945 and 1951 and that she served in the South Kanara district Board High School as a graduate assistant from June 2, 1956 till July 13, 1963. It is also seen that when she was appointed as temporary headmistress in the taluk board high school, Mudigere, she sent in her resignation of the graduate assistant's post in Karkala, and that resignation was accepted by the headmaster of that school on July 13, 1963.

3. What is also equally clear is that on January 14, 1964 the Director of Public Instruction in Mysore made an order promoting respondent 3 on a temporary basis as the headmaster of the taluk board high school in Mudigere, and the description of respondent 3 in that memorandum prepared by the Director of Public Instruction shows that respondent 3 was an assistant master in the district board high school, Huliyar, at some antecedent stage. It is on the basis of this promotion by which the taluk development board, Mudigere, considered itself bound that the petitioner was informed by the memorandum issued to her January 28, 1964 that she should hand over charge to respondent 3. By a subsequent order made on February 29, 1964 the petitioner was informed that her services were terminated with effect from January 25, 1964 and that memorandum reads :

'Srimati K. Meenakshi is hereby informed that she was appointed headmistress to the taluk development board girls' high school on temporary basis which was clearly mentioned and intimated in the appointment memorandum issued. Consequent to the posting of a headmaster by the Director of Public Instruction the services of Smt. K. Meenakshi were terminated and she has been relieved of her duties. The services of Smt. K. Meenakshi as headmistress of the taluk development board girls' high school were terminated with effect from 25 January, 1964.'

4. The clear meaning of this memorandum and of the earlier memorandum which was issued on January 28, 1964 by the concerned taluk development board is that the board terminated the services of the petitioner because it thought that Sri Mahabala Rao (respondent 3) who was appointed by the Director of Public Instruction displaced her.

5. Although the appointment of the petitioner was a temporary appointment and her services could have been terminated by the taluk board for that reason without the assignment of any other reason, what is more than perfectly manifest is that there was no application of the mind of the taluk development board to the question whether the appointment could be terminated in the exercise of its own power in that way. The reason for the termination was the promotion of respondent 3 by the Director of Public Instruction, and it is plain that the board thought that that promotion put an end to the appointment of the petitioner.

6. The main argument before us surrounded the question whether the Director of Public Instruction had the power to make an appointment to the post of a headmaster in a taluk board high school. If he did have the power, it should follow that the appointment of respondent 3 necessarily displaced the appointment of the petitioner. But it was urged for the petitioner that the appointing authority was the taluk board and not the Director, and in support of that submission the appeal was to the provisions of rule 10 of the Mysore Village Panchayats and Taluk Boards Employees (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1962, made by Government in the exercise of the rule making power created by S. 210 of the Mysore Village Panchayats and Local Boards Act, 1959. Clause (k) of S. 210(1) of the Act authorizes rules by Government in respect of recruitment of officers and servants of panchayats and taluk boards, and rule 10 of the rules which concerns itself with that topic, reads :

'In the case of posts under a panchayat, the panchayat, shall be the appointing authority for all posts. In the case of posts under the taluk board, the chief executive officer shall be the appointing authority for posts carrying a maximum pay up to Rs. 100 per month and the taluk board shall be the appointing authority in respect of other posts.'

7. The meaning of this rule is that the power to recruit officers and servants of a taluk board resides in the taluk board and in none else. But it was urged by Sri Venkataranga Ayyangar appearing for the taluk board and Sri Ramanathan appearing for respondent 3 that since the taluk board was the recipient of a huge grant by the State Government, the provisions of the Grant-in-aid Code became applicable, and that under the provisions of that code the taluk board was under a duty to be advised by the Director of Public Instruction in respect of appointments to posts in the schools managed and conducted by the taluk board.

8. But the infirmity in this submission is that the Grant-in-aid Code is a compendium of administrative instructions issued by the State Government from time to time, whereas rule 10 of the rules made under S. 210 of the Act is a statutory provision having the force in law, and, that being so, the efficacy of the rules is not defeated by anything contained in the Grant-in-aid Code, even if the instructions contained in that Code have applications to a taluk board high school, in regard to which no material was made available to us.

9. The power created by rule 10 does not to any extent depend upon the receipt of a grant made by the State Government by the taluk board. On the subject of recruitment, rule 10 is a full and complete statutory provision, and recruitment to the post of an officer or a servant of a taluk board could be made only in accordance with those provisions.

10. In that view of the matter, the appointment of respondent 3 by the Director of Public Instruction, was without the authority of law. In Adam v. Director of Public Instruction [(1966) 1 Mys. L. J. 405] this Court expressed the view that the scheme of the Mysore Village Panchayats and Local Boards Act and the rules made thereunder does not authorize the Director of Public Instruction to make appointments to educational institutions conducted by the taluk boards. We are in complete agreement with this enunciation.

11. What we have said so far demonstrates that the taluk board of Mudigere which is respondent 2 before us, could not have terminated the services of the petitioner on the ground that respondent 3 had been inducted into the post held by her, by the Director of Public Instruction. It was for the taluk board to decide by the application of its own mind, whether the petitioner should or should not continue in the post held by her, and the board should have declined to allow respondent 3 who have not been appointed by it to displace the petitioner on the basis of his appointment by the Director of Public Instruction.

12. In that view of the matter the fact that the petitioner was only temporarily appointed by the taluk board ceased to have relevance, especially, since the taluk board did not terminate her appointment because of its temporary character, but terminated it because it thought that it had no power to continue her in that post after the Director made his appointment. If that is the ground stated by the taluk board, as indeed it is, and that ground is an unavailable ground the order of termination must fall to the ground.

13. We accordingly quash the order of termination made by the taluk board on February 29, 1964 and the memorandum preceding it which was issued on January 28, 1964. In consequence petitioner will be entitled to be reinstated in that post on the basis that her services were never terminated, and without prejudice to continuity in service and the seniority emanating therefrom. But we make a record that Sri Datar made a submission in the course of his argument that the petitioner would not, in the event of our making the order which we have made, ask for a direction for payment of any salary for the period between the date on which her services were terminated and the date of this order. So we make no order in regard to that matter.

14. Sri. Ramanathan for respondent 3 contended that under S. 242(2)(b) of the Mysore Village Panchayats and Local Boards Act respondent 3 is entitled to the absorbed in a post in some taluk board or in the civil services of the State, since he was at an antecedent stage, before that Act came into force, a servant of a district board. It is very clear that respondent 3 has that right created by that clause. It is for the Government now to determine in which taluk board or in which limb of the civil services of the State he should be absorbed in implementation of that right created by that clause. It is of course clear that respondent 3 is entitled to ask for the recognition of that right through appropriate representations.

15. No costs.


Save Judgments// Add Notes // Store Search Result sets // Organizer Client Files //