Per Somnath Ayyar, J.
1. In this writ petition, we are asked to say that there was wrongful refusal of approval for dismissal under S. 33(2) of the Industrial Dispute Act. Respondent 2 is a workman and the petitioner is the employer. There was a domestic enquiry against the workman in respect of four charges. The first was that there was an act of overloading; the second was that respondent 2 had not equipped himself with ticket-books; the third was that he tampered with the ticket-books and the fourth was that he similarly tampered with the gate-pass. The finding recorded in the domestic enquiry was that all these four charges were established.
2. But the industrial tribunal, whose approval was sought under S. 33(2) to the order of dismissal made by the employer, was of the view that one of the four charges was not established. It was further of the view that since there was no standing order which made it obligatory on the part of the workman to equip himself with the ticket-book, the second charge could not be sustained and that in consequence approval for his dismissal should be refused.
3. Sri Puttaswami, in our opinion, is right in contending that so long as the other three charges were found to be well-founded, the mere fact that the tribunal thought that the second charge could not succeed, could not form a ground for refusal of the approval sought.
4. If in a domestic enquiry there are two charges and one of them does not succeed even in the domestic enquiry, the dismissal of the workman on the other charge which is proved is permissible and when approval for such dismissal is sought under S. 33(2) the industrial tribunal could not refuse it on the ground that the other charge did not succeed. We see no difference in principle between a case where the domestic tribunal exonerates the workman of one of the charges and a case where the industrial tribunal comes to the conclusion that charge is groundless. In Narayana Kamath v. Ganapathi Kamath [1966 - II L.L.J. 266] (vide p. 266 supra in this issue) this Court observed that the fact that one of the charges is not established, is not sufficient to withhold the approval asked for. So the tribunal was not right in declining to accord the approval on the ground mentioned by it.
5. We find it also difficult to agree with the view taken by the tribunal that the second charge was not established. The petitioner has not prepared any standing orders regulating the conditions of service oh his employees and so there were no standing orders in the present case. The tribunal was of the view that the second charge could not succeed since there was no standing order enjoining the workman who was a conductor to equip himself with ticket-books. But it is obvious that it is one of the obvious duties of the conductor to equip himself with the requisite number of ticket-books since one of his duties is to issue tickets to travellers in the stage carriage and to collect the fare from such passengers. It is unnecessary that there should be a standing order directing him to do so.
6. Sub-section (2) to S. 33 which empowers an employer to impose a punishment 'in accordance with the standing orders applicable to a workman' does not make it imperative for an employer to prepare standing orders before he could impose such punishment. The phrase 'in accordance with the standing orders applicable to a workman' has relevance to a case where there are such standing orders and it cannot be said that there could be no imposition of punishment by an employer in the exercise of the power created by S. 33(2) in a case where the employer has not made any standing orders. We occur in the enunciation made by the High Court of Bombay in Bipat Beni v. Sawarkar (P. D.) [1962 - I LLJ. 61] that is how S. 33(2) has to be understood.
7. We therefore, set aside the impugned order of the industrial tribunal and we direct the industrial tribunal to accord to the petitioner the approval which was sought by him. No costs.