1. The writ petitioner is a Cooperative Society registered under the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act, 1959 and is running a Sugar Factory at Gouribidanur in Kolar Dist. Gouribidanur is approximately at a distance of 15 kilometres away from the Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh border in Karnataka. The sugarcane growers of Andhra Pradesh approached the petitioner Society, according to the writ petitioner, with a request to purchase the sugarcane grown by them with a view to alleviate the suffering of the sugarcane growers from Andhra Pradesh and the Board of Management of the petitioner Society resolved to purchase the sugarcane grown by them. Pursuant to the said resolution of the Board, the Society purchased the sugarcane during the years 1973-74, 1974-75 and 1975-76. The petitioner has further submitted that at the time when the Board resolved to purchase the sugarcane from the growers in Andhra Pradesh, the purchase of sugarcane was exempted from tax under the General Sales Tax Laws. The third respondent the Asst. Director of Agriculture in the writ petition, however, issued a show cause notice demanding the tax at the rate of Rs. 10 per metric ton of sugarcane purchased by the petitioner Society from the growers in Andhra Pradesh during the year 1973 season under the Andhra Pradesh Regulation of Supply and Purchase Act, 1961. After failing in its attempt to persuade the authorities to desist from making this demand, the present writ petitioner Society filed Writ Petition No. 516 of 1976 before the High Court of Judicature at Andhra Pradesh, questioning amongst other things the legality of the demand made by the third respondent. The Andhra Pradesh High Court by its order dated 26-9-1977 allowed the writ petition filed by the petitioner herein and set aside the demand notice and further directed the third respondent herein to determine the liability, if any, after giving due notice to the petitioner Society to place before him all the materials and evidence if any, as to tile place of purchase. A copy of the order of the Andhra Pradesh High Court is produced along with the writ petition and is marked at Annexure A. Pursuant to the said direction issued by the Andhra Pradesh High Court, the third respondent herein called upon the petitioner-Society to furnish all the particulars with regard to the cane purchased from the sugar cane growers of Andhra Pradesh and to appear before him and to submit what the petitioner has to submit in the matter. In response to the said notice, the petitioner appeared before the third respondent and filed a detailed statement, regarding purchase of the cane, as per Annexure B in the writ petition. The petitioner also produced the relevant documents like agreements, permits etc., before the third respondent. After examining the documents and agreement and on hearing the petitioner, the third respondent herein held that purchase of sugarcane was completed within the State of Andhra Pradesh and as such the petitioner Society was liable to pay the tax under the Act. A copy of the order is produced along with the writ petition and marked as Annexure C. Against the order, the present writ petitioner preferred an appeal before the second respondent namely, the Cane Commissioner and the Director of Andhra Pradesh Government, Hyderabad under S. 21(a) read with Rule 43 (c) (1) of the Rules. The second respondent without hearing the petitioner, according to the present petitioner, dismissed the appeal by an order dated 29-4-1978. A copy of the said order is herewith produced and marked as Annexure D along with the writ petition. A revision petition was preferred against that order as provided under Section 21(a)(3) before the first respondent-Government of Andhra Pradesh and the first respondent-Government dismissed the revision petition without affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. It is further contended that the orders at Annexures D and E are not speaking orders. at all. On these material allegations this is what is prayed in the writ petition.
'Wherefore it is prayed that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to issue a writ in the nature of mandamus or certiorari quashing:-
(i) Order No. RCO.380/1977 dated 17-21978 issued by the 3rd respondent (Annexure C);
(ii) Order No. (F2) 1558/1975 dated 29-4-1978 issued by the 2nd respondent (Annexure D);
(iii) Order No. 3172/IA & S/78-4 dated 9-11-1978 issued by the 1st respondent (Annexure E) and
(iv) Grant such other -writ, order or direction as this Hon'ble Court deems fit in the circumstances of the case in the interest of justice.'
2. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents raised a preliminary objection at the very outset stating that the writ petition is not maintainable before this Court, on the facts. He submitted that since the prayer is to quash the order passed by the Tribunal under the jurisdiction of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, by issuing a writ of certiorari, this Court would not get jurisdiction as it has no supervisory powers over the Tribunal within the jurisdiction of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. He further submitted that the writ petition should be under Article 226 read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
3. As against that, the learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner submitted that Article 226, as amended, states that the writ is maintainable wherever cause of action or any part of it arises. This is what Art. 226(2) states:
'Power conferred by Clause 1 to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories.'
Relying on this clause, the learned counsel submitted that since the sale has taken place within the territories of Karnataka, the cause of action has arisen in Karnataka and, as such, this High Court has jurisdiction to entertain the writ and to dispose it of on merits.
4. I have already reproduced the prayer in the writ petition. The prayer is to quash the order of the Tribunal confirmed by the appellate and revisional authorities. The Tribunal is obviously situate in Andhra Pradesh and it is subject to the control of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. In other words, the cause of action for this writ petition is the order passed by the Tribunal and not the sale on which the order of the Tribunal is based. Therefore, in my considered view, the cause of action or any part of it has arisen within the territories of Karnataka. The order is not passed by the Tribunal in Karnataka but, it is passed by the Tribunal in Andhra Pradesh.
5. It may further be seen that when the authority earlier demanded Rs. 10/- per ton of Sugarcane, a writ petition was filed before the Andhra Pradesh High Court and the Andhra Pradesh High Court directed the particular authority to give an opportunity to the present writ petitioner and on hearing him, pass a considered order. It is already held that the sale has taken place in Andhra Pradesh and no part of it has taken place in Karnataka. That being so, prima facie, as the order of the Tribunal stands, the sale has taken place in Andhra Pradesh and it has assumed jurisdiction. It is the order of the Tribunal of Andhra Pradesh that is challenged before me.
6. In this context it is necessary to examine the nature of writ to be issued by way of certiorari quashing the order of the Tribunal. I would refer to only one authority by the Supreme Court as it is followed in subsequent cases. It is in the case of T. C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa : 1SCR250 . The judgment is rendered by Justice B. K. Mukherjea. In paras 5 and 6 of the judgment it is observed thus :
'Para 5 : The principles upon which the superior Courts in England interfere by issuing writs of 'certiorari' are fairly will known and they have generally formed the basis of decisions in our Indian Courts. It is true that there is lack of uniformity even in the pronouncements of English Judges, with regard to the, grounds upon which a writ, or as it is now said, an order of 'certiorari', could issue, but such differences of opinion are unavoidable in judge-made law which has developed through a long course of years. As is well known, the issue of the prerogative writs, within which, 'certiorari' is included, bad their origin in England in the King's prerogative power of superintendence over the due observance of law by his officials and Tribunals. The writ of 'certiorari' is so named because in its original form it required that the King should be 'certified of' the proceedings to be investigated and the object was to secure by the authority of a superior Court, that the jurisdiction of the inferior Tribunal should be properly exercised, vide - 'Ryots of Garabandho v. Zemindar of Parlakimedi' . These principles were transplanted to other parts of the King's dominions.
In India, during the British days, the three chartered High Courts of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras were alone competent to issue writs and that too within specified limits and the power was not exercisable by the other High Courts at all. 'In that situation' as this Court observed in 'Election Commission, India. v. Sake Venkata Rao' : 4SCR1144 the makers of the Constitution having decided to provide for certain basic safeguards for the people in the new set up, which they called fundamental rights, evidently thought it necessary to provide also a quick and inexpensive remedy for the enforcement of such rights and, finding that the prerogative writs which the Courts in England had developed and used whenever urgent necessity demanded immediate and decisive interposition, were peculiarly suited for the purpose, they conferred in the States sphere new and wide powers on the High Courts of issuing directions, orders, or writs primarily for the enforcement of fundamental rights, the power to issue such directions, 'for any other purpose' being also included with a view apparently to place all the High Courts in this country in somewhat the same Position as the Court of King's Bench in England.'
Again in para 8 the decision states that a writ of certiorari is by way of supervisory capacity of the High Court.
7. Article 227 of the Constitution reads :
'(1) Every High Court shall have superintendence over All Courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction.'
Thus taking the scheme of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and purpose of issuing the writ of certiorari by the, High Court in its supervisory capacity, I am constrained to hold that it would not be just and proper for the High Court of Karnataka to quash the order of the Tribunal situate within the jurisdiction of the Andhra Pradesh High Court by issuing of a writ of certiorari. In order to issue a writ of certiorari for quashing the order of the Tribunal, it is clear that the Tribunal should be subject to supervisory capacity of the High Court being within its territorial jurisdiction. In the instant case the Tribunal is in Andhra Pradesh and it is the order of that Tribunal which is sought to be quashed by issue of a writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution.
8. It may be pointed out that Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution are supplementary and complementary. It is necessary to bear in mind the provision made in Article 227 also while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution by issuing a writ of certiorari to quash an order of a Tribunal.
9. In the case of Oil India Ltd. v. G. N. Borah, (1977 Lab IC 1610), a Division Bench of the High Court of Calcutta, consisting of Chief Justice Sankar Prasad Mitra and Salil Kumar Datta J., has observed in Para 17 of the judgment thus, which supports the view that I have taken:
'Mr. Ginwalla has next contended that this Court has no jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari as the records of the case are not within its jurisdiction. This contention is wholly unacceptable. We have seen that by an order of the Central Government the entire proceedings had been transferred to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal at Calcutta which has its office well within the jurisdiction of this Court.'
Thus, it becomes clear that unless the records of the case are within its jurisdiction, the High Court would not issue a writ of certiorari.
Similarly, in the case of Shiv Shanker Lal Gupta v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay (AIR 1968 Delhi 295), a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, consisting of Chief Justice K. S. Hegde and T. V. R. Tatachari J., has ruled that the High Court of Delhi could not entertain a writ of certiorari with regard to an order passed by the income-tax Commissioner in Bombay for seizure of articles.
10. I have already pointed out above that what is sought to be challenged and quashed in the present writ petition is the order passed by the Tribunal within the jurisdiction of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and that no part of the cause of action has arisen within the limits of Karnataka State. Therefore, I am constrained to hold that the present writ petition is not tenable before the Karnataka High Court and, hence, it is dismissed.
11. No costs.
12. Petition dismissed.