1. In this petition under Article 226(1)(a), (b) and (c) of the Constitution the petitioner who is the registered owner of the Matador Vehicle Bearing No. MES 3306, has challenged the correctness of the order passed by the R. T. O.. Shimoga dated 3-1-1979 (Ex. B) and also the order assed by the Deputy Commissioner for Transport Shimoga in Tax Appeal No. 7/79 dated 25-5-1979 (Ex. D).
2. The necessary facts for consideration of the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner are not in dispute, The R. T.O. Chittoor after affording due opportunity to the petitioner, by his order dated 26-12-78 (Ex. C) suspended the registration certificate of the vehicle in question for a period of four months for the reasons recorded therein. Thereafter the R. T. O. Chittoor forwarded the impounded R. C. Book of the vehicle in question to the R. T. O. Shimoga. On receipt of the same the R. T. O Shimoga intimated the petitioner that he should not run the vehicle on the road for a period of four months from the date of surrender of the documents and further directed the petitioner to surrender the documents such as valid tax card, insurance certificate along with both the number plates and further to declare the place where the vehicle would be stationed during the period of suspension.
3. Against the said order the petitioner went up in appeal before the Deputy Commissioner for Transport, Shimoga who by the order dated 25-5-79 has dismissed the appeal holding that in view of the order passed by the R. T. O. Chittoor which had not been challenged before the proper authority, by action been taken by the R. T. O. Shimoga, was nothing but to enforce the order of suspension pined by the R. T.O. Chittoor and, as such there was no illegality whatsoever.
4. The Sri Viswanath , the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner put forth the following, contentions: (1) that the order passed by the R. T. O. Chittoor was without Jurisdiction; (2) that the R. T. O. Shimoga had no Jurisdiction to execute the order passed by the R. T. O. Chittoor; (3) that the appellate authority committed an error in not considering the appeal on merits.
5. The first contention is based on the provisions contained in S. 33 of the Motor Vehicles Act,'1939 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). According to the contention of Sri Vishwanath, the learned 'counsel for the petitioner, the expression.any registering authority occurring in S. 33 of the Act must mean the authority who has registered the vehicle and not any other authority. But this contention overlooks the definition contained in S. 2 (28) of the Act, according to which 'registering authority' means an authority empowered to register motor vehicles under Chap. in. It is undisputed that the R. T. O. Chittoor. was an authority empowered to register motor vehicles under Chap. III of the Act. Thus, he was the registering authority for the purpose of Chap. III of the Act. S. 33 of the Act, is found in Chap. III of the Act. That being so, the R. T. O. Chittoor, being a registering authority, was competent to take action against the vehicle in question which, having been registered as a private vehicle, was found to be used for hire when it was checked by the Assistant Motor Vehicles Inspector, Tirupathi (Enforcement), on 30-11-1978 at p. m. on Tirupathi-Tiruchanoor Road. Therefore, the first contention raised by the learned, counsel for the petitioner is without force.
6. With regard to second contention, it is not disputed that the R. T. O. Shimoga, on receipt of the order along with the impounded certificate of the registration of the vehicle in question from the R. T. O. Chittoor, has informed the petitioner not to run the vehicle for the period mentioned in the order of suspension. Under sub see. (3) of S. 33 of the Act, the authority which suspends the permit, if it is not the original registering authority has to inform that authority of suspension. Accordingly, the R. T. O. Chittoor has forwarded the impounded certificate of registration along with the order of suspension to the R.T.O. Shimoga for enforcement of the order of suspension. On receipt of the same the R. T. O. Shimoga has informed dy petitioner under sub-see. (4) S 33 of the Act. to comply with the order of suspension passed by the R. T. O. Chittoor. There is no provision prohibiting the R. T. O. Shimoga from enforcing such an order, Further, once there is an order of Suspension, the owner of the vehicle, on demand by the registering authority or other 'prescribed authority which has suspended the certificate of registration of the vehicle, is bound to surrender the necessary documents as mentioned in S. 83 (4) of the Act. The R. T. O. Shimoga, being the original registering authority was competent to enforce the order of suspension as otherwise the first part of sub-section (3) of S.33 of the Act will be rendered nugatory. The purpose of informing the original registering authority of the order of suspension is to enable that authority to enforce the order of suspension which continues for a period of four months. Accordingly the R. T. O. Shimoga was well within his jurisdiction in enforcing the order of suspension passed b the R. T. O. Chittoor against the, vehicle in question.
7. The last contention of the petitioner that the appeal was not considered on merits, cannot also be accepted. As long as the order passed the R. T..O. Chittoor remained unchallenged there was very little to be consider6d in the appeal on merits. Therefore the Deputy Commissioner for transport was right in holding that in view of the order passed by the R. T. O. Chittor which was not challenge by the petitioner before the proper authority there was nothing more to be considered in the appeal. The Deputy Commissioner for Transport, shimoga could not have sat over the order of R. T. O. Chittoor as an appellate authority and could not. have decided as to whether the order of suspension passed by the R. T. O. Chittoor was justified in law and on facts. Accordingly the Deputy Commissioner for transport has rejected the appeal on merits and not on the ground that the appeal was not maintainable. Consequently all the three contentions raised y the petitioner fail. Hence there is no ground to issue rule. Accordingly the writ petition is dismissed.
8. Petition dismissed.