Gopivallabha Iyengar, J.
1. The petitioner made an application for the grant of 3 acres of land in what he refers to as Survey No. 288 of Kadidalvillage, Mandya Taluk. This application was made for the reason that one acre of his land in survey No. 185 of the same village had been acquired. This application was made in November 1956. The 3rd respondent raised objections to this grant stating that on his application for the grant of 2 acres of land on 18-6-1948, an order had been made by the Government granting 2 acres in Block B out of survey No. 179 of the same village.
The contention was that the land granted to him was the same as the one for which the petitioner had made the application in November 1956 under the document a copy of which is marked Ex. B in this case. The Tahsildar rejected this petition on 15-7-1959. On appeal, the Assistant Commissioner remanded the matter in order to ascertain the identity of the land which was in question. After the receipt of the report from the Tahsildar, the Assistant Commissioner made an order on 11-7-1962 rejecting the petitioner's application for grant of land.
The petitioner's appeal to the Deputy Commissioner was also rejected on 31-10-1962. But on further appeal to the Divisional Commissioner by the petitioner, an order was passed on 21-7-1965 remanding the matter for fresh consideration by the Deputy Commissioner. On such remand, the Deputy Commissioner made an order on 14-12-1966 allowing the petitioner's appeal and directing the grant of land to the petitioner. That order is marked Ex. P. The Special Deputy Commissioner directed that the land applied for by the petitioner and kept by him unauthorisedly be granted to him at an upset price of Rs. 200/- an acre. This order is marked Ex. P. The 3rd respondent before us took up the matter in appeal before the Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal in appeal No. 3243 of 1966 and the appeal was allowed by an order dated 13-8-1968.
By this Order, the Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal set aside the order of the Special Deputy Commissioner and in the result respondent 2 has now to be evicted from the portion of 2 acres of land which has been granted to the 3rd respondent. The petitioner being aggrieved by this order of the Revenue Appellate Tribunal has filed this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, praying, a writ of certiorari be issued quashing the grant in favour of the 3rd respondent and also the order of the Mysore revenue Appellate Tribunal which is marked Ex. G.
2. The counsel appearing for the petitioners have taken us through the records of the case in detail. The contention of Shri Kadidal Manjappa, the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal) was wrong in holding that the land granted to the 3rd respondent is the same as the one for which the petitioner made the application for grant. It was contended that the order of the Deputy Commissioner in so far as the settlement of the boundary is concerned is final under Section 142 of the Land Revenue Code.
This question as to whether the boundary fixed by the official is final or not does not arise in this case as the question that arises is one relating to the identity of the land which the 3rd respondent claims as the one which has been granted to him for the grant of which the petitioner has made a subsequent application. Shri Manjappa further contended that the question in this case is one of interpretation of the document under which the grant has been made to the petitioner, namely, Ex. B. He contends that in effect the Revenue Appellate Tribunal has substituted Survey No. 288 in place of Survey No. 175, and therefore the order of the Revenue Appellate Tribunal is prima facie erroneous. We are unable to accept these contentions.
The question that arose for consideration was, what was intended to be granted under Exhibit B. Exhibit-B is quite clear that the Government granted Block B measuring 2 acres out of Survey No. 179. As already mentioned, the question was whether this land was identical with the one for which an application is made for the grant by the petitioner so that it is not the question of interpretation of the Government Order. The question relates to fixation of the identity of the land which is the subject matter of Exhibit B. The Tribunal on appeal has gone into this question relating to the identity of the land in very great detail and has come to a definite conclusion that there can be the least doubt that the portion of the land now in dispute is the one granted to the present appellant, that is, third respondent before us. Further, they state in paragraph 9 of the order as follows:-
'For the aforesaid reasons, we cannot uphold the contention of the respondent No. 2 that the land granted to the present appellant is something different from the land occupied by him and the order of the Special Deputy Commissioner in this behalf cannot be sustained and the appeal has to be allowed.'
Therefore it is clear from Ex. G, the order of the Tribunal that as a finding of fact, they hold that the land in respect of which the application for Darkhast was made by petitioner was the same as the one that was granted to the petitioner. Shri Manjappa invited our attention to decision in Syed Yakoob v. Radhakrishnan, : 5SCR64 in support of his contention that the finding of the Revenue Appellate Tribunal is not based on any evidence. On a reading of Ex. G we find that this contention is unsustainable. The Tribunal has gone into the question that arose before them for consideration in great detail. Even if we should find that on facts it is possible for us to take a different view, even then we cannot interfere in exercise of our powers under Art. 226 with the finding of fact given by the Tribunal. In the same decision as the one cited by Shri K. Manjappa, the Supreme Court observes as follows:--
'The jurisdiction of High Court to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings on fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be.....'
It was also urged by Shri Manjappa that there is an error of law in the order of the Tribunal inasmuch as it has failed to consider whether there has been a valid grant in favour of the 3rd respondent or not. In the first place, the error of law that is now referred to is not one that is patent on the face of the record. Further, at no stage of the proceedings, before the lower tribunals was the grant in favour of the 3rd respondent questioned as being not in accordance with law.
3. It was further contended that the order of the tribunal amounts to a modification of the grant made by Government. As observed already, it is not a modification of the order of Government under Ex. B, that the Tribunal has made, but has merely explained the implications of the said order. Therefore, the contention that there is a modification of the Government Order by the Tribunal cannot be sustained.
4. A further contention related to the direction issued by the Tribunal with respect to 31 guntas of land said to be the remaining area after the grant of two acres to the 3rd Respondent. The direction of the Tribunal is as follows:-
'If the remaining area of 25 guntas, out of S. No. 288 shown in the said sketch is available for disposal the concerned authority may consider granting the same to the respondent No. 2 as already indicated in the previous orders and strictly according to Rules. We also direct that the Tahsildar shall consider that case of respondent No. 3 in respect of 6 guntas in this area about which his application is said to be pending before the Tahsildar....'
In view of this observation it is not as if the petitioner is refused the grant of land, but the matter is left open. In view of the fact that the Darkhast was not in respect of 25 guntas of land nor did it concern the 6 guntas of land in respect of which the 3rd respondent before the Tribunal laid claim, we are not inclined to interfere with that portion of the Tribunal's order also.
5. The next contention urged was in respect of costs awarded by the Tribunal. We think that the Tribunal was not right in granting exemplary costs to the third respondent to be paid by the appellant. We see no justification for this order regarding costs. This portion of the Tribunal's order is set aside. We direct that each party will bear his own costs in the proceedings before the Tribunal as also here.
6. Shri K. Manjappa represents that there are standing corps (sugarcanes crops) on the disputed land, and raised by the petitioner, and he may be granted some time to reap the same, before he is evicted from the land. The fact that crops are standing is not admitted by third respondent. We hereby direct that in case the crops are now standing on the disputed lands, the petitioner will have three month's time from this date to obey the orders of eviction. If the Deputy commissioner finds that there are no standing crops, the petitioner will be evicted in accordance with the Tribunal's order. Subject to the directions given above, this writ petition is dismissed.
7. Order accordingly.