Skip to content


J. Nandanlal Javantaraj Vs. V. Narayanaswamy - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectTenancy
CourtKarnataka High Court
Decided On
Case NumberCivil Petn. No. 237 of 1974
Judge
Reported inAIR1975Kant237; 1975(2)KarLJ145
ActsKarnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 - Sections 3, 21 and 50; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908 - Order 47, Rule 1; Trade Marks Act, 1940
AppellantJ. Nandanlal Javantaraj
RespondentV. Narayanaswamy
Appellant AdvocateB.G. Sridharan, Adv.
Respondent AdvocateM. Sreerangaiah, Adv.
Excerpt:
.....and give the evidence in a proceedings under section 138 of the act? held, there is no bar for the power of attorney holder to initiate proceedings under section 138 of the act . the power of attorney holder is also competent to give evidence on behalf of the complainant. section 138; complaint under whether the cheques issued being transferred to another branch of the same bank, attract the offence under section 138 of the n.i. act ? held, whether the cheque was returned for the reasons of the account being closed or the account being transferred to some other branch, is not the criteria, but the fact is that there was no fund available in that particular account of the respondent to honour the cheques thereon in favour of the complainants. on facts, held, even the reasons given by the..........act. the question is whether in the absence of such an express provision the courts can exercise power of review in a matter arising under the act. 6. in national sewing thread co. ltd. v. james chadwick & bros., ltd. : [1953]4scr1028 , the supreme court considered the question whether from the decision of a single judge of the high court in an appeal arising under the trade marks act, 1940, a letters patent appeal would lie to the division bench of that court. the trade marks act did not provide for such further appeal. the supreme court observed that after an appeal had reached the high court, the future conduct or career of that appeal has to be determined according to the rules of practice and procedure of that court and in accordance with the provisions of the charter under which.....
Judgment:
ORDER

1. This is a petition for review of my order dated 13/14-8-1974 in C. R. P. No. 1423 of 1973, a revision petition under Section 50 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act. 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The petitioner herein was the respondent in revision petition while the respondent herein was the petitioner therein. For the sake of convenience they will be referred to hereinafter as the landlord and the tenant respectively.

2. The landlord had made an application under Section 21 of the Act for eviction of the tenant from the petition premises on the ground that he required the premises for his (the landlord's) own occupation. The front portion of the petition premises was being used by the tenant for carrying on his business and he was residing in the rear portion of the premises. In the revision petition I made a decree for eviction of the tenant from the residential portion and refused eviction from the non-residential portion of the premises.

3. In this petition, the landlord has prayed for reviewing and setting aside my order in the revision petition. Alternatively, he has prayed that the order in the revision petition be modified so as to permit him (the landlord) to construct a wall of 9' thickness running through the non-residential portion of the premises so as to provide a passage of 3 feet width to give access to the residential portion of the premises from the main road.

4. Mr. M. Srirangaiah, learned Counsel for the tenant, raised a preliminary objection that an order made under the Act cannot be reviewed as there is no express provision in the Act providing for review of an order thereunder.

5. It is true that the Act does not contain any express provision empowering the Court as defined in Section 3 (d) of the Act, or the District Judge or this Court to review an order made under the Act. The question is whether in the absence of such an express provision the Courts can exercise power of review in a matter arising under the Act.

6. In National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. V. James Chadwick & Bros., Ltd. : [1953]4SCR1028 , the Supreme Court considered the question whether from the decision of a single Judge of the High Court in an appeal arising under the Trade Marks Act, 1940, a Letters Patent appeal would lie to the Division Bench of that Court. The Trade Marks Act did not provide for such further appeal. The Supreme Court observed that after an appeal had reached the High Court, the future conduct or career of that appeal has to be determined according to the rules of practice and procedure of that Court and in accordance with the provisions of the Charter under which that Court is constituted and which confers on it power in respect to the method and manner of exercising that jurisdiction. Their Lordships held that the Letters Patent appeal was competent even though Trade Marks Act did not expressly provide for such appeal. Their Lordships quoted with approval the following observations of the Judicial Committee of Privy Council in Adaikappa Chettiar v. Chandrasekhara Thevar .

'Where a legal right is in dispute and the ordinary Courts of the country are seized of such dispute the Courts are governed by the ordinary rules of procedure applicable thereto and an appeal lies if authorised by such rules, notwithstanding that the legal right claimed arises under a special statute which does not, in terms confer a right of appeal.'

7. In the light of the above pronouncements of the Supreme Court and the Privy Council, ordinary Courts which have been seized of a dispute in respect of a legal right or liability under a special enactment, should be regarded as having power to adjudicate such dispute according to the ordinary rules of practice and procedure which would includethe power to review judgments and orders.

Even in the absence of an express provisionin the Act conferring the power of review,the Court as defined in Section 3 (d) of theAct, the District Judge and this Court, havein my opinion, power to review his or its decision. Hence I overrule the preliminary objection of Mr. Srirangaiah.

* * * * *

8. Order accordingly.


Save Judgments// Add Notes // Store Search Result sets // Organizer Client Files //