Govinda Bhat, C.J.
1. This writ Appeal arising under the Karnatnka Land Reforms Act, 1961, is directed against the order dated 17-9-1976 made in W. P. No. 8042 of 1976 by Mali-rnath, J., dismissing the Writ Petition a: the preliminary hearing stage.
2. The second respondent Sub-bakka Shedthy is the wife of Manjayya Shetty. The petitioner is theland-holder. The second respondent made an application before the LandTribunal, Coondapur (respondent No. 1) on 3-3-1976 to grant her occupancy right in respect of several items of agricultural lands situate in Chittur village of Coondapur Taluk. In the said proceedings, she made an application under Section 48-C of the Act for issue of an order of Temporary Injunction against the land holder from interfering with her alleged possession of the lands. On that application, the Tribunal made local inspection in the presence of the parties on 17-5-1976. On 15-6-1976 an order was made granting the application for Temporary Injunction in respect of 8 items of agricultural lands. It is relevant to state at this stage that the original records, which we had perused on an earlier occasion, show that the Chairman and threemembers of the Tribunal were present when the decision was taken; but the order has been signed only by the Chairman and not by the other Members. This fact has been verified byus. The order signed by the Chairman of the Tribunal states -
'All the members of the Tribunal are therefore, unanimously of the opinion that on the facts of the case and also on the materials found at the time of local inspection, the applicant has been in actual possession of the lands detailed below.'
The said order was challenged by the appellant before this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. When the matter came up before Malirnath, J., the learned single Judge dismissed the writ petition at the preliminary hearing stage on the ground that the order made by the Tribunal being a discretionary order, there is no ground to issue rule nisi.
3. The ground which was pressed before us seriously, viz., that the impugned order of the Tribunal has not been signed by the members other than the Chairman was not urged before the learned single Judge. With the leave of the Court, the learned counsel for the appellant raised that ground in this appeal.
4. We do not propose to deal with the other grounds urged by the learned counsel for the appellant since, in our view, the order which has been signed only by the Chairman of the Tribunal Cannot be construed as an order of the Tribunal. The order of the Tribunal was not dictated in open Court when all the members who constituted the Tribunal sat as a Tribunal. It was written by the Chairman and signed about a month after the date of local inspection Certain reasons have been given for making the order. There is nothing on record to show that the members of the Tribunal have agreed not only with the order to be issued, but also with the reasons given. If they had signed the order, it would have conclusively shown that though the order was written by the Chairman, the members of the Tribunal have agreed with the reasons given therein. Let us envisage a case where the members do not agree with the conclusion of the Chairman but the Chairman issues the order - interim or final - signed by himself solely, stating in the order that the Tribunal has unanimously come to that decision. We have corne across several orders where the members have differed from the Chairman. There are Tribunals constituted under various . Acts, e.g., the Income-tax Act, 1961, The Karnataka Sales Tax Act, etc., We have not come across any case where the Chairman alone signs the order and the members do not sign. Signatures of the members are necessary to render the order one made by the Tribunal. The fact that the original order has been signed only by the Chairman and not by the other members, renders the order, in our opinion, ineffective and inoperative. In the eye of law, it is no order at all-This is not a technical error. It is an infirmity which goes to the root of the matter.
5. Therefore, reversing the order of the learned Single Judge, we allow this appeal and quash the impugned order dated 15-6-1976, reserving liberty to the Tribunal to take up the matter afresh and make an order in accordance with law after giving opportunity to both the parties of being heard and placing all the relevant material before if. All other contentions are left open.
6. In the circumstances, the parties are directed to bear their own costs.
7. Appeal allowed.