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The Union of India Vs. Kashappa and ors. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectProperty
CourtKarnataka High Court
Decided On
Case NumberMisc. First Appeal Nos. 1166 and 1167 of 1978 and 1263 to 1265 of 1980
Judge
Reported in1982(2)KarLJ128
ActsLand Acquisition Act, 1894 - Sections 18, 20, 24, 50(2) and 54
AppellantThe Union of India
RespondentKashappa and ors.
Appellant AdvocateN. Basavaraju, Addl. Central Govt. Standing Counsel
Respondent AdvocateI.G. Gachchinanatb, ;S.N. Hetti, Advs. and ;C.S. Kottavale, Govt. Pleader
Excerpt:
- karnataka stamp act, 1957.[k.a. no. 34/1957]. section 2(mm): [ram mohan reddy, j] market value agreement of sale time consumed in obtaining the decree for specific performance whether stamp duty is payable on the consideration mentioned in the agreement or on the market value of the property as on the date of execution of sale deed and registration? held, a bare reading of the definition makes it abundantly clear that for the purpose of stamp duty in relation to the property shall be that which it would have fetched if sold in the open market on the date of execution of such instrument or the consideration as set out in the instruments, whichever is higher. section 2(mm) is not violative of article 14 of the constitution. - ' in that case shri paramsukhdas bad no interest in the.....malimath, j.1. all these appeals are by the union of india presented under section 54 of the land acquisition act, 1894, as amended by karnataka act no. 17 of 1961 (hereinafter referred as the act), challenging the awards made by the principal civil judge, belgaum in l. a. c. nos. 627 of 1978, 628 of 1978, 234 of 1977, 253 of 1977 and 489 of 1978 respectively.2. it is in pursuance of the preliminary notification issued on 20th may, 1971 under section 4 of the act that the lands belonging to the respective claimants situate in sambra village, belgaurn taluk in belgaum district were acquired for the construction of civil aviation at sambra. the land acquisition officer awarded compensation fixing the market value of the lands acquired at rs. 2.300/- per acre. the respective claimants sought.....
Judgment:

Malimath, J.

1. All these appeals are by the Union of India presented under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as amended by Karnataka Act No. 17 of 1961 (hereinafter referred as the Act), challenging the awards made by the Principal Civil Judge, Belgaum in L. A. C. Nos. 627 of 1978, 628 of 1978, 234 of 1977, 253 of 1977 and 489 of 1978 respectively.

2. It is in pursuance of the preliminary notification issued on 20th May, 1971 under Section 4 of the Act that the lands belonging to the respective claimants situate in Sambra Village, Belgaurn Taluk in Belgaum District were acquired for the construction of Civil Aviation at Sambra. The Land Acquisition Officer awarded compensation fixing the market value of the lands acquired at Rs. 2.300/- per acre. The respective claimants sought reference under Section 18 to the Court of the Civil Judge, Belgaurn. for enhancement of compensation. The learned Civil Judge has enhanced the compensation in all these cases by fixing the market value of the lands acquired at Rs.12,000/- per acre. It is the awards made by the learned Civil Judge enhancing compensation that are challenged by the Union of India in these five appeals.

3. In the first two appeals, the appellant has filed I. A. I. seeking leave of the Court to prefer the appeals. In the remaining three appeals, no such applications have been presented. As common questions of law regarding maintainability of these appeals have arisen for consideration, all these appeals were heard together and are being disposed of by this communion judgment.

4. The contesting respondents-claimants have raised a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of these appeals. They contend that the Union of India was not a party to the proceeding before the Civil Judge and that therefore it is not entitled to prefer appeals under Section 54 of the Act. They also contend that as the lands were admittedly acquired for the Government of India, no notice was required to be given to the appellant under S. 20 of the Act in the reference proceedings under Section 18 of the Act. They further contend that the Land Acquisition Officer who has proceeded to acquire the lands in question in all these cases, not having preferred appeals challenging the awards made by the Court below ' the Union of India is not entitled to prefer appeals and that these are also not cases in which the Court should exercise discretion in the matter of granting leave to the appellant to prefer appeals. It was contended on the other hand by Shri N. Basavaraju, Additional Central Government Standing Counsel appearing for the appellant-the Union of India that the appellant is entitled to prefer appeals, the land in question having been acquired for the Union of India for the construction of Civil Aviation at Sambra Village. lie contended that the Court below should have issued notice and given an opportunity to the appellant of adducing evidence in regard to the proper amount of compensation payable in respect of the lands acquired having regard to the provisions of S. 20N of the Act, He further submitted that though no application as such has been presented seeking leave to appeal in the last three appeals, the Court may be pleased to grant leave in those three appeals also for the very reasons stated in I. A. No. I presented in the first two appeals, namely, M. F. A. Nos. 1166 and 1167 of 1978. In the light of these contentions, the following points arise for consideration in these appeals :-

(1) Whether the Union of India is entitled to prefer these appeals under S. 54 of the Act; and

(2) Whether leave may be granted to the Union of India to prefer these appeals?

5. We shall first deal with the first point as formulated above. Section 54 of the Act provides for appeals against awards made by the Court on a reference under Section 18 of the Act. For the sake of convenience, the said provision is extracted below :

'54. Appeals in proceedings before Court

(1) Subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 applicable to appeals from original decrees, an appeal shall lie from the award, or from any part of the award, of the Court in any proceedings under this Act to the Court authorized to hear appeals from the decision of that Court(2)

(2) From any decree of a Court, other than the High Court, passed on an appeal under sub-section (1) an appeal shall lie to the High Court, if, but only if, the amount or value of the subject matter in dispute in appeal exceeds two thousand rupees or the case involves any question of title to land.

(3) From any decree of the High Court passed on an appeal under sub-section (1), an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court, subject to the provisions contained in Section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and in 0. XLV of the First Schedule to the Code.'

Having regard to the value of the subject matter in dispute, it is not disputed that the awards made by the Court below in all these cases could be challenged in appeals to this Court. Section 54 does not expressly provide as to who is entitled to prefer appeals challenging the awards made by the Court on reference under Section 18 of the Act. The Union of India, not being a party to the proceeding before the Court of the Civil Judge. would not ordinarily be entitled to prefer appeals under S. 54. But it was contended by Shri Basavaraju that the Union of India was required to be notified by the Court under S. 20(b) of the Act and given an opportunity to participate in the proceeding for enhancement of compensation as if the Union of India was a party to those proceedings. It was urged that if the Court below had complied with the provisions of S. 20(b) of the Act, the Union of India would have become a party to the proceedings in which event it would be entitled to challenge ihe awards made by the Court below under Section 54 of the Act. It was further contended by Shri Basavaraju that the Union of India cannot be deprived of the right of appeal by the mistake committed by the Court below in not complying with the provisions of S. 20(b) of the Act. We shall therefore proceed to examine as to whether Shri Basavaraju is right in contending that the Union of India was required to be served with notice under S. 20(b) of the Act. For the sake of convenience, we extract below the provisions of S. 20 :-

'20. Service of notice.- The Court shall thereupon cause a notice, specifying the day on which the Court will proceed to determine the reference and directing their appearance before the Court on that day, to be served on the following persons, namely:

(a) the Deputy Commissioner;

(b) all persons interested in the reference; and

(c) if the acquisition is not made for Government, the person or authority for whom it is made.'

Section 21 of the Act provides that the scope of the enquiry in every such proceeding shall be restricted to a consideration of the interests of the persons affected by the objection. Shri Basavaraju maintained that the Union of India is one of the persons interested in the reference and that therefore, the Court below was required to issue notice to the Union of India to appear before it.

6. In para 3 of the affidavit filed in support of 1. A. 1. in the first two appeals, it is stated as follows:

'3 ... .... . . . It is submitted that as per the preliminary notification under S. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, the land in question has been acquired for the purpose of expansion of the Airport in Belgaum to wit for public purpose for the Union of India. The compensation that is to be paid is by the Union of India. It is through the machinery of the State Officials that the land is sought to be acquired. In other words, the Special Land Acquisition Officer, viz. the Assistant Commissioner, Belgaum Sub-Division, has been authorized to proceed with the acquisition proceedings for and on behalf of the Union of India. It is respectfully submitted that in the proceedings before the learned Civil Judge, Belgaum, wherein the claimant filed an application under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition ,Net for enhancement of compensation, the Union of India was not made a party ......It is thus clear from the stand taken by the appellant that the acquisition is made for the Government of India and not for a company or a local authority. Though the expression 'appropriate Government' has been defined in the Act, the word 'Government' has not been defined. It is clear from the definition of the word 'Government' occurring in the General Clauses Act that it shall include both the Central Government and the State (Government. Section 20(c) of the Act makes it clear that: it is only if the acquisition is not made for Government that the person or authority for whom it is made has to be notified. As according to the appellant in these cases the acquisition is made for the Central Government , the provisions of S. 20(c) of the Act referred to above are not attracted. Shri Basavaraju therefore rightly conceded that the Union of India cannot assert that it has a right to be notified under S. 20(c) of the Act. It was urged that the Union of India being a person interested in the reference, it was required to be notified under S. 20(b) of the Act.

7. Another provision which requires to be noticed in this behalf is sub-section 2) of S. 50 of the Act which reads as follows:

'50 (2). In any proceeding held before a Deputy Commissioner or Court in such cases the local authority or Company concerned may appear and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation: Provided that no such local authority or Company shall be entitled to demand a reference under S. 18.'

It is clear from the scheme of the Act that land can be acquired under the Act only for a public purpose. The expression 'public purpose' has been defined in S. 3(f) of the Act. It is clear from the public purposes enumerated in the said clause that land can be acquired for several purposes o f the Government, local authority and for a company. Part VII of the Act which contains provisions for acquisition of land for companies, inter alia, contains provisions requiring the company to enter into an agreement with the appropriate Government when it approaches the said Government for acquisition of land for the company. Section 41 of the Act makes it clear that the company has to agree for the payment to the appropriate Government the cost of acquisition etc. Sub-section (2) of S, 50 is a special provision which confers right on the local authority or the company for whose benefit the land is acquired of appearing and adducing evidence before the Deputy Commissioner or the Court for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation The proviso to sub-section (2) of S. 50 further makes it clear that though such right has been conferred on the local authority or the company, it has no right to demand a reference under S. 18 of the Act. Clause(c) of S. 20 of the Act is thus consistent with sub-section (2) of S. 50 as it expressly provides that a person or authority for whom the land is acquired has to be notified if the land acquisition is not made for Government The question that legitimately requires ex examination therefore is as to what is the position when the acquisition is made for the Government. As clause (c) of S. 20 of the Act is not attracted when the acquisition is not made for Government, the only other provisions which survive for examination are clauses (a), and (b) of S. 20. The person to be notified under these two clauses are the Deputy Commissioner and all persons interested in the reference. It appears to us that having regard to the scheme of the Act, when the land is acquired for the Government of by required the interests of the Government are expected to be taken care of by the Deputy Commissioner who is required to be notified under clause (a) of S. 20 of the Act. Clause (b) of S. 20 which refers having regard to the context, excludes the Government for whose benefit the land is acquired. As the land has been acquired for the Central Government and as the liability for paying compensation is that of the Central Government, it was contended Government, the interests of the ment are expected to be taken care the Deputy Commissioner who is to be notified under clause (a) of S the Act. Clause (b) of S. 20 which by Shri Basavaraju, that the said Government is a person interested in the reference within the meaning of that expression in clause (b) of S. 20. In support of this contention, he invited our attention to the definition of the expression 'person interested' occurring in S. 3(b). It is an inclusive definition and includes all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made on account of the acquisition of land under this Act. It further provides that a person shall be deemed to be interested in land if he is interested in an easement affecting the land. As the Central Government is interested in ensuring that there is no enhancement of compensation, it was submitted, it has an interest in compensation and therefore is a person interested in the reference. The decision of the Supreme Court in Himalaya Tiles and Marble (P.) Ltd. v. Francis Victor Coutinho by his LRs. AIR 1980 SC 1118, ( 1980 ) 3 SCC 223 was relied upon by Shri Basavaraju. In para-7 of the judgment their Lordships of the Supreme Court have observed as follows :

' 7. It seems to us that the definition of ,a person interested' given in S. 18 is an inclusive definition and must be liberally construed so as to embrace all persons who may be directly or indirectly interested either in the title to the land or in the quantum of compensation. In the instant case, it is not disputed that the lan -ds were actually acquired for the purpose of the company and once the land vested in the Government, after acquisition, it stood transferred to the company tinder the agreement entered into between the company and the Government. Thus it cannot be said that the company had no claim or title to the land at all. Secondly, since under the agreement the company had to pay the compensation, it was most certainly interested in seeing that a proper quantum of compensation was fixed so that the company may not have to pay a very heavy amount of money. For this purpose the company could undoubtedly appear and adduce evidence on the question of the quantum of compensation.'

It is thus clear from the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court that! when the land is acquired for a company the same has to be regarded as a person interested within the meaning of the expression used in Section 18. One of the reasons given for this conclusion is that the company which has to pay compensation is interested in seeing that the proper quantum of compensation is fixed, so that the company may not have, to pay a very heavy amount of, compensation. The Supreme Court has further observed that it is for this purpose that the company could undoubtedly appear and adduce evidence on the question of quantum of compensation. We have already observed that a company for whose benefit the land is acquired is a person falling under Section 20(c) of the Act and therefore it is entitled to be notified to appear before the Court and adduce evidence particularly having regard to the specific provisions contained in sub-section (2) of S. 50. The Supreme Court was dealing with the case of a company and not with the case of a Government. If the land was acquired for a company or a local authority having regard to the provisions of S. 20(c) and sub-section (2) of S. 50 and also the decision of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case, there cannot be any doubt that a company or the local authority would be entitled to be notified and to appear and adduce evidence in regard to the proper determination of compensation by the Court. There was no occasion for the Supreme Court to consider the case of acquisition of land for the Government and consequently it had no occasion to examine as to whether the Government for whose benefit the land was acquired, is a person interested in the reference and therefore entitled to participate in the proceeding having regard to the provisions of S. 20(b) of the Act.

8. Another decision of the Supreme Court to which our attention was drawn in this behalf by Shri Basavaraju is the one reported in : [1968]1SCR362 (Sunderlal v. Paramsukhdas). In that case, the Supreme Court pointed out, after examining the scheme of the Act and particularly the provisions of Ss. 3(b) , 18, 20 and 21 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, that a person who claims interest in compensation to be awarded is also a person interested as defined in S. 3(b) of the Act. We consider it useful to extract paras 10 and 12 of the judgment which read :

'(10). Before examining the authorities cited at the Bar, it is necessary to examine the scheme and the provisions of the Act in so far as they are relevant to the question of determination of compensation, the question of apportionment of the compensation and the question as to the persons who are entitled to be heard. Section 3(b) defines the expression 'person interested' as follows: 'The expression 'person interested' includes all. persons claiming an interest in companies to be made on account of the acquisition of land under this Act; and a person shall be deemed to be interested in land if he is interested in an easement affecting the land.'

It will be noticed that it is an inclusive definition. It is not necessary that in order to fall within the definition a person should claim an interest in land, which has been acquired. A person becomes a person interested if he claims an interest in compensation to be awarded. It seems to us that Paramsukhdas is a 'Person interested' within Section 3(b) of the Act because he claims an interest in compensation. But before he can be made a party in a reference it has to be seen whether he comes within S. 20(b) and S. 21 of the Act.

xx xx xx

(12). Under S. 18 any person interested can claim a reference. A person claiming an interest in compensation would also be entitled to claim a reference. After a reference is made the Court is enjoined under Section 20 to determine the objections, and serve, among others, all persons interested in the objection. A person claiming an interest in compensation would, it seems to us, be a person interested in the objection if the objection is to the amount of compensation or the apportionment of compensation, and if his claim is likely to be affect. ed by the decision on the objection. Section 21 restricts the scope of enquiry, to a consideration of the interests of the persons affected by the objection. But it does not follow from See. 21 that there is any restriction on the grounds which can be raised by a person affected by the objection to protect his interests. The restriction that is laid is not to consider the interests of a person who is not affected by the objection. Section 29 deals with apportionment of compensation, if there is agreement, and Section 30 enables the Collector to refer disputes as to apportionment to the Court. From the above discussion it follows that a person claiming an interest in compensation is entitled to be heard under Ss. 20 and 21 of the Act. The provisions of the Act, including Ss. 20 and 21, do not prescribe that his claim to an interest in compensation should be 'as compensation', as urged by Mr. Desai. This is really a contradictory statement. For, a fortiori, he has no interest in land, and compensation is given for interests in land. He can never claim compensation qua compensation for what he claims is an interest in the compensation to be awarded. This is not to say that a person claiming an interest in compensation may not claim that the compensation awarded for the acquired land is low, if it affects his interests.'

In that case Shri Paramsukhdas bad no interest in the land acquired. He bad obtained a decree against one of the claimants and in execution of 'that decree he secured the attachment of the amount of compensation payable to one of the claimants. It is in this background that the Supreme Court held that though Shri Pararnsukhdas bad no interest in the land acquired, as be had interest in the compensation payable in respect of the land acquired, he is a person falling under clause (b) of S. 20 of the Act and therefore was entitled to participate in the proceeding pertaining to the determination of compensation. This case is also of no assistance to Shri Basavaraju as it is not laid down therein that a person for whose benefit the land is acquired can be regarded as a person interested in the reference. Their Lordships have pointed out that a person who is interested in the proper determination of compensation may be a person interested within. the meaning of the expression 'person interested' occurring in S. 3(b) of the Act. Their Lordships further pointed out that in order to claim a right under Section 20(b) of participating in the proceeding, it is not enough that he is a person interested as defined in S. 3(b) of the Act. It has to be further shown that such a person interested falls under clause (b) of S. 20 of the Act. In that case, their Lordships of the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the person who claims an interest in the compensation is a person interested in the reference or objection. The decision of the Supreme Court cannot he regarded as laying down That a person for whom the land is acquired is a person interested in the reference. In our opinion, the scheme of the Act makes it clear that the Deputy Commissioner who is entitled to be notified under Clause (a) of S. 20, is expected to take care of the interest of the Government when the land is acquired for the Government. When the land is not acquired for the Government, the person or authority for whom it is made is also given a right to participate in the proceeding by clause (c) of S. 20. Other persons who are interested in claiming the enhancement or a share in the compensation are all persons contemplated by clause (b) of S. 20 of the Act. If the Government for whom the land is acquired was intended to be given an opportunity of participating in the proceedings in addition to the Deputy Commissioner, the expression 'if the acquisition is not made for the Government' occurring in S. 20(c) would not have been necessary. If clause (c) read as 'the person or authority for whom it is made' it would have included the Government if the acquisition is made for the Government, The fact that the Government for whom the land is acquired is expressly excluded in Clause (c) of S ' 20 makes it clear that it was not intended to give to the Government for whom the land is acquired. a separate right of participation in the proceedings in addition to the Deputy Commissioner. In our opinion, the scheme of the Act makes it clear that when the land is acquired for the Government, it is only the Deputy Commissioner that is expected to participate in the proceedings and to safeguard the interest of the Government for whom the land is acquired.

9. Section 20 does not contemplate the participation of the Government for whom the land is acquired in addition to the participation of the Deputy Commissioner. If the Government for whom the land is acquired can be regarded as a person interested in the reference, there is no need to have an independent provision like clause (c) of Section 20 giving right to the person or authority other than the Government of being notified and participating in the proceedings. If Shri Basavaraju is right in contending that a person interested in the reference includes the person for whom the land is acquired, it necessarily includes the other persons or authority including the company or local authority for whom the land is acquired. The acceptance of the contention of Shri Basavaraju would render the provisions in clause (c) of S. 20 superfluous and unnecessary. It is not reasonable to presume that the Legislature intended to make a redundant provision in clause (c) of S. 20 of the Act. The conclusion which we have arrived at receives support from another decision of the Supreme Court rendered in Civil Appeals Nos. 1045 and 1046 of 1977 in which the appellant was New Government Electric Factory Ltd., and in Civil Appeal No. 2665 of 1980 in which the appellant was the Town Municipal Council, Harihar. Though the land was acquired for the company in the former case no notice was issued by the Court to it under Section 20 of the Act. The award made by the Court of the Civil Judge without notifying the said company was challenged in two writ petitions presented under Article 226 of the Constitution. This Court having dismissed the said writ petitions at the stage of preliminary hearing, the same were challenged in appeals before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals set aside the awards made by the Court of the Civil Judge and remitted the cases for fresh disposal after notifying the company as required by S. 20(c) of the Act. In the latter case, i.e.. Civil Appeal No. 2665 of 1980, the local authority namely, the Town Municipal Council, Harihar. was not notified under Section 20 and an award came to be passed. When that award was challenged by the said local authority, the same was dismissed by this Court. On appeal, the Supreme Court, set aside the award made by the Court of Civil Judge and remitted the case for fresh disposal with a direction that the said municipality should be given an opportunity of participating in the proceedings as required by S. 20(c) of the Act.

10. It is clear from these pronouncements of the Supreme Court that their Lordships came to the conclusion that a company or a local authority was entitled to notice under S. 20(c) of the Act and to participate in the proceedings before the Court in the matter of determination of compensation. It is necessary to point out that the lands were acquired in those cases for the benefit of the company or for the benefit of the local authority. Their Lordships did not take the view that as the lands were acquired for the benefit of the company or the local authority they are persons interested in the reference and therefore entitled to be notified under S. 20(b) of the Act. That the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the case of the company and the local authority fell under clause (c) is very significant. If the contention of Shri Basavaraju that every person for whose benefit the land is acquired is a person interested in the reference and therefore entitled to be notified under clause (b) of Section 20, the Supreme Court would have held that the cases of the company and the local authority dealt with by them would have fallen under clause (b). But the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that their oases fell under clause (c). If their cases could fall under clause (b) the Supreme Court would have said so. All persons for whose benefit the land is acquired would fall only under clause (c) except when the land is acquired for the Government. The interest of the Government is expected to be taken care of by issue of notice to the Deputy Commissioner under clause (a) of Section 20 of the Act We have therefore no hesitation in taking Central Government for the view that the whom the land question has been acquired cannot be regarded as a person interested in the reference contemplated by clause (b) of S. 20 of the Act. As already stated, the interest of the Central Government was expected to be protected by giving an opportunity to the Deputy Commissioner of participating in the proceedings. That being the position, there is no substance in the contention of Shri Basavaraju that the appellant has statutory right to be notified by the Court under clause (b) of S. 20 of the Act. As the Court below has not committed any error in not issuing notice to the appellant and as it is not its case that the Deputy Commissioner was not notified, it is not possible to take the view that the Court below has acted in contravention of the provisions of S. 20 of the Act. Hence, it is not possible to accepting the contention of Shri Basavaraju that the appellant has a right to prefer these appeals the statutory right of participating in that proceedings before the Court below having! been denied to it. As the appellant was not a party to the proceedings before the Court below and is also not entitled to participation in the proceedings, it follows that it has no right to prefer these appeals challenging the awards made by the Court below.

11. The only other Point that remains for consideration is as to whether leave to appeal may be granted. We have already come to the conclusion while dealing with the first point that the appellant for whom the lands were acquired was not entitled to participate before the Civil Judge in the matter of determination of compensation though compensation amount has to be paid by the appellant. We have already come to the conclusion that the interests of the Government for whom the lands are acquired are expected to be safeguarded adequately by the Deputy Commissioner to whom such a duty has been entrusted by the statute. No reasons have been assigned as to why it was not possible for the Government to persuade the Deputy Commissioner who was a party to the proceedings before the Court below to prefer an appeal to this Court. Not a single reason has been assigned in the application presented in the first two appeals seeking leave to appeal. In the absence of any satisfactory reason or justification, even assuming for the sake of argument that it was open for this Court- to grant leave to appeal, the appellant has not made out a case for grant of such leave. In the absence of any allegations against the Deputy Commissioner, it has to be presumed that the Deputy . Commissioner , has discharged his obligations consistent with his responsibilities. As no oblique motive has been attributed to the Deputy Commissioner for his not preferring appeals, it is reasonable to presume that he must have come to the conclusion, on consideration of all relevant aspects, that these are not fit cases for challenging the awards in appeals. Having regard to all the relevant aspects in these cases, even assuming without going into the question as to whether leave could be granted to appeal, we do not consider these cases as fit for grant of leave to appeal. Hence leave sought for in I. A. No. I presented in the first two appeals as also the oral request made in the remaining three appeals is refused. As we are sustaining the preliminary objection and dismissing these appeals on the ground that they are not maintainable at the instance of the appellant, we do not go into the merits of these cases.

12. For the reasons stated above, all these appeals fail and are dismissed. No costs.

13. Appeals dismissed.


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