K.S. Hegde, J.
(1) All these petitions under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution arise from the decision of the Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal Bangalore to be hereinafter referred to as the 'Tribunal' in Appeal No. 390 of 1964(M.V) on it stile. They raise common questions of law for decision. Hence they will be dealt with in one Order.
(2) In these petitions the aforementioned Order of the Tribunal was challenged on tow grounds namely (1) the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal in question and (ii) under any circumstances, the impugned Order suffers from errors of law apparent on the face of the records.
(3) The contention that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal in question was not pressed at the hearing of these Writ Petitions possibly because the same is concluded by the decision of this Court in W.P. Nos. 458 and 630 of 1965. Therefore, the only surviving question for decision is whether the impugned Order suffers from errors of law apparent on the face of the records.
(4) The facts relevant for the purpose of pronouncing on the contention urged at the hearing are these: Puttanarasimharaju, proprietor, Sri Chamundeswari Motor Service Kunigal, one of the Respondents in all these Writ Petitions, applied for a permit to run a stage carriage service between Kunigal and Tirupathi via Mogadi Tavareker, Bangalore Hoskote, Kolar, Mulbagal Palamner and Chittoor. The Regional Transport Authority Tumkur considered his application as subject No. 116 of 1962-63 on 4/5-3-1965 and rejected the same holding that there was no need for the service in question. Aggrieved by the Order of the M.S.T.A.T Puttanarasimharajau went up in appeal to the Tribunal, in Appeal No.390 of 1964. The Tribunal in a considered Order reversed the decision of the R.T.A. and the M.S.T.A.T and directed the R.T.A. to grant the permit prayed for. It is as against that Order the present petitions have been filed by some of the persons who had objected to the grant of the permit.
(5) In these writ petitions various contentions have been raised, several of which were not pressed at the hearing of the petition. Therefore, we shall only consider such of the contentions as were pressed at the time of the hearing.
(6) Sri V.S. Malimath the learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P. No. 199/65 formulated the following contentions in support of that Writ Petition; (i) the Tribunal's finding on the question of need is based on surmises and conjectures and hence the same cannot be sustained; (ii) The Tribunal had failed to take into consideration the objections filed by the Petitioner in W.P.199 of 1965; (iii) Puttanarasimharaju's application for the grant was not tenable in law as the route mentioned therein is not specific; (iv) the tribunal had not considered the priority of timings of the existing operators; and (v) the permit granted is not in accordance with law.
(7) Sri P.R. Srirangiah the learned counsel for the petitioners in W.Ps. Nos. 205 and 464 of 1965 urged the following additional contentions: (i) The R.T.A. Tumkur had no jurisdiction to conduct a route survey; and
(ii) the Tribunal failed to take note of the fact that the resolutions of the group Panchayats relied on by it were wholly irrelevant s no portion of the route fell within the jurisdiction of those panchayats.
(8) Sri M. Rangaswamy the learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P. No. 990 of 1965 in addition to the contentions urged by Sri Malimath and Sri Srirangiah urged that no permit could have been given to any operate on a route which is a portion of a notified route, the route between Bangalore and Kolar is a part of the route between Bangalore and Kolar is a part of the route concerned in these petitions it is a notified route: hence, the permit asked for by Puttanarasimharaju could not have been given. He also complained that some of the contentions urged on behalf of his client had not been considered by the Tribunal and hence its order is not sustainable.
(9) From the material on record it is not possible to uphold the contention of Sri Rangaswamy that the Tribunal had failed to consider any of the contentions advanced on behalf of the parties. It was the duty of the Tribunal every one of the relevant grounds urged before it. Prima facie assumption is that every judicial or quasi judicial authority has aced according to law. It is for the party who contends otherwise to establish his contention by satisfactory evidence. Mere allegation that a Tribunal had failed to consider any of the contention urged before it without supported by satisfactory evidence or strongly probabilities by the available circumstances will not be entertained.
The impugned Order is a well considered order. In it there is detailed discussion of the several contentions advanced before the Tribunal. Our attention has not been invited to any circumstance from which it is possible for us to conclude that the Tribunal had failed to consider any of the material contentions advanced before it. The mere fact that a contention had been taken in the grounds of appeal by itself is not sufficient to conclude that that contention had been urged before the Tribunal in all contested cases where opposing interests are represented, all that the Tribunal is expected to do it is to consider the contention advanced before it by the parties and pronounce on the same. Judicial work with the impossible if in won and every case the Appellate Authority has to make its own investigation of the grounds taken in the appeal. Therefore, we are made to accept the contentions of Sri Rangaswamy that the tribunal had failed to take into consideration any of the grounds urged before it.
(10) The question of need is essentially a question of fact. It was not disputed that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to go into that question. Its finding on the question of need is final and conclusive if the same is supported by some evidence on record. While exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction, this Court does not go into the correctness of findings of fact reached by subordinate Tribunals.
(11) The Tribunal had elaborately considered the question of need in paragraphs 4 to 11 of its order. It has given cogent reasons in support of its finding. If founded its conclusions on the basis of the report of the R.T.O. Tunkur, S.P. Tumkur and the resolutions passed by certain Group Panchayats. It was not disputed before us that the report of the R.T.O. and that of the S.P. are relevant materials. If the Tribunal relied on those reports and came to the conclusion that the need put forward is established, the correctness of that conclusion cannot be challenged before this Court.
(12) The contention that the R.T.O. Tumkur within whose jurisdiction only 18 miles of the route lie was not the proper authority to hold the traffic survey or to report about the need has no substance. The Tribunal came to the conclusion that large number of persons go as pilgrims to Tirupathi from Kunigal and the surrounding areas. In reaching that conclusion it relied on the report of the R.T.O. and the S.P. The R.T.O. and the S.P. Tumkur were well qualified to find out whether there was any need for a stage carriage service for taking pilgrims from Kunigal to Tirupathi. What those authorities had to investigate was as to the probable number of pilgrims daily travelling from Kunigal to Tirupathi and back and not the passengers that may be available at other points on the route.
(13) There is also no force in the contention that S.P's report should not have been relied on the question of need as he did not enclose the reports of his subordinates. The S.P. called for reports from his subordinates for his own satisfaction. So far as the concerned authorities were concerned, it was open to them to rely on the report of the S.P. If any of the authorities under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 to be hereinafter referred to as the 'Act' doubted the correctness of the report of the S.P it was open to them to seen for the reports of his subordinates. But that is not the same thing as saving that the report of the S.P. is either inadmissible or irrelevant. Enquiries under the 'Act' are not governed by the provisions of the Evidence Act.
(14) We are unable to agree with Sri Malimath that the finding of the Tribunal on the question of need is based on sunrises and conjectures. The Tribunal has given good reasons in support of its finding. As mentioned earlier it has relied on the report of the R.T.O and the S.P. which it was entitled to do.
(15) The contention that the question of timings was not considered by the Tribunal before directing the grant of the permit is also without force. None of the respondents who appeared before the Tribunal appeared to have raised question of timings. The duty of an appellate Tribunal, ordinarily, is to pronounce on the contentions urged before it and not to enquire into questions that may arise from the pleadings. If the parties did not choose to press before the Tribunal any of the contentions which they were entitled to press, then no duty was cast on the Tribunal to raise those questions suo motu and to pronounce on them
(16) Sri Malimath, strenuously contended that the Tribunal erred in not considering the objections filed by his client in response to the notification under Section 57(3) of the 'Act' He urged that from his representation a copy of which is marked as Ex Bin W.P. a copy of which is marked as Ex. B. in W.P. No. 199/65, it would be seen that he had raised various objections to the grant in question. The Petitioner in writ Petition No.199 of 65 did not appear before the Tribunal though he was made a party to the appeal and notified about the appeal. It is not his case that the objections raised by him in his representation had been urged before the Tribunal by any of the parties. From the Order of the Tribunal it is seen that the Tribunal merely considered the correctness of the Orders of the authorities below as well as the contentions specifically urged before it. Quite clearly, it did not investigate into the various objections raised in the representations made.
(17) It was Sri. Malimath's contention that it was the duty of the Tribunal to examine afresh all the representations made by the objectors and consider each one of the objections taken therein on its own merits. In support of this contention of his, he laced strong reliance on the decision of this Court in Pancha Sherif v. D.T. Sundar (1964) 2 Mys LJ 113, to which one of us was a party in that decision it was observed:
'Though there is no express provision under the Act requiring that the appellate authorities constituted under the Act, shall take into consideration the representation made by person mentioned in sub-section (1) of S. 47, it is clear from the nature of the power that why have also the duty to take all those matters into consideration which the Regional Transport Authority is required by statute to take into consideration. It cannot be contended that while the Regional Transport Authority is required to consider the representations, the Appellate Authorities have no such duty'
If this passage is read by itself, there is no doubt that it supports the contention of Sri Malimath in that case, the question that arose for decision was, whether a person already providing road transport facilities among or near the proposed route for which permit is asked for who had made a representation before the R.T.A. should be afforded an opportunity of being heard at the stage of the appeal against the Order of the R.T.A. rejecting the application for the permit. This Court upheld the contention that he was necessary party to the appeal. Within discussing that question this Court opined that the Tribunal being the final fact finding authority is entitled to go into all gone into. It is in that context the above quoted observations were made.
(18) Section 57(4) of the 'Act' provides:
'No representation in connection with an application referred to in sub-section (3) shall be considered by the Regional Transport Authority unless it is made in writing before the appointed date and unless a copy thereof is furnished simultaneously to the applicant by the persons making such representation.'
From this provision it follows that if a representation is mad in accordance with law that representation is bound to be considered by the R.T.A.
(19) Sub-section (5) of S. 57 prescribes:
'When any representation such is referred to in sub-section (3) is made, the Regional Transport Authority shall dispose of the application at a public hearing at which the applicant and the person making the representation shall have an opportunity being heard either in person or by a duly authorised representative.'
From these provisions, it is clear that every representations made under Section 57(3) if it is made in accordance with the conditions prescribed in Section 57(4) should be considered by the R.T.A and further the person making the representation made under Section 57(4) should be considered by the R.T.A. and further the person making the representation should also be given an opportunity of being heard in person or by a duly authorised representative. There is no provision in the 'Act', requiring either the S.T.A.T or the Tribunal to follow the procedure prescribed in sub-sections (4) and (5)of S. 57. But as held by this Court in P. Abdul Azeez v. Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal Bangalore, AIR 1962 Mys 31, the appellate authority and the Tribunal are also facts finding authorities. Therefore it follows that facts which are relevant before the M.S.T.A.T and Tribunal. It is in that context, this Court observed that a representation made by an objector has also to be considered by the Tribunal.
(20) But, then there is a fundamental difference in the manner of disposal of an application by the R.T.A. and its disposal by the M.S.T.A.T and the Tribunal in appeals. In the very nature of things, he R.T.A. will have to consider all the materials before it and decide the relevant questions. But the appellate authority need not again dismissed the spade work. Ordinarily it will only consider such contentions as are urged before it, though its jurisdiction to investigate into questions of facts is co-extensive with that of the R.T.A. Work will be impossible if the M.S.T.A.T and the Tribunal are required to do move examine all the materials placed before the authorities whether any particular point is taken or urged before them or not. We do not think that such could be the position in law. Our attention has not been invited to any provisions in the 'Act' requiring the appellate authority to examine all the representations made under R.T.A. Section 64 which provides for appeals merely says:
(a) aggrieved by the refusal of the State or a Regional Transport Authority to grant a permit or by any condition attached in a permit granted to him; or
(b) aggrieved by the revocation or suspension of the permit or by any variation of the conditions thereof; or
(c) aggrieved by the refusal to transfer the permit to the person succeeding on the death of the holder of a permit; or
(d) aggrieved by the refusal of the State or a Regional Transport Authority to counter sign a permit or by condition attached in such counter signature; or
(e) aggrieved by the refusal of renewal of a permit; or
(f) being a local authority or police authority or an association which or a person providing transport facilities why having opposed the grant of a permit is aggrieved by the grant thereof or by any condition attached thereto; or
(g) aggrieved by the refusal to grant permission under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of S. 59; or
(h) aggrieved by a reduction under sub-section (1-A) of S. 60 in the number of vehicles or routes or area covered by a permit; or
(i) aggrieved by any other order which may be prescribed may, within the prescribed time and in the prescribed manner appeal to the prescribed authority who shall give such person and the Original Authority an opportunity of being heard.'
This provision is not in any manner different from the other provisions for appeals in other enactments. Hence we are unable to agree with Sri Malimath that the Tribunal had a duty to examine the objections taken by his client though these objections were not pressed before it.
(21) Yet another contention of Sri Malimath was that the permit granted is not in accordance with law. A copy of the permit is marked as Ex. G. in W.P. No. 199/65 In that permit, after mentioning the usual clauses, it is stated 'this permit will become effective in Andhra Pradesh after the counter signature of the Regional Transport Authority. Chittoor for the portion of route lying in Chittoor District limits.' It was urged by Sri Malimath that by that endorsement a single and indivisible permit has been unlawfully cut into two, i.e. One form Kunigal to the border and another from the border to Tirupathi the latter coming into force after the counter-signature by the R.T.A., Chittoor. According to him, such splitting is impermissible under law. He also complained that the grantee had already begun to operate a stage carriage service from Kunigal to the border even before obtaining the counter-signature of the R.T.A Chittoor.
In support of his contention that the permit in question is single and indivisible and the grantee cannot operate any stage carriage in only a portion of the route, he invited our attention to the decision in Cr.R.Ps Nos.309 and 310 of 1960(Mys). On the other hand, in support of the contention that the permit in question is valid until the border even before its countersignature by the R.T.A Chittoor., the learned counsel for the grantee invited our attention to a decision of this Court in W.P. No. 1272 of 1961(Mys). We have not thought it necessary to go into this controversy as in our opinion the endorsement cited above does not authorise the grantee to act in any manner other than in accordance with law. It merely points out to him the necessity of getting the countersignature of the R.T.A Chittoor before operating on the route from Kunigal to Tirupathi.
In order to find out the try the scope of the permit, one has to look to the order of the Tribunal on the basis of which it was given. The endorsement made by the R.T.A on the permit cannot change the character of the permit. If the grantee is illegally operating any service, then proceedings under the appropriate provisions in the 'Act' can be initiated. There are provisions in the 'Act' providing for prosecution of person operating stage carriage services without valid permits. Further, the question whether the permit granted is valid or not is not germane in a petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution wherein the only relevant point for decision is as to the legality of the Order impugned. If the condition attached to a permit is invalid, it is open to an aggrieved person to appeal against it under S. 64 of the 'Act'.
(22) The last contention urged by Sri Malimath was that the route asked for by the respondent is vague and therefore a permit could not have been given by the authorities for the same. According to him, there are number of alternate routes between Bangalore and Hoskote. Hoskote and Kolar and Kolar and Mulbagal; in his application the respondent had merely asked for a permit from Kunigal to Tirupathi via Magadi Tavarekere, Bangalore, Hoskote Kolar, Mulbagal, Palamner and Chittoor; he did not mention therein the required details necessary to fix the route, on the basis of the details given in his application, he can operate in more routes than one and hence his application was invalid. This objection relates to a question of fact. That objection does not appear to have been taken in the representation made by the petitioner in W.P. 199/65 But none of the authorities below appear to have had any doubt as regards the identity of the route. We are given to understand that the route mentioned is a well known route and there can be no difficulty about its identify. The alternative routes pointed out are only subsidiary routes. They are circuitous. Further they have their distinctive, names. Hence we are unable to agree with Sri Malimath that from the details given in the grantee's applicant the identity of the route for which the permit was asked for cannot be established.
(23) Several of the contentions urged by Sri Rangaswamy have already been dealt with by us earlier.
(24) His only contention that remains to be examined is that the Tribunal was incompetent to grant the permit asked for as a portion of the route for which the permit was asked is a notified route. On this question the arguments proceeded thus: Admittedly the route from Bangalore to Kolar is a notified route; that route is a portion of the route from Kunigal to Tirupathi; that being so the authorities under the 'Act' were not competent to grant the permit asked for.
(25) The Tribunal has proceeded on the basis that the route from Kunigal to Tirupathi is not the same as the route from Bangalore in Kolar though the road from Bangalore to Kolar lies on the route Kunigal to Tirupathi.
(26) On behalf of the grantee, it was contended that route. A-C is not the same thing as route A-B though the route A-B may be part of the route Act. It was strenuously contended on his behalf that the word 'route' is not synonymous with the term 'highway'. It was said that 'highway' is the physical track along which an omnibus runs, whilst a 'route' is an abstract from the highway traversed. Support for this contention was sought from some of the decisions of this Court.
(27) In Nilkanth Prasad v. State of Bihar, : AIR1962SC1135 the Supreme Court laid down that under the 'Act' there is no distinction between a 'route' and a 'highway' Therein it was observed:
'This means that even in those cases where the notified route and the route applied for run over a common section the curtailment by virtue of the notified scheme would be by excluding that portion of the route or in other words the 'road' common to both. The distinction between 'route' as the notional line and 'road' as the physical track disappears in the working of Chap IV A because you cannot curtail the route without curtailing a portion of the road and the ruling of the Court to which we have referred would also show that even if the route was different the area at least would be the same.'
This pronouncement is binding on us.
(28) It was strenuously urged on behalf of the grantee that we should confine the ratio of that decision only to intra State routes as was the case before the Supreme Court and should not extend it to inter State routes Otherwise, it was said, there would be innumerable practical difficulties. We were told that under Chapter IV A of the 'Act' only inter-State routes can be notified, it is common knowledge that large number of inter-state routes pass over one or the other of the notified routes, if they are precluded from doing so all inter-State communication by means of stage carriages would be cut off; nothing so drastic could have been intended by Particularly in enacting the 'Act'
(29) On the facts of this case, we have not found it necessary to examine the true scope of the decision of the Supreme Court in Nilkanth Prasad's case. AIR 1963 SC 1135 referred to earlier. In the cases before us our extraordinary jurisdiction is invoked. As laid down by the Supreme Court in G. Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd., : 1SCR583 that we should issue writs only in grave cases where the subordinate Tribunals or bodies or Officers act wholly without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or in violation of the principles of natural justice or refuse to exercise a jurisdiction vested in them or there is an error apparent on the face of the record and such act, omission error or excess has resulted in manifest injustice. In this case no such manifest injustice was pointed out to us.
(30) One other principle of law which has to be borne in mind while exercising our extraordinary jurisdiction is whether the petitioners before us are really aggrieved by the impugned order. The petitioners can have no interest over the notified route from Bangalore to Kolar. In that regard, they are in the same position as the grantee. In fact the routes on which some of them are operating include portion of the notified routes. The State Transport Under taking has not objected to the grant. It is open to the State Transport Undertaking if it is otherwise permissible by law, to move the authorities to cancel or modify the grant in question under S. 68F(2) of the 'Act'.
(31) For the reasons mentioned above these petitions fail and they are dismissed No costs.
(32) Petition dismissed