1. This appeal by the plaintiff in Original Suit No. 36 of 1968 on the file of the Civil Judge, Bidar, is directed against the judgment of dismissal made in the above suit.
2. The suit was for a decree for permanent injunction on the basic of possessory title. In the Court below the suit was valued for purposes of Court-fee at Rupees 307.38, but for the purpose of jurisdiction, the value of the land has been stated to be Rs. 36,000/-. Presumably on account of the latter valuation, although the Court-fee paid on the plaint was only Rs. 25/- the learned civil Judge heard the matter and disposed of it as aforesaid. The plaintiff, aggrieved by the decree, has preferred the first appeal under Section 96. Civil Procedure Code, paying the same court-fee as had been paid in the Court below.
3. On behalf of the respondents Sri Muralidhar Rao raised a preliminary objection that the appeal ought to have been presented before the District Court having jurisdiction over the area concerned and not to this Court, for the reason that the valuation made for purposes of payment of Court-fee was also the valuation to be taken into account for the purpose of jurisdiction. It seems to us that this contention must be accepted as correct.
4. This Court in Subrao Ranba Ravalu Kedari v. Kallappa Nana Kadapure, 1972 (1) Mys LJ 180 = (ATR 1972 Mys 242) has held that in a suit for injunction falling under Clause (c) of Section 26 of the Act, the valuation of the suit for purposes of jurisdiction cannot be different from the valuation for the purpose of payment of court-fee. Admittedly, the valuation for the purpose of court-fee in the present case is Rs. 307.38, which is less than Rs. 20,000/-. Therefore, this appeal cannot be entertained in this court and the appeal ought to have been presented before the District Court, Bidar.
5. Therefore, the only order we could make is that the appeal Memorandum be returned to the appellant for presentation before the court of the District Judge at Bidar. The appellant is directed to take back this appeal within a week from today and re-present the same before the court of the District Judge at Bidar, as soon as possible with an application for condonation of delay in preferring the appeal before that Court. If and when an application for condonation of delay and the appeal are presented, the learn-ed District Judge will take into account the time spent by the appellant in this court and also the uncertainty of the state of law until the decision in Subrao's case referred to above, was rendered, in considering the application for condonation of delay.
6. Return the Appeal Memorandum to the appellant for representation to the proper Court.