Chandrakantaraj URS, J.
1. The Petitioner is working as Statistical Assistant in the Directorate of Economics and Statistics in Karnataka. By an order made by the Director dated 15th May 1984 the Petitioner has been placed under suspension. Aggrieved by the same, he has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for relief praying for the quashing of the said order which is at Annexure-A to the Petition inter alia, contending that the order is made without proper application of mind and without satisfaction being recorded, that the suspension has become necessary on the facts and circum-stances stated in the order.
2. In order to appreciate the above contentions as well as the arguments of the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner, it would become necessary to set out the operative portion of the order in question.
'Office Order No. Adm./103/1984-85
In his letter dated 18-4-1984 referred to at (2) above, the Superintendent of Police, Bangalore District has inform-ed this Directorate that Shri T. Shivashankar, Junior Statistical Assistant of this Directorate, working in the Taluk Office, Channapatna, has got himself involved in mob violence in Mathikere village and that he has been charged under Section 148/83, 143, 144, 145, 147, 148, 149 and 324, 307 Cr. P.C. he was found guilty and that a case filed against him is being enquired in Ramanagaram Court. He has, therefore, requested to place Shri Shivashankar, under suspension till the case is decided in the Court of law.
In the circumstances stated above, Shri T. Shivashankar Junior Statistical Assistant, Taluk Office, Channapatna is placed under suspension under the provision of sub-rule (b) of Rule 10 of K.C.S. (C.C.A.) Rules 1957 with immediate effect pending disposal of the criminal case in the Judicial Court at Ramanagaram.
Sd/- R.G. Bhat,
3. Mr. K. Subba Rao, Learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner, on the facts disclosed in the first paragraph above, has stated that the Officer signing the order of suspension himself did not desire the suspension of the Officer but merely carried out the request of some one else and therefore such an order which has been mechanically made suffers from the vice of non-application of mind and non-recording of satisfaction for the need to make suspension order. He has essentially placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of P.R. Nayak -v.- Union of India, : (1972)ILLJ535SC . In that decision, the Supreme Court was considering Rule 3 of All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969, (hereinafter referred to as the Rules). Sub-rule(l) of Rule 3 of the Rules provides for making an order of suspension only in the event of there being satisfaction having regard to the nature of the charges and the circumstances of the necessity or desirability of placing under suspension, the member of the Service against whom the disciplinary proceedings had been started. Especially having regard to the language of the sub-rule itself that the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that there was no satisfaction recorded and therefore the suspension order in that case was bad.
4. It was next contended that this Court also in the case of K.S. Muni Reddy -v.- Deputy Director of Public Instructions, Kolar and Others, ILR 1978 (Karn) 1835 has taken a similar view. In that case a Learned Single Judge of this Court held as follows :
'Therefore, in the present case if the Deputy Director was satisfied that the charges, levelled against the Petitioner were of serious nature, be could have placed him under suspension either under Rule 10 of the Karnataka Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957 or under Rule 102 of the Karnataka Civil Services Rules. Whatever that may be, the impugned order of the Deputy Director to the effect that the Petitioner is considered to have been kept under suspension with effect from the date of his arrest in view of Rule 102 of the Karnataka Civil Services Rules, is plainly unsupportable on the wording of the said rule.'
The Learned Counsel for the Petitioner drew my attention to the opening sentence of that paragraph by which the Learnea Judge is said to have expressed himself in favour of satisfaction being recorded by the authority concerned under Rule 10 of the Karnataka Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957, (hereinafter referred to as the C.C.A. Rules or Rule 102 of the Karnataka Civil Services Rules (hereinafter referred to as the K.C.S. Rules). That does not appear to be correct understanding of the ruling. What was in issue there was the order relating back to an anterior date and not the recording of satisfaction. The order of suspension could not be made retrospectively. That appears to be the ratiodecidendi of the case and not that in every case that order must be on satisfaction that the facts and circumstances of the case require that a suspension order is necessary.
5. Having regard to the charges levelled against the Petitioner under I.P.C. for which he is standing trial in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Ramanagaram, about which there is no dispute, I do not think under Rule 10(l)(b) of the C. C. A. Rules any satisfaction is required to be recorded by the authority making the suspension order because the power conferred is to be exercised when the fact is established which occasions exercise of that power. If the fact is not established then the question of exercising that power does not arise. Rule 10(1)(b) of the Rules reads as follows :
'10(1)(b) ...... where a case against him in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation or trial;'
It is seen that sub-clause (b) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 10 of the C.C.A. Rules provides for the power being exercised when there is a case pending trial or when the trial is in progress. There may be cases in which even at the stage ofinvestigation of a crime, the officer concerned may be kept under suspension. As is seen from the order of suspension extracted above the information supplied by theSuperintendent of Police, Bangalore District merely informed the Directorate about the fact of the charges against the petitioner and the trial that had commenced in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class at Ramanagaram. The fact that he also requested for the suspension of the petitioner who was one of the accused at the trial does not necessarily lead me to draw the conclusion that the Director-2nd respondent herein did not feel the need for the suspension imposed in paragraph-1 of the order. He has no more than recorded the information received by him and the fact of the request made. The very fact that he hasproceeded to pass the order of suspension is ample proof that he was satisfied that the circumstances warranted it. From that it cannot be said that there has been no application of mind. It is an administrative order of suspension made under Rule 10(l)(a) or (b) of the CCA.Rules and is not an order of punishment. It is purely an administrative order made in exercise of administrative power. There may be cases, that even an adminstrative order must necessarily be after recording satisfaction of the need to make that administrative order, but one under Rule 10(l)(a) or 10(l)(b) of the C.C.A. Rules need not be construed as such an administrative order. A mere contemplation of an enquiry or pendency of criminal trial will be sufficient to exercise the power without actually recording judicial or quasi-judicial satisfaction for making the order.
6. No doubt, Shri Subba Rao has stressed the need for proper application of mind and for recording satisfaction on the use of the term 'may' which being used in the directory sense necessarily imposes the need to act with discretion and therefore the need to apply the mind and exercise the power. Undoubtedly, it is so. The very fact that the material was placed before him with a request is enough indication of his application of mind. I have already stated that when he has proceeded to pass the suspension order, the officer concerned has recorded his satisfaction also. Every order of suspension if it is written like a judicial order, administration becomes almost impossible. Certain amount of mechanical power to pass the order in cases like this is necessary and it should be so understood. Then the impugned order does not suffer from the vice attributed to it.
7. There is no merit in this Writ Petition and it is rejected.