Chandrakantaraj Urs, J.
1.This Revision Petition is by one of the tenants in the three tenements belonging to the landlord. He has suffered an order of eviction in the Court of the Munsiff where the Petition was presented for eviction and also by the District Judge who has confirmed it. The. Respondent-landlord who was the owner oftenements sued eviction of all the three tenants on the ground that he requires the premises inquestion for use and occupation of his own family. That the three tenements are residential is not in dispute. That the landlord lives in a rented premises is also not in dispute. On the evidence placed before the Trial Court, the landlord's need was established and therefore, eviction was ordered.Purring the pendency of the proceeding, one of the tenants voluntarily vacated one of the tenements. When the Revision Petitions of the two other tenants including the present petitioner was pending in the District Court, the other tenant also agreed to vacate the premises and reached settlement with the landlord and took some time. The District Judge has taken notice of that event. Nevertheless, he directed eviction of the present Revision petitioner upholding the findings recorded by the Munsiff in regard to the bona fide requirement of the landlord.
2. Mr. Balakrishna Sastry, Learned Counsel for the Revision-petitioner-tenant urged before me the following three grounds:
(1) That the landlord having obtained possession of the other two tenementsis not entitled to maintain the eviction petition against the Revision-petitioner as the cause of action of the same has disappeared and this Court, even in revision under Section 115 of the C.P.C., can take notice of the fact and direct dismissal of the eviction petition.
(2) That it must be held that the two tenements which have been made available now or a little later to the landlord would be sufficient for the landlord and his family and that if that satisfied his requirement, the District Judge erred in evicting the petitioner.
(3) That eviction should not have been ordered without ascertaining the exact requirement of the landlord.
3. I do not think there is any force in any one of the above contentions. Reliance placed by Mr. Sastry on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Venkateswaralu v. Motor and General Traders, : 3SCR958 is not really of much assistance to him. Undoubtedly, in that decision the Supreme Court, speaking through Krishna Iyer, J , as he then was, stated that even under Section 115 C.P.C., the High Court can interfere after taking notice of a new fact as was brought to the notice of the High Court in that case. What was brought to the notice of the High Court of Delhi in that case was that the landlord had obtained possession of another of his own premises where he could carry on his motor spare parts business. The High Court declined to take notice of the fact on the ground that under Section 115 C.P.C. they could not take notice of the fact. They refused to act on such new facts brought to its notice. The Supreme Court found that: the High Court was in error on the sole ground that the need of the landlord if satisfied there would be no cause of action surviving to present the original eviction Petition itself in the Court which was authorised to entertain such eviction Petitions In these circumstances, the High Court ought to have exercised jurisdiction under Section 115 C.P.C, and dismissed the Revision Petition. In other words, the ratio of the decision is that whenever it touches upon the jurisdic-tion, the High Court should act accordingly under Section 115 C.P.C., and there is nothing new in the principleenunciated but what could be borne in mind is the fact that the landlord had obtained possession must remain undisputed before the High Court.
4. In this case one of the tenements perhaps has come to the possession of the landlord. The othertenement has been promised. The third one is not yet available to him. Therefore, to conclude from all these disputed facts that the landlord has obtained possession and his cause of action has disappeared would, in my opinion, be an erroneousconclusion to be drawn, in the sense, this Court on the mere submission of one of the tenants, cannot come to theconclusion that the tenant has obtained adequate accommodation for himself and therefore his original cause of action against the present petitioner or others did not survive.
5. The second of the contentions is unsupported by evidence. A bare denial by the tenant that the landlord does not require the accommodation is not enough. The land-lord says that thepremises in occupation of the three different tenants was required for his family consisting of himself,his wife and children. That must be understood to include the requirement of space occupied by all the three tenants though he filed separate eviction petitions as he must. If any portion alone was required for his use, then the landlord would not have presented the petitions against all the three tenants. There is no clear evidence as to the total accommodation available to the landlord's family in one of the tenements or two of the tenements or 3 of the tenements. What is required under the provisions of the Act for the landlord is to establish his need. If he has established that need by evidence in the Trial Court, that evidence has to be rebutted by the tenant by independent evidence. Mere assertion that it would be adequate if the two tenements are made available now or one tenement would be made available to him is not proper defence by one of the tenants. In the circumstances, if the Courts below came to the conclusion that he needs all the three tenements, this Court cannot interfere with the finding based on evidence.
6. The last contention also is devoid of merit for the reasons I have already given. One decision relied upon by Mr. Sastry in the case of Hasmath Rai v. Raghunath Prasad, A.I R. 1981 S.C. 1711 would not be of much assistance as the Supreme Court held in that case that during the pendency of a second appeal, the landlord requiring possession of one of the premises for his personal business requirements would not be entitled for eviction of another tenant whose premises had become vacant. This was held on the ground that there was no pleading as to the exact requirements of the landlord. But, I have already pointed that in the instant case, by the fact that the landlord preferred three eviction petitions against three tenants showed that he requires all the three tenements for his use and occupation. In other words, the Court should not lose sight of the fact that if a portion of the single premises is let out, the privacy of the family of the landlord which is important should be taken into consideration by the Courts in directing either partial eviction or holding that part of the tenement would satisfy the requirement of the landlord. Privacy is a word capable of multiple meaning taking in its ambit a number of facts and in each case what constitutes privacy must be gone into in detail by Courts before jumping to conclusion that part of the premises would satisfy the requirements of the family, particularly in regard to residential accommodation. It depends upon the number of people, depends upon, sex to which such members of the family belong to, their age and compatibility of living and difference in religion and custom of the tenant and the land-lord. If these and the likefactors are borne in mind, the Court will not easily resort to partial eviction or hold that part of| the premises would satisfy the requirements of the landlord. No evidence is available in this case to hold that the land-lord's requirement has been satisfied by the tenements which he has obtained vacant possession or promised vacant possession.
7. For the reasons given above, there is no merit in this Petition and therefore, it is rejected.