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S.V. Sequera Vs. Nagesh Raghunath Goje - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectCivil;Tenancy
CourtKarnataka High Court
Decided On
Case NumberC.R.P. No. 1653 of 1985
Judge
Reported inILR1985KAR2877
ActsKarnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 - Sections 50(2)
AppellantS.V. Sequera
RespondentNagesh Raghunath Goje
Advocates:Anant Mandgi, Adv.
Excerpt:
.....rent control act, 1961 (karnataka act no. 22 of 1961) -- section 50(2) -- revisional powers of district judge under act wider than under cpc -- powers exercisable not only to remit matters but also to record evidence on a point raised, if warranted -- oral evidence as to partition if proved acceptable -- admission of evidence place during revision proceedings before district judges not illegal.;petition for eviction under section 21(1)(h) was resisted on the ground another premises of landlord fell vacant and failing to occupy it no eviction could be sought. landlord rebutted the defence on the ground, premises that fell to his share at family partition was petition premises not the one that fell vacant. since there was no evidence on this point, the district judge in revision got..........the tenant under section 115 of the civil procedure code. it is directed against the order of the district judge made in revision of the order of the munsiff in proceedings for eviction under the karnataka rent control act, 1961.2. the bare facts necessary may be stated and they are as follows :the landlord sought eviction on the ground that the premises was required for his bonafide use and occupation, i.e., the premises in the occupation of the tenant. tenant among other grounds resisted the eviction on the grounds that it was not so required and that in any event that another premises belonging to the landlord fell vacant during the pendency of the proceedings and landlord having failed to occupy the vacant premises could not possibly sustain his claim on the ground urged by him. the.....
Judgment:
ORDER

Chandrakantaraj Urs, J.

1. This revision is by the tenant under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. It is directed against the order of the District Judge made in revision of the order of the Munsiff in proceedings for eviction under the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961.

2. The bare facts necessary may be stated and they are as follows :

The landlord sought eviction on the ground that the premises was required for his bonafide use and occupation, i.e., the premises in the occupation of the tenant. Tenant among other grounds resisted the eviction on the grounds that it was not so required and that in any event that another premises belonging to the landlord fell vacant during the pendency of the proceedings and landlord having failed to occupy the vacant premises could not possibly sustain his claim on the ground urged by him. The landlord rebutted the defence by contending that there was apartition in 1970 in his family and the house that fell vacant did not fall to his share. The petition premises fell to his share and therefore the question of not occupying what did not belong to him did not arise. There was no evidence before the District Judge. Therefore, he directed the parties to lead evidence before him. Evidence was lead. The landlord petitioner and his sister examined themselves and produced several documents and spoke of the partition and theallotment of properties to their respective shares. Certain documents like the mutation entries in the register of the Cantonment Board of Belgaum and some receipt Books for the period covered by the years 1977-80 were also marked. On appreciating the evidence, the District Judge concluded that the landlord could not have occupied the premises which was not allotted to his share and therefore directed eviction. Aggrieved by the same, the present revision petition is preferred.

3. Mr. Mandagi, Learned Counsel appearing for the tenant-revision petitioner in this Court has contended:

(i) That the District Judge had no jurisdiction to record evidence in exercise of his revisional jurisdiction under sub-section (2) of Section 50 of the Act.

(ii) That without clear evidence in writing of the partition and the properties allotted to the respective sharers, the Court could not have come to the conclusion that only the Petition premises fell to the share of the landlord, and in any event, the material or documentary evidence produced only proved inheritance or the Successors of the previous owner and could not be held to be proof of partition.

(iii) That in any event, the evidence relied upon by the District Judge was evidence placed before the Court after 1982 during the pendency of the Revision Petition, and therefore, there is clear error of law in admitting such evidence.

4. First of the contentions advanced need not detain me for long. This Court has taken a consistent view that the powers of the District Judge under sub-section (2) of Section 50 are much wider, even though, such power is to beexercised in revision. Undoubtedly, there is a distinction between revisional powers exercised and appellate powers exercised by a Superior Court. The revisional jurisdiction conferred on Courts by statute other than the Civil Procedure Code is generally quitedissimilar to the language employed in the Code of Civil Procedure. This has fallen forconsideration before the Supreme Court and the High Courts. The catena of decisions need not be cited, but it suffices to state that it is held that the revisional powers exercised in special statutes, though do not amount to the powers of a second Court of first appeal is nevertheless wider than what is understood under the Code of Civil Procedure. The Revision Court exercising such wider power must beconscious that it is not exercising appellate powers and no more than that. Sub-Section (2) of Section 50 of the Act has used expression that the Court on perusing the record of the case under revision, with reference thereto, pass such order as it deems fit. In fact, this definitely gives ample powers to the District Judge not only to remit matters to the Court below but also to record evidence in his own Court if the circumstances and facts of the case warrant the same. One should not lose sight of the fact that the Rent Control Act is devised and designed to protect landlords and tenants alike from lengthy litigation. The procedure recommended is summary for all proceedings under the Act whether before the Court or some other authority. If the District Judge chooses to record evidence himself on a point which has been raised before him, question of exceeding hisjurisdiction does not arise.

5. In so far as second contention is concerned, I also do not see any force in that contention as well. Hindus, which the landlord and his family are, need not reduce into writing a partition. In fact, Mr. Mandagi, drew my attention to the Commentary of Mulla in 15th Edition at Note 327, where the Court found that paragraphs 1 and 5 of that note clearly support the conclusions reached by the District Judge, in as much as, what was proved by oral evidence before the District Judge was that there was partition by metes and bounds, though nothing was recorded in writing. That is more than adequate evidence if two of the sharers came forward and deposed on oath that there was a partition and that particular property fell to the share of the landlord. The Court in summary jurisdiction can accept the evidence, if there is no blemish in it to reject the same.

6. The contention No. 3 is equally without force. Evidence though recorded - related to a period subsequent to the filing of the petition could nevertheless be evidencereferrable to an event that had taken place in 1970. Admission of such evidence cannot be said to be illegal. I, therefore, do not find any compelling reasons to interfere with the order of the District Judge.

7. It was also feebly contended that such evidence like mutation entries and the Bill Books etc., were evidence of inheritance and succession and not of partition. I have already adverted to the oral evidence. If inheritance proves joint ownership, oral evidence proves partition among the successors.

Hence, the Civil Revision Petition is rejected.

8. Mr. Mandagi, however, pleaded that great hardship would be caused to the tenant in view of the ensuing Monsoon, if the time given by the District Judge is not extended by this Court to serve the ends of Justice. No doubt, all evicted tenants may suffer hardship. But the Court must also bear in mind the considerable time lost in the proceedings and the fact that the legitimate rights of the landlord have been kept in suspension. Time given by the District Judge ends in the course of a day or two. Having regard to the circumstances, this Court reluctantly extends the time by two months more than what the District Judge had given. Ordered accordingly.


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