Skip to content


Barikara Narasayya Vs. Basavana Gowd - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectCivil
CourtKarnataka High Court
Decided On
Case NumberCRP No. 3744 of 1982
Judge
Reported inILR1985KAR2937; 1985(2)KarLJ274
ActsCode of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908 - Sections 20; Negotiable Instruments Act
AppellantBarikara Narasayya
RespondentBasavana Gowd
Appellant AdvocateBushani Kumar, Adv.
Respondent AdvocateShivaraj Patil, Adv.
Excerpt:
..... part of cause of action -- court where assignment taken place has jurisdiction to entertain suit.;the assignment of a negotiable instrument is a part of the transaction recognised under the negotiable instruments act itself. even the assignment of debt is also recognised by law. thus, assignment of a debt or a negotiable instrument is a part of the transaction itself, and therefore, when a part of the cause of action takes place in a particular place, the court having jurisdiction over that place would have the jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit. - section 8: [h.n. nagamohan das,j] general rules of succession in case of males -petitioners claim that they are surviving legal representatives of deceased 2nd plaintiff -2nd respondent died without leaving any relations..........of october 1977. notwithstanding the notice, the defendants did not pay the amount. hence, the suit.3. defendants 1 to 3 resisted the suit. defendant no. 4 remained absent.4. ultimately the court below decreed the suit. hence, the revision by the defendants.5. the court below, on the strength of the evidence of the plaintiff and linganagowd p.w. 2 and on perusal of the pronote exhibit p.i. and oncomparison of the signature found at the foot of exhibit p.i. with the admitted signatures of chinna ayyanna, has come to the conclusion that chinna ayyanna had executed the pronote on receiving theconsideration. the defendants' contention that chinna ayyanna died on 6-8-1977, has not been accepted by the court below. the lower court has rejected the so called death certificate exhibit d.i......
Judgment:
ORDER

Kulkarni, J.

1. This is a revision by defendants 1 to 3 against the judgment and decree dated 10-8-1982 passed by the Civil Judge, Bellary, in S.C. 308 of 1980, decreeing the suit.

2. One Chinna Ayyanna, father of defendants 1 to 3, borrowed Rs. 1,800/- from defendant No. 4 on 27-9-1977 and executed the pronote agreeing to repay the loan with interest at 18 percent per annum. Defendant No. 4 assigned the pronote in favour of the plaintiff for valid consideration on 10-9-1980 at Bellary. The plaintiff is a holder of the pronote in due course. Chinna Ayyanna died leaving behind defendants 1 to 3 as his legal representatives, in the first week of October 1977. Notwithstanding the notice, the defendants did not pay the amount. Hence, the suit.

3. Defendants 1 to 3 resisted the suit. Defendant No. 4 remained absent.

4. Ultimately the Court below decreed the suit. Hence, the revision by the defendants.

5. The Court below, on the strength of the evidence of the plaintiff and Linganagowd P.W. 2 and on perusal of the pronote Exhibit P.I. and oncomparison of the signature found at the foot of Exhibit P.I. with the admitted signatures of Chinna Ayyanna, has come to the conclusion that Chinna Ayyanna had executed the pronote on receiving theconsideration. The defendants' contention that Chinna Ayyanna died on 6-8-1977, has not been accepted by the Court below. The lower Court has rejected the so called death certificate Exhibit D.I. Even the so called condolence resolution was found by the Court below as highly suspicious and concocted. P.W. 2 Linganagowd is the creditor, who advanced the money to Chinna Ayyanna and in whose presence the pronote has been executed. There is no reason to disbelieve the evidence of defendant No. 4,Therefore, the Trial Court, rightly believing the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 and disbelieving the evidence of D.Ws. 1 and 2, concluded that Chinna Ayyanna had executed the pronote in favour of defendant No. 4 and that defendant No. 4 in turn had assigned the pronote in favour of the plaintiff for consideration.

6. The Learned Counsel Smt. Bhushani Kumar submitted that the pronote had been executed in Adoni and the con-sideration had passed to Chinna Ayyanna in Adoni and that therefore, it is only the Court at Adoni that had got the jurisdiction. According to her, the simple assignment of the pronote by defendant No. 4 in favour of the plaintiff at Bellary did not give rise to any cause of action at Bellary. Thus, in short, she contended that the Court at Bellary had no jurisdiction. The argument advanced by Smt. Bhushani Kumar, at the first blush, appears to be rather tempting. But on a closer perusal of Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure and the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act, I do not find any substance in the contention raised by her. She placed before me Rameshwar Lal Ram Karan and others v. Gulab Chand Puranmal, . It is stated in the said case as:

'An assignment of debt cannot be treated as forming part of a cause of action for the purpose of giving jurisdiction to the Court at the place of the assignment. If this were so, the defendant could be compelled to defend the suit at the choice of the plaintiffs and this would cut at the basic principle underlying Section 20 C.P.C-'

The facts in the said case were-

'The defendant had a shop at Kanpur under the name and style of Nanagram Chauthmal. It was alleged that the plaintiff's firm at Karachi had certain dealings with the Kanpur firm, as a result whereof the plain-tiffs were entitled to recover Rs. 5,147-6-6 inclusive of interest on their claim.'

7. In Abdul Gafoor v. Sensmal and others AIR 1955 Rajasthan 53 it has been held as-

'The expression 'cause of action' means all that bundle of facts which it would be necessary for the plaintiff' to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. In the case of assignment of a debt the plaintiff will be bound to prove that the debt was assigned in his favour by the assignor and therefore the assignment is a part of the cause of action. Therefore, in a suit brought by an assignee of a debt, the cause of action partly arises because of the assignment of debt and therefore the Court within whoseterritorial jurisdiction the assignment is made would be competent to entertain and decide the suit subject of course to the pecuniary and other limitations.'

This decision is rendered by a Division Bench of the Rajas-than High Court. The subsequent Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court, reported in without any reasons has refused to follow this decision.

8. In Muzafar Ali Khan and another v. L. Jawanda Mal Lala Ditmal and another it has been stated as-

'The expression 'cause of action', may be defined as being the fact or facts which establish or give rise to a right of action or the existence of which entitles a party to seek redress in a Court of law. The facts which comprise the cause of action are those which must, it traversed, be proved by the plaintiff to enable him to obtain a judgment in his favour. This expression came up for interpretation in the well known case of - 'Read V. Brown', (1889) 22 QBD 128 (D). In that case the plaintiff brought an action in the Mayor's Court as assignee of a debt alleged to be due in respect of the price of goods sold and delivered to the defendant by the assignor. The sale and delivery bad taken place without the City of London, but the debt had been assigned in writing to the plaintiffpursuant to Section 25, sub-section 6, Judicature Act, 1873, within the City of London. It was held that the assignment of the debt was part of the cause of action, and 'hat the cause of action having arisen in par' within the City of London there was no ground for a prohibition.'

9. In Manepalli Magamma and others v. Manepalli Sathiraju, AIR 1917 Madras 221 a Division Bench of the Madras High Court has held that-

'The assignment of a promissory note by the payee is a part of the 'cause of action' within the meaning of Section 20(c), Civil Procedure Code and the assignee can sue on it in the Court having jurisdiction where the assignment took place.'

A similar view has been taken in Official Receiver of the Estate of Mohandas Chatandas v. Naraindas Lotaram and others AIR 1926 Sindh 31 and Abdul Hamind v. Prakash Chandra Nandi and others. : AIR1934Cal175

10. The Learned author Sri Mulla in his Code of Civil Procedure, Fourteenth Edition, Volume 1, on pages 215 and 216 has stated as :

'There has been some conflict of judicial opinion on the question whether a suit can be filed in a Court within whose jurisdiction a negotiable instrument has been assigned. In support of the view that an assignment is not in itself part of the cause of action, it is said that otherwise the provision in Section 20, Clause (c) might be evaded. (Jupiter General Assurance Co. -v.- Abdul Aziz, I Rang. 231, (1924) A. Rang. 2 ; Ramaeshwar Lal -v.- Gulab Chand (1960) A. Raj. 243) But thepreponderance of authority is in favour of the view that the words 'cause of action' would, in their accepted sense, include assignment and that the Court where the assignment took place would have jurisdiction under Section 20(c). (Suganchand -v.- Mulchand, 9 Bombay High Court 272, Mangamma -v.- Sathya Raju, 31 M.L.J. 816 ; Dilbagh Raj -v.- Valuram (1933) A. Lah. 940 ; Harnath Raj -v.- Choramani Sha (1934) A.C.175 ; Gopal -v.- Narayana (1953) A.N. 192). This view would bring the law relating to assignment of negotiable instruments in line with that relating to assignment of choses in action and other rights.'

11. In S. Row's the Negotiable Instruments Act, 6th Edition, 1968, on page 165, it is stated as -

'In a suit by an indorsee of a negotiable instrument, the indorsement forms a material part of the cause of action, and, if the indorsement has taken place within the limits of the ordinary original jurisdiction of a High Court, the indorsee may institute the suit in that Court, first obtained the leave of the Court under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, Where a firm in Benares drew a hundi on its branch firm at Bombay in favour of a firm that was carrying on business at Calcutta and Mirzapur, and the hundi was indorsed at Calcutta and dishonoured by the firm at Bombay. Held, that the indorsement of the hundi constituted a part of the cause of action, and that the indorsee could, with the leave of the Court bring a suit on the hundi at Calcutta, under the 12th clause of the Charter of the Calcutta High Court.'

The assignment of a negotiable instrument is a part of the transaction recognised under the Negotiable Instruments Act itself. Even the assignment of debt is also recognised by law. Thus, assignment of a debt or a negotiableinstrument is a part of the transaction itself, and therefore, when a part of the cause of action takes place in a particular place, the Court having jurisdiction over that place would have the jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit. Therefore, under these circumstances, the argument advanced by the Learned Counsel Mrs Bhushani Kumar is rejected.

12. Then the Learned Counsel submitted that the past interest at the rate of 18 per cent per annum was highly obnoxious. This is a case where the original debtor him-self was dead and his children are now sought to be made liable. Hence, I find some force in her contention. There-fore, the past interest is reduced to 9 per cent per annum.

13. Therefore, under these circumstances, the decree passed by the Court below is modified. The revision is allowed in part. For the purpose of clarification, it is ordered that the plaintiff do recover Rs. 2,300/- from defendants 1 to 3 with future interest on Rs. 1,800/- at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the date of suit till its recovery from defendants 1 to 3.

14. Defendants 1 to 3 should pay proportionate costs in the Trial Court and should bear their own in the Trial Court. As the revision involves, to a very large extent, consideration of a question of law relating tojurisdiction, it is ordered that all the parties should bear their own costs in the revision. Further, it is made clear that defendants 1 to 3 are not personally liable to pay the debt. They are liable only to the extent of the property of deceased Chinna Ayyanna, that has come to their hands.


Save Judgments// Add Notes // Store Search Result sets // Organizer Client Files //