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Hyderabad State Vs. Beerappa and ors. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectCriminal
CourtAndhra Pradesh High Court
Decided On
Judge
Reported in1951CriLJ912
AppellantHyderabad State
RespondentBeerappa and ors.
Excerpt:
- motor vehicles act (59 of 1988)section 149 (2): [v. gopala gowda & jawad rahim, jj] insurers entitlement to defend the action joint appeal by insured and insurer - held, the language employed in enacting sub-section (2) of section 149 appears to be plain and simple and there is no ambiguity in it. it shows that when an insurer is impleaded and has been given notice of the case, it is entitled to defend the action only on grounds enumerated in sub-section (2) of section 149 of the act, and no other grounds are available to it. the insurer is not allowed to contest the claim of the injured or heirs of the deceased on other grounds, which are available to the insured. if insurer is permitted to contest the claim on other grounds it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer..........by the indictment because the word 'property' occurring in the section charged did not cover immovable property. for this proposition reliance was placed on ammeeruddin v. sarkar-e-aali, 27 deccan l. r. 5. it is laid down there that the word 'property' read in the context of the definition of extortion given in section 319, hyderabad penal code, connotes the attribute of movability so as to be capable of being handed over or delivered.3. the learned mag. did not decide the objection & as the offence under section 267 was exclusively triable by a ct. of session he committed the case to the addl. ses. j. at bidar, leaving the objection to be decided by the latter ct. this was obviously wrong & consequently when the question was raised by the accused persons before the learned addl j.....
Judgment:
ORDER

1. Beerappa & seven others were charged, before the Mag. of Cheetapur, under Sections 124 & 267. Hyderabad Penal Code for rioting with deadly weapons & voluntarily causing hurt to one Devappa to compel him to give their shares in the house & mother landed property.

2. It was argued before the Mag., on behalf of the accused that Section 267 could not apply to the facts of the present case as disclosed by the indictment because the word 'property' occurring in the section charged did not cover immovable property. For this proposition reliance was placed on Ammeeruddin v. Sarkar-e-Aali, 27 Deccan L. R. 5. It is laid down there that the word 'property' read in the context of the definition of extortion given in Section 319, Hyderabad Penal Code, connotes the attribute of movability so as to be capable of being handed over or delivered.

3. The learned Mag. did not decide the objection & as the offence under Section 267 was exclusively triable by a Ct. of Session he committed the case to the Addl. Ses. J. at Bidar, leaving the objection to be decided by the latter Ct. This was obviously wrong & consequently when the question was raised by the accused persons before the learned Addl J he rightly felt himsGlf bound by the interpretation put by a D. B. of this H. C. on the word' 'property' occurring in Sections 267 & 319 in the ruling referred to above. He, therefore, made a reference to the H. C. with the recommendation that the commitment be quashed. When the reference came up before the D. B. the learned Judges differed from the view taken in Ammeeruddin v. Sarkar-e-Ali, 27 Deccan L. R. 5 & have referred the case to the F.B.

4. After hearing the arguments on both aides -we are of the opinion that Ameeruddin v. Sarkar-e-Aali 27 Deccan L. R. 5 was not rightly decided. The offence mentioned in Section 267, Penal Code, is concerned inter alia with voluntarily causing hurt for the purpose of extorting property. The offence of extortion is defined in Section 319 of the Code as putting any person in fear of injury to that person or to any other & thereby dishonestly inducing the person so put in fear to deliver to any person any property or valuable security, etc. The word 'property' has not been defined anywhere in the Hyderabad Penal Code. It is defined in Section 2, Clause 19 Alif, Hyderabad General Clauses Act III [3] of 1308F, as comprising both movable & immovable property. According to this definition the word 'property' occurring in Sections 267 & 319 of the Code must be taken to cover both movable & immovable, property. In the opening part of S. I, Hyderabad General Clauses Act, it is stated that in all laws passed by the Legislative Council the definition of words or expressions given in the Act will unless there was anything repugnant in the subject or context. The learned Judges who decided Ameeruddin v. Sarkar-e- Aali 27 Deccan L. R. 5 were of the opinion that repugnancy lies in the fact that the Legislature has, in Section 319 of the Code, used the expression (jaidad hawala karne ki tabreek kare) and compound verb (hawala.karna) cannot be predicated of immovable property. But with respect, the very (hawala karna) & its noun form (hawalagi) in common parlance & in law are used in the same sense as the words 'deliver' or 'delivery' are used in the English language for both movable & immovable property. These expressions are found used in one Hyderabad Sale of Goods Act in regard to movables, & in the Hyderabad T. P. Act in respect of immovable property. Thus there being no grammatical or & etymological repugnance, the word 'property' used in Sections 267 & 319 of the Penal Code will be taken to mean both movable & immovable property as denned in Section 2. Clause 19 Alif, Hyderabad General Glauses Act.

5. In this view of the law no question of quashing the commitment arises within the meaning of Section 224, Hyderabad Criminal P.C. We reject the reference & direct; the learned Addl. Ses. J. to proceed with the trial of the case.


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