1. This is an application for the issue of a Writ of Habeas Corpus to release a detenu who has boon detained under the Preventive Detention Act. A counter has been filed on behalf of the Government supporting the order of detention. We heard the advocate for the detenu and the detenu himself, who requested that he might be allowed to address the court.
2. Three points were urged by the advocate for the detenu viz., (1) that the grounds on which the detenu has been detained are vague, (2) that the detenu was prosecuted for having committed dacoity and in that case he was discharged, no charge being framed against him and the detaining authority failed to take note of this fact while confirming the detention and (3) that while the order o detention directing his detention states that his detention was necessary for the maintenance of public order, the individual acts that have been attributed to the detenu are, that he was creating disloyalty, disaffection against the established Government. It was contended that the activities imputed to detenu are outside the scope of 'maintenance of public order' mentioned in this order of detention. The contention was that the grounds for detention must be based on the activities attributed to the detenu and not otherwise.
3. So far as the first point is concerned, we are not satisfied with the argument that the grounds that have been furnished to the detenu are vague. It has been repeatedly laid down by the Supreme Court that the grounds would be considered vague only where on the grounds furnished it would not be possible for the detenu to make an effective representation to the Advisory Board. If the grounds are such that they are incapable of being understood by the detenu to enable him to make a proper representation to the Advisory Board then alone would the grounds be Regarded as vague. This has been laid down in the case of the State of Bombay v. Atmaram Vaidya : 1951CriLJ373 which has been followed by the Supreme Court in the case of Ramsingh v. State of Delhi : 2SCR451 . As a matter of fact in this case the detenu has made a detailed representation to the Advisory Board, and, therefore, it could not be argued that the grounds were such that representation was not possible. This objection, therefore, fails.
4. The second objection of the learned advocate for the petitioner is that it docs not appear from the record whether the detaining Authority took into consideration the fact of the detenu having been discharged in a case of dacoity filed against him before a magistrate without a charge having been framed against him. In so far us this argument is concerned, we must straightway mention that the activities that have been attributed to the detenu are not confined to his having committed dacoity alone, as would be clear from the grounds of his detention. His activities as have been mentioned in the grounds comprised of nefarious activities coupled with violence in and around Kothagudam till August 1949, creating disloyalty, disaffection and violence against the established Government of the State and inciting labourers in Warangal to resort to violence. Under the above circumstances where there are other activities attributed to the detenu, different and independent of the alleged charge of dacoity (wherein be was discharged), the detaining authority is at liberty to continue the detention if ho finds that such detention is still necessary for the maintenance of public peace and tranquillity. The detention is after all preventive and, therefore, the fact that he was discharged from a charge made against him for dacoity could not materially affect the order of detention. We, therefore, see no force in this argument either.
5. As regards the third contention it must be admitted that it is open to the detaining authority to detain a person where ho is satisfied that the (security of the State is imperilled or the maintenance of public order is being endangered. The grounds of detention which have been served on the detenu mention acts of disloyalty, disaffection and violence which acts are relevant for the subjective conclusion by the detaining Authority relating to their being prejudicial and affecting the security of the State and the fact that the individual acts relate to the security of the State and the order of detention is for the maintenance of public order does not in our opinion make any difference as the detaining authority has power to detain a person in either circumstances. The learned advocate relied upon a case reported in Asha Ram v. State : AIR1950All709 . In this case the learned Judge was of opinion that the words 'breach of peace' used in the order of detention were of the vaguest character possible and that inference could not be drawn from that that the detaining authority had in mind a breach of the public order for which he detained the detenu. We are of opinion that the difference that is sought to be made by the learned advocate is a distinction without substance. Where the detaining authority is satisfied that the security of the State is imperiled and from the acts attributed to the detenu it can very well be inferred that the security of the State would be imperiled, the detention is justifiable. This is not in our opinion a case where the reason given for the detention of a person is not within the scope and ambit of the Act. No doubt if the reason given was entirely outside the scope and ambit of the Act and did not fall within the scope of Section 3, Sub-section 1 of the Act, it would be open to the detenu to say that the detaining authority had no jurisdiction to pass an order of detention. Such is not the case before us. As to whether the grounds are sufficient to enable the detaining Authority to pass an order of detention is beyond the scope of our enquiry and the satisfaction is only that of the detaining Authority, This has been repeatedly laid down by the federal Court and the Supreme Court that the court is the least appropriate tribunal to investigate into this question and the latest case is the case of Bhimsen v. The State of Punjab, decided by the Supreme Court in : 1952CriLJ75 . For all the above reasons we are of opinion that this petition should be dismissed. The petition is, therefore, dismissed.