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Commissioner of Income-tax, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad Vs. Trustees of H.E.H. the Nizam's Wedding Gifts Trusts (30.12.1983 - APHC) - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectDirect Taxation
CourtAndhra Pradesh High Court
Decided On
Case NumberCase Referred Nos. 92 of 1978 and 28 of 1979
Judge
Reported in[1985]154ITR573(AP)
ActsWealth Tax Act, 1957 - Sections 5(1) and 21(1); ;Income Tax Act, 1961 - Sections 2(14), 41(1), 45, 45(1), 53, 54, 54B, 54D, 54E, 139(2), 143(3), 161, 161(1) and 164
AppellantCommissioner of Income-tax, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad
RespondentTrustees of H.E.H. the Nizam's Wedding Gifts Trusts
Appellant AdvocateM.S.N. Murthy, Adv.
Respondent AdvocateK. Lakhsminarayana, Adv.
Excerpt:
direct taxation - assessment of capital gain - sections 5 (1) and 21 (1) of wealth tax act, 1957, sections 2 (14), 41 (1), 45, 45 (1), 53, 54, 54b, 54d, 54e, 139 (2), 143 (3), 161, 161 (1) and 164 of income tax act, 1961 - whether capital gain arising on sale of jewellery is assessable - high court observed that answer depends on construction of section 2 (14) (ii) - jewellery intended to be used by beneficiaries on wedding day as mark of status and pride and to be returned to trustees for safe custody after occasion - it does not come under personal effects within definition of section 2 (14) (ii) - jewellery cannot have benefit of exemption contemplated under section 2 (14) (ii) constituting capital asset - sale proceeds obtained on sale of jewellery will come under 'capital gains' and.....punnayya, j. 1. since these two reference have arisen from out of the trusts created by the late nizam nawab mir sir osman ali khan bahadur on september 5, 1951, in respect of jewellery specified in schedules i and ii of the trust deed for the use of his two grandsons, prince mukkaram jah and prince muffakkam jah, and since the facts are also the same, they can be disposed of by a common judgment. 2. the object of the trusts are enumerated in the trusts are enumerated in the deed. in the accounting year, the trustees sold the jewellery by virtue of their power conferred on them in part i of the first schedule and part i of the second schedule. on april 6, 1971, the trustees sold the jewellery mentioned in part i of the second schedule relating to prince mukkaram jah for rs. 5,98,000 and.....
Judgment:

Punnayya, J.

1. Since these two reference have arisen from out of the trusts created by the late Nizam Nawab Mir Sir Osman Ali Khan Bahadur on September 5, 1951, in respect of jewellery specified in Schedules I and II of the Trust Deed for the use of his two grandsons, Prince Mukkaram Jah and Prince Muffakkam Jah, and since the facts are also the same, they can be disposed of by a common judgment.

2. The object of the trusts are enumerated in the trusts are enumerated in the deed. In the accounting year, the trustees sold the jewellery by virtue of their power conferred on them in Part I of the First Schedule and Part I of the Second schedule. On April 6, 1971, the trustees sold the jewellery mentioned in part I of the Second Schedule relating to Prince Mukkaram Jah for Rs. 5,98,000 and on November 18, 1971, they sold the jewellery mentioned in Part I of the trust and claimed therein that the jewellery was sold in the year of account and it is nor a capital gain and hence not taxable. The ITO, however, issued notice under s. 139(2) of the I.T. act calling upon the trustees to file the returns in the status of 'association of persons'. Thereupon, the trustees folded a the return showing an income of Rs. 650 representing interest on Government of India securities, specified in the Third Schedule. They contended before the ITO that they cannot be the assessed as 'association of persons' as there are two trusts in respect of the two grandsons and if at all assessment is to be made, there should be two assessments. They also contended that no tax can be levied on capital gains inasmuch as the definition of capital assets under s. 2(14)(ii) exclude jewellery held for personal use by the assessee. The ITO did not accept these contentions. Hence, appeals were preferred by the trustees to the ACC. The ACC accepted their contention that there are two trusts relating to the two grandsons, though there was only one document and, consequently, he held that a single assessment could not be made combining the income of both the trusts. He also held that the benefit under s. 2(14)(ii) does not enure to the benefit of the trustees. The ACC cancelled the assessment. The assessee, therefore, preferred an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal questioning the correctness of the finding of the ACC that the trustees are not entitled to the benefit of the trustees. The ACC cancelled the assessment. The assessee, therefore, preferred an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal questioning the correctness of the finding of the ACC that the trustees are not entitled to the benefit of s. 2(14)(ii). The Revenue also was not satisfied with the finding of the ACC that there are two trusts and that there should be two assessments. The Revenue also took up another ground with regard to the actual value of the jewellery as on January 1, 1954, and filed an appeal before the Tribunal. The Appellate Tribunal held that there are two trusts relating to two grandsons and there are distinct provisions relating to each of them, though a single document was drawn up and hence there should be two assessments. Regarding the jewellery, the Tribunal held that the trustees did not use them for their personal use and the use if at all is for the beneficiaries, who are the assessees. The Tribunal held that jewellery is exempted under s. 2(14) and, consequently, the beneficiaries cannot be liable to assessment. The Tribunal, therefore, allowed the appeal filed by the assessees and dismissed the appeal preferred by the Revenue.

3. Aggrieved with the finding of the Tribunal, the Revenue filed a reference application before the Tribunal for making a reference to the High Court on the questions mentioned therein. But the Tribunal rejected that application. Hence, the Revenue filed another application for a reference before the High Court. This court allowed the application and directed the Tribunal to refer the question of law for the opinion of this court. On the directed of this court, the Tribunal referred the following three question for the opinion of this court. The reference is registered as R.C. No. 92 of 1978 :

'1. Whether, on a proper construction of the trust deed, the Appellate Tribunal was correct in law in holding that the settlor had created two separate trusts in favour of the two beneficiaries

2. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, a single assessment cannot be made on the trustees

3. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, capital gains tax is not exigible on the profit arising on the sale of jewellery ?'

4. The Department again filed another reference application before Tribunal for making a reference to this court under s. 256(1) on the following question :

'Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, capital gain arising on sale of jewellery is assessable ?'

5. The Tribunal allowed the said application and framed the said question and referred the same to this court under s. 256(1). The reference is registered as R.C. No. 28 of 1979.

6. The question No. 3 in R.C. No. 92 of 1978 and the question in R.C. No. 28 of 1979 are one and the same. Hence, all the question in both the references can be answered by a common judgment.

7. From the facts mentioned above, it is clear that the late Nizam created trusts in favour of his two grandsons viz., (1) Mukkaram Jab, and (2) Muffakkam Jah, in respect of the jewellery mentioned in the deed. The terms of the trust created in respect of each of the beneficiaries are identical. According to the terms of the trust, each of them is to wear the jewellery mentioned as item No. 1, in the First Schedule on the occasion of their marriage and also should hold on that occasion the sword known as 'Shamsheer Murassa Khurd', which is mentioned in item No. 2 of the First Schedule, Soon after ceremonies and festivities are over each shall return and hand over to the trustees, the said jewellery and sword and the trustees should hold them upon trust. Prior to the marriage of the present princes, Mukkarram Jah and Muffakkam Jah, the trustees shall not sell or otherwise dispose of the articles of jewellery. After their marriages and during their lifetime, the trustees should not sell or otherwise dispose of the articles of jewellery specified in the First Schedule. The trustees may at any time and from time to time if they so think fit and with his previous consent in writing sell the said articles specified in Part I of the First Schedule after their marriages at such price of prices as they may think fit and they shall thereupon invest the sale proceeds thereof in securities of the Government of India and pay the interest thereof to the said Prince Mukkarram Jah and Prince Muffakkam Jah till their deaths. The two trusts relating to the jewelleries in respect of the two grandsons of late Nizam were incorporated in one single document.

8. Thus, it is clear that the two trusts are created by the late Nizam, each in favour of each grandson named specifically though they are incorporated in one and the same document. Hence, the Appellate Tribunal was justified in holding that there are two trusts. If that be so, should be two assessments but not a single assessments but not a single assessment and the Appellate Tribunal was, therefore, justified in giving such a finding. Hence, our answer to questions Nos. 1 and 2, are in the affirmative.

9. Now, we have to examine the third question. The answer to this question depends upon the construction of s. 2(14)(ii) of the I.T. Act.

10. It is not in dispute that the jewellery relating to Mukkarram Jah was sold on April 6, 1971, for Rs. 5,98,000 and the jewellery relating to Muffakkam Jah was sold on November 18, 1971, for Rs. 8,27,600 by the trustees. The trustees field two separate returns in respect of the two beneficiaries of the trust and claimed therein that the jewellery was sold in the year of account and it is not a capital gain and hence not taxable. In support of their contention, they relied upon the definition given in s. 2(14)(ii).

11. The ITO did not accept the contention of the assessee but held that the sale proceeds are capital gains. The AAC also agreed with the ITO on this aspect and held that the benefit under s. 2(14)(ii) does not ensure in the case of the trustees who are the assessees. According to the AAC the trustees are holding the sale proceeds and the benefits given under s 2(14)(ii) does not apply to sale proceeds held by the trustees. The Tribunal held that the trustees did not use them for their personal use and the use if at all is for the beneficiaries who are the assessee and, hence, the jewellery held by the trustees for the benefit of the beneficiaries is exempted under s. 2(14)(ii) and, consequently, the beneficiaries cannot be liable to assessment. The question is whether the finding of the Appellate Tribunal on this aspect is correct.

12. The jewellery was sold in the year 1971. The assessment year is 1972-73. In such a case, the definition given to s. 2(14)(ii) of the I.T. Act, 1961, i.e., prior to the Amendment Act, applies. It reads as follows :

'2. (14) 'Capital asset' means property of any kind held by an assessee, whether or not connected with his business or profession, but does not include -.....

(ii) Personal effects, but that is to say, movable property (including wearing apparel, jewellery and furniture) held for personal use by the assessee or any member of his family dependent on him;'

13. Thus it is clear that s. 2(14)(ii), in so far as jewellery is concerned, is amended by the Finance Act, which came into force from April 1, 1973. In the unamended Act, jewellery was included in personal effects, while the same is excluded in the Amendment Act. Since the assessment year in the case on hand is 1972-73, the definition under s. 2(14)(ii) under the unamended Act applies to the case of the assessee. If that be so, jewellery is included in the personal effects.

14. Sri Anjaneyulu contends that since jewellery comes under personal effects and is, therefore, not capital asset, the sale proceeds obtained on the sale of the jewellery do not become capital gains. In support of his contention, he relies upon the definition in s. 45(1) of the Act, which reads as follows :

45. 'Capital gains. - (1) Any profit or gains arising from the transfer of a capital asset effected in the previous year shall, save as otherwise provided in section 53, 54, 54B, 54D and 54E, be chargeable to income-tax under the head 'Capital gains', and shall be deemed to be the income of the previous year in which the transfer took place.'

15. A careful reading of s. 45(1) makes it clear that where on account of the transfer of a capital asset effected in the previous year, a capital gain obtained, it shall be deemed to be the income of the previous year in which the transfer took place and it is, therefore, chargeable to income-tax unless it is otherwise provided under ss. 53, 54, 54B, 54D and 54E, It follows that if jewellery was a capital asset, the sale proceeds obtained on the sale of the jewellery became capital gain.

16. On the basis of this legal proposition, the learned standing counsel for the Revenue contends that the jewellery given to each of the beneficiaries to be worn by each of the beneficiaries under the terms of each trust cannot be treated as personal effects within the definition of s. 2(14)(ii) and hence it comes under capital asset and the sale proceeds obtained on the sale of such jewellery shall be treated as capital gain and it is, therefore, taxable. According to him, every jewellery cannot be treated as personal effects. It is only such jewellery that was intimately and commonly used by the assessee that can be treated as personal effects. In Maharaja Rana Hemant Singhji v. CIT : [1976]103ITR61(SC) , their Lordship held that the legislature intended these articles to be included within the expression 'personal effects' as they articles to be included and commonly used by the assessee.

17. Sri. Y. V. Anjaneyulu, the learned counsel for the assessee, on the other hand, contends that even under the terms of the trust, the jewellery is required to be worn by the beneficiaries on the occasions of marriages or any other ceremonies and, hence, the jewellery comes under personal effects.

18. From the terms of the trust mentioned above, it is clear that the jewellery given to the beneficiaries under the said trusts is not for the daily use of the beneficiaries. The beneficiaries, therefore, have limited rights to wear the jewellery and they have to wear them only on a occasions like marriages and after the ceremonies are over, the beneficiaries have to return them to the trustees immediately for safe custody. On account of the restrictions imposed on the use of the jewellery in the case of hand under the terms of the trusts, it is clear that the jewellery cannot be intimately and commonly used by the assessees. The expression 'jewellery held for personal use' used in s. 2(14)(ii) should be understood to mean the jewellery which is a necessary adjunct to the person. In other words, it should be an article that should be associated with the person of the person of the possessor. It is, therefore, clear that an intimate connection between the effects and the person of the assessee must be shown to exist to render them 'personal effects'. According to this expression, any jewellery held by the assessee does not come under personal effects. It is only such jewellery that is normally, ordinarily and commonly used that comes under personal effects but not the jewellery calculated to give a pride of possession on special ceremonial occasions. By employing this expression, the legislature intended to lay emphasis on the nature of the use of the article by the assessee showing the intimate connection between the effects and the person of the assessee. A close scrutiny of the context in which the expression 'jewellery held for personal use by the assessee' occurs shows that it is only those effects that are specifically mentioned by way of illustration in the above-quoted definition of personal effects that can legitimately be said to be personal. The Supreme Court in Maharaja Rana Hemant Singhji v. CIT : [1976]103ITR61(SC) had to examine as to what constituted personal effects and also the expression 'the jewellery held for personal use by the assessee'. As to what the expression 'jewellery' would mean, their Lordship referred to the Random House Dictionary, the of the English Language, Black's Law Dictionary, fourth edition and Cyclopaedic Law Dictionary, third edition. In Random House Dictionary, the expression 'personal effects' is given the following meaning : 'Personal effects, privately owned articles consisting chiefly of clothing, toilet items, etc., for intimate use by an individual'. In Black's Law Dictionary, the expression is assigned the following meaning : 'Personal effects, articles associated with person, as property having more or less intimate relation to Person of possessor'. In Cyclopaedic Law Dictionary, the expression 'personal effects' is interpreted to include generally such tangible property as is worn or carried about the person. On the basis of these meanings, their Lordship observed that various dictionaries and cases, the silver bars or bullion can by no stretch of imagination be deemed to be 'effect' meant for personal use. Even the sovereigns and the silver coins which are alleged to have been customarily brought out of the iron safes and boxes on two special occasions, namely, the Ashtami day of 'Sharadh Paksh' for Maha Lakshmi Puja and for worship on the occasion of Diwali festival cannot also be designated as personal effects meant for personal use. They may have been used for puja of the deities as a matter of pride or ornamentation but it is difficult to understand how such user can be characterised as personal use. Their Lordships held that an intimate connection between the effects and the person of the assessee must be shown to exist to render them 'personal effects' within the meaning of the expression used in clause (ii) of the exceptions in 2(4A) of the Indian I.T. Act, 1922.

19. In the light of this decision, we have no hesitation in holding that the jewellery in question, which is intended to be used by the beneficiaries on wedding day and other ceremonial occasions as a mark of status and pride and they have to be returned to the trustees for safe custody after the ceremonies and commonly, therefore, does not come under personal effects within the definition of s. 2(14)(ii) of the Act.

20. But Sri Y. V. Anjaneyulu, the learned counsel for the assessee, relies upon a decision of this court in Nizam's Supplemental Jewellery Trust v. CWT [1975] Tax LR 1085, in support of his contention.

21. The jewellery in that case was found to be intended for personal use of the assessee commonly and ordinarily and, hence, the Bench held that it is entitled to exemption. But that is not a case in respect of jewellery under the custody of the trustees.

22. Since we hold that the jewellery in question cannot have the benefit of exemption contemplated under s. 2(14)(ii) of the Act, it constitutes capital assets. Hence, the sale proceeds obtained on the sale of the jewellery will come under 'capital gains' and, consequently it is exigible to tax under s. 45 of the Act.

23. But Sri Anjaneyulu contends that inasmuch as the sale proceeds should be invested in securities of the Government of India and the beneficiaries are entitled to take interest thereof, neither the trustees nor the beneficiaries have any right in the corpus, i.e., the sale proceeds and, hence, it cannot be treated as capital gains exigible to tax.

24. We find no substance in this contention. When once it is held that the jewellery in question is not a personal effect, if has to be concluded that it is a capital asset and hence the sale proceeds obtained on the sale of the same constitutes a capital gain. It is true that as per the terms of the trust, the sale proceeds should be invested in securities of the Government of India and the beneficiaries are entitled to take the interest thereof. But it does not alter the legal position that the sale proceeds, which sale of the jewellery and, consequently, is a capital asset. It is the corpus that is material for considering whether it is a capital gain or not. As the corpus is derived from the transfer of the jewellery which is a capital asset, it is exigible to tax under s. 45. Section 45 is concerned with the corpus arising from the transfer of a capital asset effected in the previous year and it is erroneous to say that the corpus will not be treated as capital gain merely because it is invested in securities of the Government of India.

25. As the income derived from the sale of the jewellery, in respect of which the trusts were created, is treated, in the circumstances stated above, as capital gain, it is liable to tax. As the trustees are holding the corpus for the benefit of the beneficiaries, as could be seen from the terms of the trust, they are liable to be assessed as representative assessees. Whenever an assessment is made on the trustees in their representative character, the assessment shall be made either under s. 161 or under s. 164 of the I.T. Act. We have therefore, to examine whether the trustees in the case on hand should be assessed under s. 161 or under s. 164 of the Act. Sri Anjaneyulu contends that this question cannot be gone into at stage as this was not raised at any stage before any of the lower authorities including the Tribunal.

26. The learned standing counsel for the Revenue, on the other hand, contends that the assessment itself was made by the ITO under s. 143(3) read with s. 164. He further contends that the ITO's assessment order and also the order of the AAC clearly mention the provisions of law under which the assessment was made as s. 143(3) read with s. 164. He also contends that the Appellate Tribunal in para. 7 of its judgment rejected the contention of Sri A. V. Swaminathan in view of s. 161(1). The learned standing counsel for the Revenue, therefore, contends that in view of this material, the contention of Sri Anjaneyulu is unsustainable. He further contends that even though the order of reference made by the Tribunal does not contain this question, it cannot be said that on that account that this is a new question, it cannot be said that on that account that this question, it cannot be said that on that account that this is a new question of law that is raised before the High Court for the first time. According to him, who when once the corpus realised on the sale of the jewellery, which is the subject-matter of the trust, is capital gain, it did not feel it necessary to consider the question whether the trustees are to be assessed under s. 161 or under s. 164. Hence, the reference was restricted to only three questions. He also contends that if once this court comes to the conclusion that the corpus comes under capital gain, the court cannot leave the matter there and it has to consider further whether the assessment has to be made either under s. 161 or under s. 164 and this question, therefore, arises from out of the conclusion that the corpus comes under capital gain. We find force in the contention of the learned standing counsel for the Revenue.

27. The orders of the ITO and the AAC clearly mention the provisions of law under which the assessment was made as s, 143(3) read with s. 164. Even para. 7 of the Appellate Tribunal's order shows that the question was raised though not directly. After quoting the observations of a Division Bench of this court in R.C. No. 48 of 1973 dated April 8, 1975, the Appellate Tribunal observed as follows :

'It is seen that the provisions of section 21(1) of the Wealth-tax Act are in pari materia with section 161 of the Income-tax Act. Therefore, the observations of their Lordships would apply with equal force. While dealing with the provisions of section 161 on the basis of which only an assessment on the trustees could be made as indicated by us, i.e.,... Then only a proper effect would be given to the expression in like manner and to the same extent as it would be leviable upon and recoverable form the person represented by him occurring in section 161(1). While dealing with this aspect, the question of ownership or the meaning to be given to the word 'held' will be immaterial. Mr. Swaminathan, the learned department representative, no doubt, contended that the language used in the Wealth-tax Act in section 5(1)(viii) is different form the language used in section 2(14)(ii). In our view that would hardly make any difference in view section 161(1). One need not look as to whether the trustees are the owners or the beneficiaries are the owners. It may be that the trustees are the owners, but when an assessment is made on the trustees, it should be in the same manner as if an assessment is made on the beneficiaries in which case the provisions of the Act will have to be looked into qua beneficiaries.......'

28. The Tribunal, therefore, adverted to the provisions of s. 161(1) and it effect. Since the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the corpus realised on the sale of the jewellery which is the subject-matter of the trust, does not come under capital gain, it did not feel the need to consider further whether the assessment has to be made under s. 161 or under s. 164 of the Act. Since the Tribunal held that the sale proceeds realised on the sale of the jewellery does not come under capital gain and its view is contrary to the views taken by the ITO as well as the AAC, the reference made by the Tribunal was restricted to the three questions mentioned above. Since the question whether the assessment should be made under s. 161 or under s. 164 will arise only if the court comes to the conclusion that the corpus comes under capital gain, then the question whether the assessment should be made under s. 161 or under s. 164 of the Act does not arise.

29. It is true that the High Court cannot travel beyond the reference. But on that account is cannot be said that the High Court is fettered form giving a decision on a question of law which arises from the decision of the High Court rendered on the question referred to it, as such a decision of the High Court will have to be treated as a consequential order and it cannot be said to be a new question of law.

30. As stated above, since we have taken the view that the corpus comes under capital gain, it is necessary for us to decide whether the assessment has to be made under s. 161 and or under s. 164 of the Act.

31. The difference between s. 161 and s. 164 is very clear. Where it is found that the corpus is not received on behalf of or for benefit of the beneficiaries, then s. 161 applies.

32. In Mahalaxmiwala v. CIT[1954] 26 ITR177 (Bom), Chief Justice Chagla, specking for the Division thereto in the following terms (p. 180) :

'..... the main section 41(1) makes the income of a beneficiary taxable in the hands of the trustee to the4 same amount and the like manner as the beneficiary himself would have been taxed. But the first proviso imposes a heavier liability upon the income received form a trust under the circumstance mentioned in that proviso, and the circumstance are that if the income is not specifically receivable on behalf of any one person, or where the individual shares of the persons on whose behalf they are receivable are indeterminate or unknown the an the tax shall be levied and recoverable at the maximum rate. Therefore, the proviso clearly contemplates tow cases. One case is where the trust is in favour of one beneficiary and if the trustees do not receive the income specifically for that person, then the liability is that the tax shall be paid at the maximum rate. The other case contemplated is where the beneficiary is more than one person and in such a case if the trustees do not receive the income for the beneficiaries in specific shares, than also the liability is to be taxed at the maximum rate. Therefore, the scheme of the proviso is clear that if there is one beneficiary, no question of share arises and the income must be received specifically on behalf of that share individual. But where there are more than one beneficiary, then the question of their shares arises and those shares must be determined and known.'

33. Following the above decision, the Gujarat High Court in Kum. Pallavi S. Mayor v. CIT : [1981]127ITR701(Guj) held that under s. 161(1) the tax to be realised form a beneficiary, etc., can be levied upon and recovered form a representative assessee in the like manner and to the same extent as it would be leviable upon and recoverable form the person represented by him. It further held that s. 164, however, is more or less in the nature of an exception to s. 161. Consequently, therefore, if s. 164 is attracted, the assessment of income has got to be made in the hand of the trustees. It further held that in order that s. 164 is to be attracted, it should be found that the income or any part thereof is not specifically receivable by the trustees on behalf of or for the benefit of the assessee.

34. As per the terms of the trust deed the immediate beneficiaries are not entitled to the sale proceeds, which is the corpus realised form the sale of the jewellery. They are entitled only to the interest our of it during their lifetime. Thus it is clear that the trustees did not receive the sale proceeds of the jewellery, which is the corpus, on behalf of or for the benefit of the beneficiaries and hence the trustees are liable to be assessed under s. 164 but not under s. 161 of the Act.

35. Having regard to the above discussion, our answer to the third question is that the capital gains realised on the sale of the jewellery is exigible to tax and that assessment should be made under s. 164 of the Act.

36. In the result, our answers to question Nos. 1 and 2 are in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessees and against the Revenue. Our answers to question No. 3 in R. C. No. 92 of 1978 and the question in R. C. No. 28 of 1979 are in the negative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessees. There shall be no order as to costs.

37. Sri Ratnakar, learned counsel for the assessee, seeks for the grant of a certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court. We cannot certify that this is a fit case for appeal to the Supreme Court, Hence, the certificate is refused.


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