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Sridhara Suryanarayana Vs. Medikonduru Ankamma - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectCivil
CourtAndhra Pradesh High Court
Decided On
Case NumberA.A.A.O. No.72 of 1968
Judge
Reported inAIR1971AP168
ActsCode of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908 - Order 21, Rule 57
AppellantSridhara Suryanarayana
RespondentMedikonduru Ankamma
Appellant AdvocateA.V. Krishna Rao and ;T. Seshagiri Rao, Advs.
Respondent AdvocateP.L.N. Sarma and ;B. Subbaramaih, Advs.
Excerpt:
civil - attachment - order 21 rule 57 of code of civil procedure, 1908 - whether attachment of property ceases by reason of orders of stay made by superior court - where court was unable to proceed with execution for causes not attributable to decree-holder's default - penal provision of discontinuance of attachment not attracted - held, attachment deemed to be subsisting notwithstanding specific direction by court. - .....part of sub-rule (1) of r.57 applies to a case where an execution petition is terminated for the decree-holder's default. in that contingency, no question can arise as to the continuance of the attachment. but we are concerned here with a case where the execution could not be proceed with by reason of orders of stay made by a superior court. even in a case of this description. mr. krishna rao for the appellant submits that in the absence of a specific order of the court, the attachment must be deemed to have come to an end. the emphasis laid by the learned counsel is on the need for a specific order of the court. according to him, if the court does not give a direction as to the continuance of the attachment the sequel is that the attachment comes to an end. i am unable to accept this.....
Judgment:

1. This civil miscellaneous second appeal arises out of proceedings objected to the sale of the properties in the execution petition presented on July 9, 1965 on the ground that the attachment effect earlier in a prior execution petition cannot be deemed to be subsisting. The order passed on the prior execution petition on 24th June 1960 was in these terms:

'E. P. dismissed as execution is stayed.'

The question, therefore, is whether, as a result of the order made on 24th June. 1960, the attachment of the property can be said to have been terminated.

2. The answer depends upon the construction of the provisions of Rule 57 of Order 21. The contention urged for the appellant before me is that it is incumbent on the Court when it dismisses or adjourns a proceedings in execution to a future date to state whether the attachment continues or ceases. The later part of sub-rule (1) of R.57 applies to a case where an execution petition is terminated for the decree-holder's default. In that contingency, no question can arise as to the continuance of the attachment. But we are concerned here with a case where the execution could not be proceed with by reason of orders of stay made by a superior Court. Even in a case of this description. Mr. Krishna Rao for the appellant submits that in the absence of a specific order of the Court, the attachment must be deemed to have come to an end. The emphasis laid by the learned counsel is on the need for a specific order of the Court. According to him, if the Court does not give a direction as to the continuance of the attachment the sequel is that the attachment comes to an end. I am unable to accept this contention as sound.

3. It is true that the expression 'shall' is used in Rule 57 with reference to orders that are directed to be made in respect of both categories of cases i.e., cases where the inability of the Court to proceed with execution arises by reason of the decree-holder's default, and also to cases that fall in the other category. As pointed out by me in both cases, the expression 'shall' is used and a duty is case on the court to give a direction. Notwithstanding the use of the expression 'shall' in both cases, it seems to me that the rule-making authority did maintain a distinction between the cases of the one description and the cases of the other. The intention I manifest that the penalty of the discontinuance of attachment is intended to be made ipso facto applicable only to cases of default of the decree-holders. If that be the intention it is obvious that in cases where the execution proceedings come to an end for reasons other than the decree-holder's default, the compulsion or inevitability for the enforcement of the penalty does not arise. Having regard to the legislative intention. I think that the reasonable constriction that is to be placed upon the provision is that where the Court is unable to proceed with execution for causes not attributable to the decree-holder's default, the penal provision of discontinuance of the attachment is not attracted.

4. There are clear pronouncements of Courts which have considered the matter. It is sufficient to refers to Sreenivassalu v.Nataraja Goundan, : AIR1955Mad461 , and to an earlier decision in Murugappa v. Nayanim, : AIR1950Mad314 . IN view of these pronouncements, and the contrast that is to be drawn between cases of that is to be drawn between cases of decree-holder's default and cases of other description. I do not think the contention of Mr. Krishna Rao and can be accepted. The attachment must be deemed to be subsisting notwithstanding the fact that the Court has not chosen to give a specific direction in that behalf.

5. The provisions of Rule 57, have given rise to several difficulties in the matter of its application. It is high time that the rule-making body should frame Rule 57 in a manner which would minimise, if not altogether eliminate, the situations where the question whether an attachment is subsisting or not, becomes debatable by reason of ambiguity in its terminology.

6. In the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs.

7. Appeal dismissed.


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