Krishna Rao, J.
1. The plaintiff is the appellant. He brought the suit on 28-9-1958 for the specific performance of an agreement to sell the suit lands for Rs. 14,000, Ex. A-1 dated 21-10-1957, which was executed in bis favour by the defendant Under the terms of Ex. A-l, the defendant received a sum of Rs. 2,000 as earnest money and promised to get the permission of the Government and to execute the safe deed hi favour of the plaintiff. In his written statement, the defendant denied the agreement altogether and also contended that the alleged contract of sale was unenforceable by reason of Section 47 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act (XXI of 1950). The learned Subordinate Judge found, on a consideration of the evidence, that the defendant did execute Ex. A-1 and that he has also received a total sum of Rs. 5600 towards the purchase money. But he upheld the defendant's contention that the contract was not enforceable for want of the previous sanction of the Tahsildar which is necessary under Section 47 of Act XXI of 1950. He therefore decreed the suit against the defendant for payment of Rs. 5600 with interest. which was the alternative relief claimed by the plaintiff, The contention in the appeal is that the plaintiff is entitled to the main relief, of specific performance by directing the defendant to apply for sanction under the said Section 47 and to execute the sale deed after obtaining the sanction.
2. The appellant's contention is well found-ed. In Motilal v. Nanhelal, AIR 1930 PC 287 the question arose whether Section 59(1) of the Central Provinces Tenancy Act, 1920, requiring the sanction of the Revenue Officer for transfer of the cultivating rights in sir lands was an obstacle to the decree for .specific performance directing the 1st defendant to apply for such sanction and to transfer the lands to the plaintiff after receipt of that sanction. Sir Lancelot Sander son said that by the 1st defendant's agreeing to transfer the cultivating rights in the sir lands,
'there was an implied covenant on his part to do all things necessary to effect such transfer which would include an application to the Revenue Officer to sanction the transfer'
and that the decree for specific performance was properly made. This principle applies a fortiori to the present case because there is an express covenant in Ex. A-1 on the part of the defendant to get the permission of the Government', which obviously refers to the sanction necessary under Section 47 of Act XXI of 1950.
3. Sri V. Madhava Rao, the learned counsel for the defendant, does not dispute the correctness of the lower Court's finding that he executed Ex. A-1 and received a total sum of Rs. 5600 in pursuance thereof. He has merely attempted to support the learned Subordinate Judges view that Ex. A-l was unenforceable. Section 47 of Act XXI of 1950 omitting the proviso to Sub-section (1), which is immaterial, is in the following terms:
'47(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any decree or order of a court, no permanent alienation and no other transfer of agricultural land shall be valid unless it has been made with the previous sanction of the Tahsildar.
(2) Applications for such previous sanction shall be made and disposed of in accordance with such procedure as may he prescribed.'
4. The procedural rules under the section provide for applications for sanction to be made either by the transferor or the transferee. It is properly explained by the learned counsel for the appellant that he could not apply for sanction became the defendant went to the length of denying the agreement itself. Sri V. Madhava Rao urges, relying on Rayagonda Anna Patil v. Jankibai, : AIR1959Bom468 and Narasappa v. Shaik Hazrat, AIR 1960 Mys 59 that since no previous sanction for the sate was obtained Ex. A-l was invalid and unenforceable.
5. In : AIR1959Bom468 , the agreement of sale came into existence on 26-4-1946 and the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 1948 imposing restriction on such sales was made applicable to the areas on 1-5-1949. There could have been no implied covenant on the part of the vendor to comply with the legal requirements which came into force more than 3 years after entering into the agreement of sale.
In this situation, the learned Judges held that the agreement to execute the sale deed within four months of the document became unenforceable owing to the various provisions of the Bombay Act. The question of applying the principle thai an agreement to do an act implies a covenant to do all things necessary to perform it did not arise there.
6. In AIR 1960 Mys 59, the plaintiffs who sought specific performance were parties to the proceedings before the Collector in which the Ist defendent was granted permission to sell the lauds to defendants 2 and 3 in preference to them. In spite of the sanction from the Collector for the sale, required by Section 4 of the Hyderabad Prevention of Land Alienation Act of Fasli 1339, having been refused to them, they asked for specific performance. The learned Judges held that the contract of sale in their favour, though was earlier than that in favour of defendants 2 and 3, was invalid. But the situation here is catirely different. The sanction for sale in favour of the plaintiff has not been applied fur at all, such less refused. The agreement Ex. A-1 in explicit terms contemplates a perfectly legal procedure for the execution of the sale deed, after the sanction for the sale is obtained by the defendant. Therefore, by no means can the agreement be considered invalid.
7. Sri V. Madhava Rao sought to raise a point that if the defendant executed the sale to the. plaintiff, he would be left only with ac 1.00 of land which is not permissible under Section 4S(l)(a) of the Act (XXL of 1950). But this contention is only based on the allegations in para 8 of the written statement. It is disproved by his own admission and was contradicted by the plaintiff in para 8 of his rejoinder where he said that the entire lauds belonging to the defendant were agreed to be sold under Ex. A-1 consistently with Section 18(1)(a) of the Act, Apart from this, under Section 99 of Act XXI of 1950 no Civil Court h;ts jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question which falls for determination by the tribunals created under the Act. The question whether to grant the sanction tor the sale under Ex. A-1 is entirely a matter for the decision of the Tahsildar. If the sanction is refused, the defendant would not be under an obli-gation to execute the sale deed. But this possibility does not in any way detract from his obligation under Ex. A-1 to apply for and if it is legally possible, to obtain the sanction for the side.
8. Sri V. Madhava Hao finally contended that the present case was one where pecuniary compensation would be an adequate relief to the plaintiff and therefore specific performance ought to be refused under Section 12(c) and Section 21(a) of the Specific Relief Act. In this connection, he sought to call in aid the case of Ramji Patel v. Rap Kishore Singh, AIR 1929 PC 190. The question whether compensation in money is an adequate relief naturally depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. The sole basis for such a contention here is the fact that the plaintiff asked in the plaint for the alternative relief of damages of Rs. 2,000 besides the refund of Rs. 5,600. According to the learned counsel, by asking for alternative relief, he plaintiff impliedly took the position that the alternative relief is an adequate remedy. But Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act in explicit terms provides Cor the asking of such relief other in addition to or in substitution for specific relief. It cannot, therefore, be said that the two reliefs are mutually destructive. The contention is clearly untenable. I may also notice that there was not even a plea by the defendant to that effect and such a ground for refusing specific performance does not really arise for consideration.
9. It follows that the plaintiff is entitledto a decree requiring the defendant to apply forand if possible, obtain the sanction of the Tah-sildar, for the sanction for the sale and to executethe sale deed on payment of the balance of consideration by the plaintiff after the sanction isobtained. The defendant is directed to applyfor the sanction within one month of the dateof rcceipt of this decree in the lower court andto execute a registered sale deed within 2 monthsafter obtaining the sanction and deliver possession. The plaintiff will also be at liberty to apply for and obtain the sanction. There will bethe usual clause for the execution and registration of the sale deed by the court in the eventof default by the defendant. The lower Court'sdecree is set aside and the appeal is allowedto the above extent with costs throughout.