Satyanarayana Raju, C.J.
1. The S. R. is sought to be filed as a Civil Miscellaneous Petition under Section 151 C. P. C. to vacate the judgment passed in A. S. No. 54/1960 on the file of the limit Court and to set aside the decree and judgment of the trial Court and to order a retrial of the suit. The office look objection to the maintainability of the petition on the ground that the judgment and decree in the appeal can only be set aside by way of a review or a further appeal.
2. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the petition is maintainable as he is seeking to set aside the judgment and decree on grounds other than those permitted under Order 47 C. P. C. As supporting his contention, the learned counsel has relied upon a decision of the Madras High Court in Perumal Moopan v. Venkatachariar, 12 Mad LJ 503: (AIR 1922 Mad 193). There the Registrar of Cooperative Credit Societies applied to the Dirstrict Judge to set aside a decree in appeal on the ground that the Society is not properly represented and to rehear the appeal after bringing him on record as the proper person to represent the Society. Kumaraswami Sastri, J. held that where a Corporation or a Company is made a party to a proceeding, but is not represented by the person having legal authority to do so and an order is passed adversely to it, it is competent for the proper officer to apply for vacating the order and for a decision after hearing the person through whom the corporation or Company can legally act.
3. The second of the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel is one of Calcutta High Court in Akina Bibi v. Mahammad Ali Shaha, AIR 1941 Cal 336. There it was held that where a decree obtained by fraud on the Court an application under Section 151 for setting aside the decree is competent even though a separate remedy by way or suit is open. The above two cases are clearly distinguishable and cannot apply to the present case. In the instant case, the petitioner seeks to have the decree and judgment of this Court vacated on the ground that the opposite party has practised fraud by suppressing documents. It is stated that the respondent filed only an encumbrance certificate, but not the sale-deeds referred to therein. The judgment of the trial Court was rendered on 9th January, 1958 and this application was filed on the 21st September, 1964. Neither during the trial of the suit, not thereafter did the petitioner make any complaint on the score of the documents having been suppressed. Assuming, however, that the complaint is well-founded, that would not be a justifiable ground for the petitioner to invoke the inherent powers under Section 151 C. P. C. to vacate the judgment of the trial court and that of this Court. We hold that the petition is not maintainable and we accordingly reject it.