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Sultan SalehuddIn Vs. the State of Andhra Pradesh and ors. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectCriminal;Constitution
CourtAndhra Pradesh High Court
Decided On
Case NumberCriminal Misc. Petition No. 614 of 1958
Judge
Reported inAIR1959AP73; 1959CriLJ160
ActsConstitution of India - Article 22 and 22(5); Preventive Detention Act, 1950 - Sections 3 and 7
AppellantSultan Salehuddin
RespondentThe State of Andhra Pradesh and ors.
Appellant AdvocateA.A. Peerbhoy and ;Mohd. Jahangir Ali, Advs.
Respondent AdvocateD. Narasaraju, Adv. General
DispositionPetition dismissed
Excerpt:
criminal - ground for detention - article 22 of constitution of india and section 3 of preventive detention act, 1950 - principle of preventive detention not repugnant to constitution - action of detaining authority should not be ultra vires the law empowering detention - ground of detention should be communicated to detenue as soon as possible - past conduct of person furnish reasonable ground for coming to conclusion whether he act in manner prejudicial to security of state - object of preventive detention is to prevent likely prejudicial activity in future - advocacy of violence raise inference of threat to maintenance of public order. - - how khasim razvi after his release from prison in september, 1957 and before he left for pakistan nominated ovaisi as president of the.....kumarayya, j.1. this is a petition under section 491, cr. p. c. and article 226 of the constitution of india for a writ of a habeas corpus. petitioner is the son of the detenue, abdul wahed ovaisi, who was taken into oustody on 14-3-1958 under the order dated 13-3-1958 made by the commissioner of police, hyderabad under section 3(1) read with sub-section (2) of the preventive detention act, 1950 (act iv of 1950). on 37-3-1958 the grounds on which the order was made were communicated to the detenue informing him at the same time that against the order he had aright to make representation to the chief secretaryto the government of andhra pradesh within the prescribed period.these grounds were to the effect that the saiddetenue had been 'rousing or attempting to rouse communal passions and.....
Judgment:

Kumarayya, J.

1. This is a petition under Section 491, Cr. P. C. and Article 226 of the Constitution of India for a writ of a habeas corpus. Petitioner is the son of the detenue, Abdul Wahed Ovaisi, who was taken into oustody on 14-3-1958 under the order dated 13-3-1958 made by the Commissioner of Police, Hyderabad under Section 3(1) read with Sub-section (2) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (Act IV of 1950). On 37-3-1958 the grounds on which the order was made were communicated to the detenue informing him at the same time that against the order he had aright to make representation to the Chief Secretaryto the Government of Andhra Pradesh within the prescribed period.

These grounds were to the effect that the saiddetenue had been 'rousing or attempting to rouse communal passions and creating or attempting to create panic, resentment or hatred in the minds of the Muslims against the State and the non-Muslims as disclosed by his speeches made by him in public meetings' on 5th, 12th, 23rd, 24th. October 1957, 15-11-1957 and 9-1-1958. They contain some extracts of these speeches and also the particulars of the places where they were made. They further hear reference to the historical background which gives an account of the organisation known as Majlis Ittehadul Muslemeen of which the detenue is the present President by virtue of his nomination by the previous president, Khasim Razvi.

It shows how Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslemeen which was started at Hyderabad in 1928 entered the political field in 1939-40 and then after Khasim Razvi had become its President in 1946 had made an intensive demand for an independent Islamic State under the sovereignty of the Nizam and organised a militant batch of armed volunteers called 'Razakars' with a view to resist all attempts of accession of the State to the Union of India and how their activities became a menace to the peace and tranquillity of the state resulting in several offences of arson loot and murder committed throughout the length and breadth of the State; and how Kasim Razvi, the leader of the Razakar organisation was-after the police action arrested, convicted and sentenced to a long term imprisonment in tile Bibi-nager dacoity case and then Ittehadul Muslemeen became a defunct body during the period when he-was undergoing imprisonment; how Khasim Razvi after his release from prison in September, 1957 and before he left for Pakistan nominated Ovaisi as President of the Majlis-e-IttehaduI Muslemeen on 18-9-1957; and how since then the detenue has been endeavouring to rally the Muslims and revive the Maj-lis-e-Ittehadul Muslemeen so as to make it a powerful communal organisation of the Muslims and has been 'making speeches and exploiting the religious-feelings of the Muslim masses.'

2. After these grounds were communicated,, the detenue made his representation to the authority concerned and after the review of his case by the Advisory Board the present petition has been made on 20-6-1958 for a writ of habeas corpus.

3. In the accompanying affidavit the petitioner contended that the grounds of detention communicated to the detenue were false, that they were irrelevant to the objects of the Preventive Detention Act and that they were vague, indefinite and ambiguous and in fact were no grounds at all so that effective representation of the kind contemplated by Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India could be made.

As regards the alleged extracts from his speeches, the petitioner stated that some of then are mere distorted reports while the others are wholly untrue. In relation to the historical background, the petitioner stated that he was no doubt a member of the Ittehadul Muslemeen for sometime but was not associated with any of the Razakar activities and had always tried his best to bring about peace and communal harmony. According to him, though the present Majlis bears the same name as before, its constitution is altogether different. He maintained that he had delivered no speech which is detrimental to the peace of the country.

4. The Commissioner of Police i.e. the detaining authority in his counter affidavit denied the allegations in the affidavit.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has called in question not duly the legality and the propriety of the order made but also the adequacy of the grounds furnished to the detenue, for purposes of representation. It is argued that incitement to use violence being the sine qua non for any speech prejudicial to the security of the State or the maintenance of public order, there was no occasion for the issue of the order of detention when no violence was preached but on the contrary deprecated.

The next ground raised is that the past history of the Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslemeen ought not to have weighed at all with the detaining authority and that it was an irrelevant consideration which prejudiced his mind and the order therefore is vitiated. The third point advanced is that all the speeches on which the grounds are based, if read together, or each by itself, at the most would show only some grievance against the Government.

It is urged that ridiculing or even spreading disaffection against the party Government can never be a ground for inferring that the public order will not be maintained and that assuming that one or two of his speeches are against the Government, even then the grounds to that extent being irrelevant the whole order of detention becomes bad in law.

Other pleas questioning the bona fides of the detaining authority are also raised. It is alleged that the detaining authority did not at all satisfy himself even subjectively about the sufficiency of grounds, that pressure was brought to bear on the detenue to amend the constitution of the Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslemeen in a manner as not to admit of its participation in political activities and that since he did not yield to the same the impugned order was made and this detention order being for a collateral purpose is devoid of legal validity.

The order has been attacked also on the ground that there has been infringement of the Constitutional provision of Article 22(5) inasmuch as the detaining authority did not furnish in full the reports of his speeches in order to enable the detenue to make an effective representation. These, in short, arc the grounds on the strength of which release of the detenue is asked for.

6. Before we examine how far these pleas bear scrutiny, we wish to determine the precise scope of the constitutional and legal right of the detenue of the breach of which he can complain to this court. For this we have to look to the provisions of the Constitution of India. Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India directly deal with the constitutional guarantees as to the protection of life and personal liberty of a subject.

While Article 21 provides against deprivation of life or personal liberty save in accordance with the procedure established by statute and the first two clauses of Article 22 declare the safeguards provided in the case of ordinary arrests, the last four sub-clauses with which we are concerned, provided for extraordinary situations.

It would appear from these provisions that preventive detention by itself is not considered to be an infringement of any fundamental right. As a matter of feet the Constitution of India 'postulates some law providing for preventive detention. It however prescribes some safeguards or limitations which are valuable as fundamental rights, the Infringement of which cannot be permitted. Clauses (4) and (7) contain provisions for cases where detention for three months or more is permitted without or with reference of the cases to the Advisory Board.

There is a further provision for the maximumperiod ot such detention. It also provides for the procedure of the Advisory Board which should be certain. Article 22(5) gives a further right to the detenue laying down a definite procedure for notice and hearing. This procedure is to be followed strictly or the detenue will be entitled to unconditional release. We have already pointed out that the Constitution contemplates some law providing for preventive detention. Act IV of 1950 is the law in that behalf passed by the Parliament. Sections 3 and 7 of this Act are material for our purposes. Section 3 confers power for making orders of detention on the Central Government,' the State Government and certain other authorities while Section 7 corresponds to Article 22(5)

When preventive detention has thus entered 'into the law and the Constitution, the only thing that the petitioner can complain of is non-compliance with the statutory provisions or violation of any of the above safeguards guaranteed by the Constitution. The courts of course, will always be anxious to see that these safeguards are maintained intact and are in no way whittled down.

For an order to be made carefully under Section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act, all that is necessary is that the detaining authority should be satisfied with respect to the person to be detained that his activities are directed against one or more of the subjects mentioned in that section and also that it is necessary to prevent him from acting in such manner. It is the satisfaction of the detaining authority that is sufficient for the purpose and if that is established, the sufficiency of the grounds for making the order would not be justiciable in law,

It is however necessary that the satisfaction should be based on grounds which are connected with the objects which are to be prevented from being attained. So, then, if the material on which it is based is extraneous to the scope and purpose of the legislative provision and has no rational pro-(SIC)authority was honestly satisfied and the order would not be protected from judicial review.

The order may also be challenged on grounds of mala fides, abuse of power, and malice whether in law or in fact. Though the sufficiency of the grounds for detention is left to the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority and as a rule cannot be subjected to judicial scrutiny, the same cannot be said of sufficiency of the grounds communicated to the detenue to give him an opportunity to make a representation. A detenue has a right under Article 22(5) firstly, to receive the grounds, secondly, to got them as soon as may be and thirdly, to make a representation of his case to the authority at the earliest opportunity.

Grounds, of course, are only conclusions from-particular facts. When the petitioner is given a right of representation it should naturally follow that the detaining authority will furnish such grounds and necessary particulars thereof as would enable the detenue to make a representation as effectively as possible. These are the fundamental rights of the detenue guaranteed by the Constitution.

7. We now sum up the conclusions from the above discussion thus: The theory of principle of prevenlive detation is not repugnant to the Constitution. The Constitution, in point of fact, postulates a law providing for preventive detention. It however lays clown some limitations on the power of detention which cannot be transgressed.

It is necessary that the law under which the detention is ordered should not be against the Constitution; the action of the detaining authority should not be ultra vires the law empowering detention, the power should not be exercised in bad faith or in an arbitrary manner or for collateral purpose but that the detaining authority should be honestly satisfied and the grounds on which the order is based should be rationally connected with the objects of the Act These grounds should be communicated as early as practicable and in the manner prescribed with sufficient clarity and precision to enable the detenus to make an effective representation.

8. That, in short, being the position in law and also the precise scope of the right of the detenue, we now consider whether the objections raised against dention in the case before us are well founded. One of the main arguments advanced against the propriety and legality of the order of detention is that the detaining authority was influenced by the past history of the Majlis Ittehadul Muslcmeen even though the said Majlis has for itself a new constitution and the President appointed is altogether a different person,

It is almost axiomatic that the present has its roots deep in the past. In order to understand the full implications of the speeches of the detenue, as the President of the Majlis and the probable mischief that such speeches are likely to work if no order is made under Section 3, the detaining authority had in mind the past activities of the Majlis and its organised militant body of armed volunteers called Razukars under the leadership of Khasim Razvi, the former President of the Majlis, who has nominated the detenue as the President before he himself became a Pakistan national.

It had also in view the dormant state of the Majlis when its leader Khasim Razvi was in jail and its sudden revival and a crowded programme of speeches and meetings which commenced immediately after the nomination of the detenue as the President and his assumption of the office from September 1957 and the growing attendance which these speeches attracted and also the nature of the speeches and the tendency and attitude of the crowds that had gathered on these occasions. These inter alia indeed formed the material on which the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is based.

It is not the past activities of the organisation by themselves but its present activities and their mischievous tendencies judged in the light of its past activities which have given occasion to the order in question. Learned counsel argues that the instances given of past activities of the Majlis were wholly irrelevant and could not in any manner lawfully' form part of the material for the subjective satisfaction of the authority. It is further contended that inasmuch as these speeches do not advocate violence they cannot be said to be prejudicial to the security of the state or maintenance or public order.

In our opinion, both these grounds are not tenable in law. Of course, the courts can examine the grounds disclosed by the Government to see if they are relevant to the object which the Legislature has in view, viz., prevention of acts prejudicial to the security of the State and the maintenance of public order because even the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority in this connection must be grounded on material which is of rational probative value. But if the relevancy is placed beyond doubt, the sufficiency of the grounds which gives rise to the satisfaction of the detaining authority is not a matter for examination by the court.

In this case, as already stated, the order of detention does not rest entirely on the past instances. Past instances have been considered to appreciate and assess the implications and far-reaching effects of the speeches that have been recently made and are likelyto be made if the detenu is at large. It is not correct to say that such instances of past activities are not at all relevant. On the contrary, it seems to us that they afford relevant and valuable material upon which the Government may reasonably base a conclusion as to what is to come.

As a rule, the antecedents, conduct and past activities of a person or a body of persons or an organisation would furnish reasonable grounds for finding out the present attitude of that person or the body of persons or organisation for coming to the conclusion whether he or the organisation is acting or likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the security of the state and the maintenance of public order. If the present conduct reveals that it is rooted in objectionable acts and activities of the past there is no reason why those past activities should not be considered at all. The object of preventive detention, be it noted, is to prevent likely prejudicial activity in the immediate future on the part of the detenue and reasonable apprehension as to it may be based on his past conduct.

It is not punitive detention which comes after the illegal act which has actually been committed. It is in fact the reasonable and probable apprehension of something that may be done in future which is prejudicial to the security of the state etc., that is sought to be prevented by means of preventive detention. Under these circumstances it is impossible to hold that the past acts or conduct, either of the detenue or of the organisation of which he is the head, cannot be taken into account.

In Malik Mathra Dass v. State of Punjab, 1951 SCJ 747: (AIR 1951 SC 48) (A) their Lordships have observed that the references to instances of past activities in the grounds supplied to the detenue are quite relevant. In Keshav Nilkanth Togleker v. Commissioner of Police Greater Bombay, : 1957CriLJ10 (B) it was held that past activities could constitute grounds for detention in future. Their Lordships observed:

'What a person is likely to do in future can only be a matter of inference from various circumstances and his past record will be valuable, and often the only, record on which it could be made.'

The learned counsel on behalf of the detenue relying on M. R. S. Mani v. District Magistrate Mathurai, : AIR1950Mad162 (C), In re S. V. Ghate, : AIR1951Bom161 (D) and Wahid Ali v. State of Bhopal, AIR 1952 Bhopal 6 (E) has argued that assuming that the past activities are relevant, they can be so only if they relate to a period immediate or quite proximate and that the alleged activities of the Majlis which relate to a period about ten years ago could not be taken into consideration at all.

As already stated, there was a lull in the activities of the Majlis on account of circumstances beyond the control of its organisers and sympathisers and because of its President's detention in jail but a revival followed immediately after the nomination of the President by the previous President. The distance of time therefore is immaterial unless there is practically no connection between the past and present activities.

The cases relied on which we now propose to examine are cases where the past conduct or record was the sole basis for satisfaction and no fresh prejudicial act was or could be committed by the detenue. In AIR 1912 Bhopal 6 (E) the detenue was under detention till 3-3-1950 under an order dated 4-9-1949 under Public Safety Act of 1947.

A fresh order dated 7-3-1950 by the Chief Commissioner was made for the detention and it was served on him on 5-6-1950. The order dated 7-3-50 did not specify the activities of the applicantbetween 3-3-50 and 7-3-50 which were considered to be prejudicial. So it was held that on the basisof his previous activities before September 1949 and without any acts alter his release which may be said to be prejudicial, no order of preventive detention could be made.

The case certainly would have been different if any fresh acts calculated to be prejudicial after the release were committed by the detenue. The various acts so far as they could be, would certainly then have been taken into consideration in understanding the mischievous tendency and the far-reaching consequences of the present acts. In : AIR1951Bom161 (D) an order was made on 26-2-1950 against the person who was already under detention from 1948.

There was no fresh material on which the orderof detention could be based. The detaining authority 1950 fell back upon the satisfaction of the detaining authority in 1948 and this was held to be bad in law inasmuch as the detaining authority had no material of prejudicial attitude between 1948 and 1950 and had made an order without being properly satisfied as to the necessity of making such order.

In : AIR1950Mad162 (C), all that has beenobserved is that in order to obtain the satisfaction that is required under Section 2(1) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act (1 of 1947) acts done in the approximate past and not in the remote past should alone be relied upon. It does not lay down that the present acts cannot be judged in the light of the previous conduct in obtaining satisfaction that is required under law. The learned Judge at page 174 has observed:

'I do not mean to suggest that antecedent conduct would not furnish reasonable grounds for finding out the present attitude of the person and for coming to a conclusion that he is acting or likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the public safetyor maintenance of public order.'

Asha Ram v. State, : AIR1950All709 (F), is another case which is relied upon in support of the argument advanced. All that has been laid down therein is that the court is entitled to examine the grounds to see whether there is any direct causal connection between the grounds and the maintenance of publicorder.

There is nothing in all these rulings to suggest that the present activities cannot be considered in the light of the previous conduct in order to obtain the satisfaction within the meaning of Section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act. On the contrary there is authority for the proposition that the instances of past conduct or antecedents of a person are relevant for the purpose of obtaining satisfaction for making the order.

In Maqdoom Mohiuddin v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1952 Hyd 112 (G) it was observed that the past conduct of the person detained would always afford sufficient data in order to judge about the present propensities and the criminal propensities of the detenue. They cannot necessarily be ignored. They may be safe criteria for determining his propensities and his likely future activities. Similar is the observation in : AIR1950All709 (F).

The pronouncement of the Supreme Court in : 1957CriLJ10 (B) placed the matter beyond dispute. Thus there is no force in the argument that since the historical background too weighed with the detaining authority in judging the implications and tendencies of the present acts of the detenue and in obtaining satisfaction warranted by Section 3, the order bad to law.

9. The other ground on which the order is attacked is that there could be no order under Section 3 unless the speeches in question preached violence. Reliance in this behalf is placed on AIR 1952 Hyd 112 (G), Sadat Jahan v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1953 Hyd 295 (H), Umraomal v. State of Rujasthan, (S) AIR 1955 Raj 6 (U, Ahmad Ad v. State, : AIR1951All459 (R Sarju v. State, : AIR1956All589 (K) and Mohd. Ishaq v. U.P. State, (S) : AIR1957All782 (L).

We do not think that preaching of violence or open incitement thereto is sine qua non for an order under Section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act. Advocacy of violence and incitement to use violence or to resort to other illegitimate courses are no doubt clear cases which necessarily raise an inference of threat to the maintenance of the public order or even the security of the state. But these instances are not exhaustive and there are several other ways which may produce the same or similar consequences. Instances are not lacking where the expression of certain views in certain circumstances have tended to disturb public order, peace and tranquillity.

There are also instances whereby employing language, apparently unobjectionable, communal feelings have been deliberately roused and exploited and various other objects were achieved which in fact proved fatal to the security of the states. It is not the form but the substance that is sought, to be conveyed which counts. The language may be unobjectionable; yet the spirit behind it may if skilfully conveyed work havoc. The speech is to be judged by its potentialities in the context of things, surrounding circumstances and by its inherent mischievous tendencies.

We cannot agree that since violence was not in terms preached in the speeches, the speeches became irrelevant to the objects of Section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act. Even the cases cited by the learned counsel do not exclude the possibility of cases where even without the advocacy of violence the acts may yet be prejudicial to the public order. The decision in (S) : AIR1957All782 (L), in fact deals with this aspect.

10. In the first speech delivered on 5-10-1957 which is said to have been made at the time of Milad-un-nabi the detenue after stating that Islam at any rate cannot be suppressed and he who attempts to do the same will himself be vanquished and that now-a-days people are opposing Islam and this opposition will be ineffective, referred to the various problems with which the Muslims are faced, the opposition with which they are met and also the miserable straits to which they are reduced.

He referred to the Muslims in the previous Hyderabad state, in India and the world and said that communities mad with power try to destroy the Muslims by their misdeeds yet the Muslim will work out a revolution and survive. In the second speech which was made on 12th October, the detenue said there are three problems before the Muslims: their Islam is in danger, their lives are in danger and the means of their livelihood are denied. He also referred to the fact that he who opposed the Muslims would be effaced from the face of the world and that is what God has said. He referred to the promise of God to Noah that lie would take revenge because whatever disgrace His followers may be put to will be His own disgrace.

In the third speech made on 23rd October, he referred to the same problems and said that though there are difficulties ahead, the Muslims should not think of them. The Muslims of Andhra Pradesh, 40 lakhs in number, are thinking what will come of them. They are in fact under misapprehension. Whatever promise God has made will be there, till the day judgment. He further said

'Oh Muslims! you cannot be destroyed by your being deprived of the means of livelihood. God has said that your nation will not be killed by famine or privation. Your kingdom will stretch from east to west, north to south.

He also referred to the fact that after a lapse of eight years the present organisation has again come into being. In another speech delivered on 24th October, the detenue again addressed the Muslims saying: 'your existence is in danger: Beware; be united.'

He stressed again that at this present moment the Muslims are threatened with extinction.

There is no arrangement for their religious education and the legislative enactments are fast increasing. On 15-11-1957, he stated that Muslims in Deccan have become very weak. He threw a challenge to those who offered to extend threats andsaid:

'We do not expect anything of you. We expect everything from God. Though you are rulers we do not despair. Don't you think that we have the support of God?'

He also referred to the promise of God that He willCreate such circumstances and environments that the Muslims would be revered He further stated :

'People are looking upon us with intolerance and communal bias.....There are efforts tostifle and suppress Islam. Islam is the only religion which can educate the whole world and God has said that He will make Islam supreme in the world.'

In the last speech dated 9-1-1958 :

'There are organisations and communities. Pass whatever resolution they may. We attach no importance to them. We want to give moral training to the entire world ...... There is a meetinggoing on in Pratapagiri Koti. We do not care for it.....There are certain persons who are sittingat the doors of the Government ........ We haveheld 80 meetings so far during the past 45 days. I have preached the same principles as were preached 11300 years ago by prophet Muhammad. See on 45th day in Balsetti field there a huge gathering of one lakh of Muslims ...... There are certain people who sitting at the doors of the Government extend threats to us ........... They want tothreaten us ............. We are not afraid of them.They may pass any resolution they like'.

11. These are the speeches purported to have been made by the detenue as the President of the Majlis Ittehadud Muslemeen. Thus it would appear that all the speeches are connected with one another. It is evident from these speeches that the detenue wants to revive the organisation which has been defunct for the past eight years.

The organisation to be revived is the same as the Majlis Ittehadul Muslenieen which under the Presidentship of Khasim Razvi had become a source of threat to the other communities and the band of Razakars had spread a reign of terror. The detenue is the nominee of that President. In the speeches the new President refers to the fact that Muslim and Islam are in danger and their means of livelihood are denied and they are threatened with extinction.

He refers to the Muslim population in the State, in the country and in the world, reminds them of the promise of God that their kingdom shall extend to the length and breadth of the world. He alsoStates that there is opposition against Muslims, that toleration is not shown to them and that there are attempts to suppress Islam and tells about the promises of God that he will take revenge and that the Muslims faced with destruction will bring out revolution and that he who opposed the Muslims would be effaced from the world. It would alsoappear from speeches that the audience increased from time to time.

Having regard to the tempo of the speeches, the ready response to them, the mentality of the masses for whose consumption these speeches were made, the references to serious threat to life, means of living and religion of the Muslims and to the promises of God etc, and the past activities of the organisation, which is revived, it cannot be said that these speeches in spite of some references that the President is not going to preach Jahad or to incite the Muslims to violence are not inflamatory in nature or could not form revelant material for the objects of Section 3.

Indeed the maintenance of public order is an important function of the State. To see that the peace, tranquillity and harmony among the various communities of the state is maintained is a fundamental duty of the Government. Any act affecting or calculated to affect the same should certainly be appropriately dealt with by the Government.

The detaining authority has come to the conclusion that if the detenue is at large and allowed to continue these activities there is probability that sooner or later these activities will bring about a situation where the security of the State will be in danger and that there is a strong threat to the maintenance of public order as the communal passions are being roused and seeds of discord, hatred and resentment are being sown.

This satisfaction, as we have already pointed out, is a subjective satisfaction which cannot be put to objective test. Adequacy of the material or sufficiency of the grounds that it will justify or lead to the same conclusion as the detaining authority has arrived at is not a matter to be considered by the court. It is not open to the court to enquire even into the truth or otherwise of the grounds alleged. It is sufficient if the grounds are relevant, (and in our opinion they are) to the objects of Section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act and the authority has not acted arbitrarily or for collateral purposes.

12. It has no doubt been alleged that there was an attempt to see that the organisation keeps away from politics and when this attempt had failed, the detention order was made. But there is no material on record to show that the order of detention has been made for such collateral purpose. Thus the objection as to the legality of the order fails.

13. The next question for consideration is, whether there has been any infraction of the right of the detenue vouchsafed by Article 22(5) of the Constitution read with Section 7 of the Preventive Detention Act. That article as already stated, provides for notice and hearing. Not only the grounds should be communicated as soon as may be or within a period of 5 days as Section 7 days down but also they should be given with sufficient clarity and preciseness to enable the detenue to make a proper and adequate representation as effectively as he can.

It is contended that the detaining authority ought to have furnished full text of the speeches and not mere extracts of the same. There is no force in this argument having regard to the language and purport of the provision. What is contemplated by Article 22(5) is the communication of the grounds which should be sufficient to enable the detenue to make his representation against the order at the earliest opportunity. The grounds are conclusions of facts and not recitals of facts.

If the grounds furnished are definite, clear and precise and are expressed in an understandable manner sufficient to serve the purpose for which they are communicated, the detenue cannot com-plain of anything further. In Ram Singh v. The State of Delhi, : [1951]2SCR451 (M), where it was argued that it was not sufficient that the time and place of the alleged speeches and their general effect were indicated in the grounds but it was also necessary that the offending passages or at least the gist of them should be communicated in order to enable the petitioner to make effective representation, their Lordships held that, on the facts, it was sufficient if the time and place at which the speeches were alleged to have been made were specified and their general nature and effect were also stated even though objectionable passages were not indicated in this grounds of defection.

In the present case, it would appear that the offending passages and their gist has been communicated to the detenue. Having regard to the grounds and the particulars furnished it cannot be said that the detenue was act in a position to make his representation at the earliest opportunity as effectively as possible. The grounds were clear, precise and were in no way vague and obscure.

14. It was also argued that all these grounds taken together or some of them taken individually constitute only a grievance against the Government and thus they being irrelevant to the objects of Section 3 the satisfaction based on all the grounds put together should be deemed to have been vitiated and the detenue should be released forthwith. Reliance has been placed on Ram Krishan v. State of Delhi, : 1953CriLJ1241 (N), and Dwaraka Das v. State of J. and K., : 1957CriLJ316 (O).

We do not agree with this contention that allor any of these grounds are irrelevant to the purpose of Section 3. The speeches are not expressionof mere grievances against the Government. Eventhe last speech on which much stress is laid is notone of that kind. Even if it were so, applying thetest in : 1957CriLJ316 (O), the order of detention would not have been held bad in law. Sincewe are of the opinion that the grounds, whethertaken individually or otherwise, are not irrelevant,the argument of the learned counsel will fail. It isclear to our mind that there has been no infringementof the right vouchsafed by the constitution underArticle 22(5) We therefore dismiss this petition.


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