1. These 10 revision cases raise a short point as to We applicability of the provisions of the Code of criminal Procedure of 1898 to the proceedings started after 1-4-1351 In relation to the offences under Penal code committed prior to that date in the territory included in the erstwhile Hyderabad State. The IVth City Magistrate as also the Chief City Magistrate, Hyderabad are of the view that notwithstanding the fact that the said Code has come into force in the Hyderabad State from that date, the repealed Hyderabad Criminal procedure Code shall continue to govern the proceedings of this kind as though the Cods of 1898 had not come Into force. They rely for this proposition on the decision of a single judge of this court In Re: Sri Ram Shastry, : AIR1960AP375 , of course there are authorities of Division Bench as also of Full Bench of the erstwhile Hyderabad High Court (see Jayarama Iyer v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1954 Hyd 56 at p. 60 and Waheed Hasan v. State of Hyderabad AIR 1954 Hyd. 204 (FS) for a contrary view to which reference has also been made in the order of the 4th City Magistrate. But as the courts below were bound by the compelling authority of this Court, they have allowed the application of the accused that the provisions of the Hyderabad Criminal Procedure code must be made applicant.
2. The decision to that effect in : AIR1960AP375 was indeed based on the clear language of Section 6 of Part 'B' States (Laws) Act III of 1951. That conclusion would have been unexceptionable had this provision or the said Act applied to the Criminal Procedure Code. One would look in vain to find the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 included in Schedule to Act III of 1951 which enumerates all the Acts and ordinances to which the provisions of Act III of 1951 would apply that was obviously because that Code was separately dealt with under a Specific Act (Act 1 or 1951) which received the assent of the President of India on the 17th February 1951 and came into force from 1-4-1951. The attention of the learned Judge was not invited to this event and the judgment followed on the wrong assumption that Act III of 1951 did apply to this procedural law. The title of this Act viz., 'Part 'B' States (Laws) Act' seems to have been also no less responsible for such assumption: Section 25 or Act 1 of 1951 which is relevant for our purpose provides in Sub-section 3 thus:
'The provisions of the said Code shall apply to an proceedings instituted after the coming into force of the said Code in any part B State and, so far as may be, to an cases pending in any Criminal Court in that State when the said Coda comes into force therein.'
The 'said Code' referred to according to section 2 of the Act is the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. On the clear language of this provision it is impossible to hold that this Code did not apply to all proceedings instituted on or alter 1-4-1951 as also pending on that date in part 'B' states subject of course to any of the qualifications which saving clauses provide in Sub-sections 1, 2 and 4 or Section 25. The repealed law, therefore, cannot any longer be availed of in relation to the proceedings which are instituted after 1-4-1951. In these premises, we hold that the decision rendered in : AIR1960AP375 in this behalf does not contain the correct statement of law, and therefore, must stand overruled, and that the view taken by the Full Bench of the Hyderabad High Court in AIR 1954 Hyd 304 states the law correctly. On general principles also there can be no controversy. We may advantageously refer to the observations In this behalf of the Supreme Court in Anant Gopal Sheorey v. State of Bombay, : 1958CriLJ1429 , which are to the following effect:
'No person has a vested right in any course of Procedure. He has only the right of prosecution or defence in the manner prescribed for the time being by or for the Court in which the ease is pending and if 6y am act of parliament the mode of procedure is altered he has no other right than to proceed according to the altered mode, see Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes on p. 225; Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. Irving, 1905 AC 369. In other words a change In the law of procedure operates retrospectively and unlike the law relating to vested right is not only prospective.'
3. Thus both in principle and on authority we are of the view that the orders of the courts below are wrong.
These revision petitions, are, therefore allowed and the orders of both We Chief City Magistrate and the 4th City Magistrate are reversed. The petition of the accuses in relation to applicability of Hyderabad Criminal procedure Code is disallowed.