Jeevan Reddy, J.
1. The question in these two tax revision cases is whether 'vermicelli', which is popularly called 'shevaya', is 'maida' and accordingly falls within entry 60 of the First Schedule to the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). Entry 60 at the relevant time read as follows :
'60. (a) Wheat At the point of 3 paise infirst sale in the the rupeeState. (b) Ravva, maida and ' 4 paise inatta not covered the rupeeby item (c) below (c) Ravva, maida and ' 1 paise inatta obtained from the rupeewheat that has mettax under this Act. (d) Wheat bran 1 paise inthe rupee.'
2. The Tribunal relied upon two judgments, namely, one of the Bombay High Court reported in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Sultan Shev Co.  40 STC 583 and the other of the Supreme Court in Alladi Venkateswarlu v. Government of Andhra Pradesh : 3SCR190 to come to the conclusion that 'shevaya' is 'maida' and therefore falls within entry 60. In Alladi Venkateswarlu v. Government of Andhra Pradesh : 3SCR190 the Supreme Court held that 'atukulu' and 'muramaralu', which are called 'parched rice' and 'puffed rice' in English, fall within the expression 'rice' which was then covered by entry 66 of the First Schedule to the Act. In Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Sultan Shev Co.  40 STC 583 the Bombay High Court considered this very commodity. It held that 'shevaya' is nothing but 'maida flour' mixed with water and turned through a sieve into small filaments which are then dried up, and on that basis held that 'Shevaya' falls within entry 10 in Schedule A to the Bombay Sales Tax Act, which reads as follows :
'10. Cereals and pulses in all forms and flour including atta, maida, besan, suji and bran prepared therefrom, but excluding maize flour.'
3. We may also mention that the Bombay High Court read the said entry as really two entries put together, namely, 'cereals and pulses in all forms' and 'flour including atta, maida, besan, suji and bran prepared therefrom, but excluding maize flour'. Inasmuch as 'shevaya' was held to be 'maida' in essence, though in a different form, it was held to fall within the said entry. These decisions undoubtedly support the Tribunal's view.
4. Mr. J. V. Suryanarayana, learned Government Pleader, however, contended that the Bombay High Court was considering a commodity which was exempt from tax and because they were goods of common consumption, they adopted a liberal interpretation, whereas in the present case we are dealing with goods subjected to tax and in such cases, the learned counsel contended that test which ought to be applied is, what is called, the common parlance test. In other words, his contention is that in such cases the proper test ought to be whether the goods in question are different goods or are they the same goods. For determining whether they are same goods, the learned counsel contended, we must see how the relevant goods are understood by the common people or in the commercial world. We are not impressed by this argument. We may point out that in Alladi Venkateswarlu v. Government of Andhra Pradesh : 3SCR190 the Supreme Court had to deal with one of the entries in the First Schedule and still they held that 'parched rice' and 'puffed rice' are rice. For preparing 'parched rice' and 'puffed rice' the process required is much more elaborate than the process by which 'maida' is turned into 'shevaya'. If 'parched rice' and 'puffed rice' is rice, we see no reason to hold that 'shevaya' is not 'maida'. It should also be noticed that 'shevaya' is a commodity of fairly common use. It is really an article of food and in such cases it is but appropriate that they should be treated as outside the net of higher taxability, if that can be done without doing violence to the language. The idea in including 'maida' in the First Schedule was to subject it to single point tax, the rate of tax being only one per cent. If, on the other hand, we hold that 'shevaya' is not maida, it will become 'general goods' and would be taxable at each point of sale at the rate of 3 per cent, now 4 per cent. We are also of the opinion that in case of any doubt or ambiguity on the question, it should be answered in favour of the assessee for the reason that it in turn goes to make the goods available at a lesser price to the common man. For the above reasons, we see no ground warranting interference in these tax revision cases which are accordingly dismissed, but in the circumstances without costs.