Chandra Reddy, C.J.
1. This is an appeal against the order of our learned brother, Basi Reddi, J., dismissing W. P. No. 1444 of 1958.
2. The point raised In the writ petition and in the appeal before us is whether land-cess could be levied under Section 78 of the Madras District Beards Act, 1920 on royalty in respect of a mining lease. The appellant had taken on lease from the Government an iron ore mine. Land-cess was levied on the basis of the rent payable by the appellant to the lessor, the Government. It was urged before our learned brother that no land cess could be imposed on the basis of the rent payable by him and that, secondly, the District Board had no power to levy cess after the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 was passed. This argument was based on Section 7G-A of the Madras District Boards Act, 1920. The learned Judge negatived both the contentions, the first one having been covered by the judgment of this Court in Murthy H.R.S. v. Collector of Chittoor, W. P. Nos. 534 and 535 of 1958. D/- 25-3-1960, the second one for the reason that Section 76-A of the District Boards Act would not come to the rescue of the appellant because the levy was not made under that section and, secondly, no provision had been made by Parliament for the levy of land-cess on the annual rent value computed on the royalty payable to Government in respect of mining leases. In the result, the writ petition was dismissed. It is this order of our learned brother that is brought under appeal.
3. It is urged in support of this appeal by Sri Gopal Rao, learned counsel for the appellant, that the Bench decision of this Court in W. P. Nos. 534 and 535 of 1958, D/-25-3-1960, requires reconsideration, as this Court had net considered the question whether Section 79 of the Act contravened the provisions o Article 14 of the Constitution. The argument of Sri Gopal Rao in this behalf is that bald power unguided by rules was vested in the assessing authority in regard to the choice of persons for exemption falling under Section 111 of the District Boards Act. Section 79 discriminates between persons falling under Clauses (i) and (ii) and those falling under Clause (iii) in that while the persons falling under the latter category are given the right of appeal against the assessment, those coming under the former are denied such a right, continues the learned counsel.
4. We do not think that any effect could be given to this argument. For one thing, such a contention was not raised in the writ petition, nor any such argument put forward before our learned brother in the course of arguments. Even in the Memorandum of Grounds of appeal, this point is not taken. Even otherwise, there is no substance in this argument .There is no hostile discrimination against persons coming under Clauses (i) and (ii), Section 79 merely prescribes the procedure for determining the annual rental value. Clause (i) sets out as to how the rental value should be determined in the case of persons who take leases or licences direct from Government on ryotwari tenure, while Clause (ii) contemplates the fixation of the annual rental value in regard to inam lands of lands held wholly or partially free from assessment and Clause (iii) relates to assessment in respect of lands held on tenure other than those mentioned, in Clauses (i) and (ii). The three clauses are intended to cover three different tenures. Therefore, there is no scope for invoking Article 14 of the Constitution in this regard.
5. The complaint that a right of appeal is conferred on persons failing within the contemplation of Clause (iii) while it is denied to others is equally untenable. It should be remembered that it is Section 86 that gives a right of appeal to the Board of Revenue against any assessment made by the District Collector under Sub-section (2) of Section 85 and Section 55 (2) relates to the determination of the assessment of the land-holder or sub-land-holder for the triennium with reference to the average annual rent value of his land as disclosed by the lists for the three fasli years preceding the triennium. Hence there is no question of giving a right of appeal to persons coming within the purview of Clause (iii) of Section 79. In these circumstances, we are not satisfied that the principle enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution has in any way been infringed.
6. There is also no substance in the argument that discretion untrammalled by any rules or principles is vested in the assessing authority. Section 111 gives cower to the District Board to grant exemption in regard to payment of taxes levied by it. In this case, it is not the District Board that imposed the cess but it is the District Collector. We are, therefore, unconcerned here with Section 111 of the District Boards Act.
7. Further, it does not lie in the mouth of the appellant to say that cess could not be levied on him, he having agreed to pay all the cesses in the lease deed. Even assuming for the sake of argument that there is force in the contention regarding the validity of the levy of cesses, this Court will not exercise its extraordinary. jurisdiction in favour of a person who does not want to fulfil his part of the contract.
8. We think that this appeal is utterly devoid of meritsand deserves to be dismissed with costs. Advocate's feeRs. 100/- (One hundred).