Ramachandra Rao, J.
1. The Writ Appeal is preferred against the judgment of our learned brother Jeevan Reddy, J. dismissing the Writ Petition filed by the 9 appellants herein challenging the order of the 1st respondent Government in G. O. Ms. No. 391 M. A. dated 23-6-1980 published in the Gazette dated 10-12-1980 according its approval for the Master Plan submitted by the Hyderabad Urban Development Authority, the 2nd respondent herein.
2. The relevant facts are as follows: The Legislature of the State of Andhra Pradesh enacted the Andhra Pradesh Urban Areas (Development) Act, 1 of 1975 (hereinafter called 'the Act') in order to provide for the development of Urban areas in the State of Andhra Pradesh according to plan and for matters ancillary thereto. The Act received the assent of the President on 20-1-1975 and it was published in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette on 27-1-1975. Sub-sec. (3) of S.1 provides that the Act shall come into force on such date as the State Government may, by notification in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette, appoint. By order dated 25-9-1975 in G. O. Ms. No. 409 published in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette dated 29-9-1975, the Government fixed 1st Oct., 1975 as the date on which the Act was to come into force.
3. Section 2(o) defines 'Urban area' as follows:
'(i) The area comprised within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad or of any Municipality constituted under the Andhra Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1965 and also any such area in the vicinity as the Government may, having regard to the extent of and the scope for the urbanisation of that area or other relevant considerations specify in this behalf by notification, and
(ii) such other area as the Government may, by notification declare to be an urban area, which in the opinion of the Government is likely to be urbanised.'
Section 13(1) which provides for declaration of Urban areas as development areas read as follows:
'As soon as may be after the commencement of this Act where Government consider if necessary to do so for purposes of proper development of any urban area or group or urban areas in this State they may by notification, declare such urban area or group of urban areas to be a development area for the purposes of this Act.'
4. Section 3 (1) which provides for constitution of Urban Development Authority reads as follows:
'As soon as may be after an urban area or a group of urban areas is declared to be development area under sub-sec. (1) of S. 13, the Government shall by notification constitute for the said development area, an Urban Development Authority with effect from such date as may be specified therein.'
5. Under S. 2(k) 'notification' means notification published in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette.
6. Section 6 empowers the said authority to carry out a civil survey and prepare a Master Plan for the development are concerned. S. 7 provides for preparation of zonal development plan for each of the zones into which the development area may be divided. S.8 prescribes the procedure to be followed for the preparation and approval of the plans. S. 9 requires that every plan should be submitted by the Authority to the Government may either approve the plan without modifications or with such modifications as they may consider necessary or reject the plan with directions to the Authority to prepare a fresh plan accordingly to such directions. Under S. 10, immediately after the plan has been approved by the Government, the authority shall publish in such manner as may be determined by regulations, a notice stating that the plan has been approved and upon the date of the first publication of the aforesaid notice, the plan shall come into force.
7. In exercise of the powers conferred by Ss. 2(o) and 13(1) the Government published the order in G. O. Ms. No. 411, dated 27-9-1975. The Government published in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette dated 1-10-1975 two notifications one under S. 3 of the Act constituting the 2nd respondent as the Urban Development Authority and the other under Ss. 2(o) and 13(1) declaring certain areas as urban area and developing area.
8. In this Writ Appeal, we are concerned with the later order made in G. O. Ms. No. 411 dated 27-9-1975 which is in two parts. Part I contains the notification issued under cl. (o) of S. 2 specifying the Hyderabad Municipal Corporation area and 303 villages mentioned therein as Urban area. Part II issued under S. 13 (1) declared the area comprised within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad ad the other areas specified in Part I of the Notification to be development area for the purposes of the Act. Thereafter, the authority prepared a Draft Master Plan, for the Non-Municipal Area of the Hyderabad Development area of about 635 Sq. miles (excluding the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad area and the cantonment area) and the same was approved by the Authority at its meeting held on 25-2-1980, and the Vice-chairman of the authority forwarded the Draft Master Plan by his letter, dated 24-3-1980 to the Government for approval under Sec. 9 of the Act. The Government by order dated 23-6-1980 in G. O. Ms. No. 391 M. A. Thereafter, in accordance with the provisions of S. 10 and the rules framed thereunder the authority published the plan in the local newspapers dated 19-9-1980 stating that the plan was approved inspected at the office of the said Authority. Thus the said plan become effective from 29-9-1980, the date of publication in the newspapers. The petitioners-appellants which are all Gram Panchayats of several villages covered by the urban area and development area and the Master Plan, filed the Writ Petition challenging the notification in G. O. Ms. No. 411 dated 27-9-1975 issued by the Government declaring the urban area and development area and also the Master Plan prepared by the authority and approved by the Govt. in G. O. Ms. No. 391 dated 23-6-1980.
9. Before our learned brother, the following contentions were urged (1) The notification in G. O. Ms. No. 411 dated 27-9-1975 was invalid and void for the reason that it was issued prior to 1-10-1975 the date on which the Act came into force, (2) The master plan prepared by the Authority was not in conformity with the provisions of Section 8, sub-sec. (3) as no individual notices were given to the local authorities likely to be affected by the master plan prepared by the Authority (sic) were submitted to the Government for approval not by the Authority but its Vice-Chairman and, therefore, it contravened the provisions of S. 9.
10. Our learned brother held that the notification contained in G. O. Ms. No. 411 specifying the urban area and declaring development area was issued on 27-9-78 constituted only preparatory steps, and that it was of little consequence as it was only an act of the Government and not a 'notification' within the meaning of the Acct, and that the deliberations which precede the 'notification' or the several ministeria acts leading to it should not be confused with the 'notification' contemplated by the Act, and that there was no bar to taking of preparatory steps which ultimately lead to issuance of the 'notification' as required by the Act and that the issuance of the order in G. O. Ms. No. 411 was not the same thing as the issuance of notification contemplated by the Act and that under S. 2(o) and Section 13(1) read with the definition of 'notification' in S. 2(k) the order in the impugned G. O. Ms. No. 411 became a notification only on its being published in the Gazette and that the publication of the said G. O. having been made in the Gazette on 1-10-1975, the date on which the Act came into force, the said G. O. was valid and accordingly rejected the contention of the petitioners.
11. It was contended before our learned brother that the said G. O. Ms. No. 411 was not saved by S.6 of the Andhra Pradesh General Clauses Act corresponding to Sec. 22 of the Central General Clauses Act. But, in the view taken by the learned Judge that the notification was published only after the Act came into force, the learned Judge felt it unnecessary to deal with the said contention.
12. On the second ground, the learned Judge found that individual notices were as a matter of fact given to all the affected Gram Panchayats including the petitioners herein, and that the procedure prescribed by S.8 and R. 12 was duly followed and hence, rejected the said contention.
13. The third contention was also negatived as it was found that the Authority itself approved the Master Plan and submitted the same to the Government for approval, and that the Vice-Chairman only forwarded the said plan with a covering letter.
14. In this writ appeal, Sri K. Pratap Reddy, the learned counsel for the appellants submitted that he was not pressing points 2 and 3, which were urged before our learned counsel confined his challenge only to the first point viz. that the G. O. Ms. No. 411 dated 27-9-1975 was issued on 27-9-1975 by the Government whereas the Act came into force on 1-10-1975 and therefore, the Government had no jurisdiction or power on 27-9-1975 to issue the said G. O. and that the said G. O. is not covered by the provisions of Sec. 6 of the Andhra Pradesh General Clauses Act. He also contended that the said order amounts to a substantive order specifying the urban area under S.2 (o) and declaring the development area under S. 13(1) and that the Government cannot exercise such a power when the said statutory provisions had not come into force by the date of issuance of the said G. O. Ms. No. 411.
15. On the other hand, it is connected by Sri. P.M. Gopala Rao that though the G. O. was issued earlier, it did not come into force instantaneously and that inasmuch as steps have to be taken for making the Act operative immediately on the date of Act coming into force, necessarily the Government have to take steps to identify the urban area and development area in order to apply the provisions of the Act to the said area, and that the said G. O. would not be operative until it is notified as required by S.2(k) of the Act and that inasmuch as the impugned G. O. was published in the gazette on the date on which the Act came into force the said G. O. cannot be challenged as being invalid or void. He also submitted that the said G. O. is covered by the provisions of Sec. 6 of the Andhra Pradesh General Clauses Act.
16. Sri Innayya Reddy, the learned Government pleader submitted that the issuance of the G. O. 411
on 27-9-1975 was merely a preparatory step, and that it became affective or operative only on and after its being published in the gazette, and that the Act came into fore by the date of its publication in the Gazette and therefore, it was valid. He also contended that the provisions of S. 6 of the General Clauses act saves the said G. O.
17. The Act received the assent of the President on 20-01-1975 and it was published in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette dated 27-1-1975. But, under sub-sec. (3) of S. 1, the Government fixed 1-10-1975 as the date on which the Act would come into force. Thus, there was a time lag of nearly, 8 months 10 days between the date of coming into force of the Act. The impunged G. O. 411 was issued by the Government on 27-9-1975 but it was notified in the Gazette on 1-10-1975 is concerned, it is after the coming into force of the Act. The notification of the said G. O. by the Government is in accordance with the provisions of Secs. 2(o) and 13(1) read with S. 2(k) of the Act and is therefore, valid. This position is not disputed.
18. But the contention of Sri Pratap Reddy, the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the said G. O. 411 was issued by the Government on 27-9-1975 prior to the coming into force of the Act and such an act is without jurisdiction and the said G. O. is therefore, illegal and void ab initio in which case it does not acquire validity by its notification in the gazette after the coming into force of the Act.
19. The question then for consideration is, whether the act of the Government in issuing the said G. O. on 27-9-1975 is wholly devoid of jurisdiction. We are inclined to think that Sec. 6 of the General Clauses Act is a complete answer to the challenge of the said G. O.
20. Section 6 of the A. P. General Clauses Act reads as follows:-
'6 Marking of rules and issue of orders between passing and commencement of Act whereby an Act to which this Chapter applies and which is not to come into force immediately on the passing there of a power is conferred on Government or other authority to make rules or to issue orders, with respect to the application of the Act, or with respect to the appointment of any officer thereunder, such power may be exercised at any time after the passing of the Act but rules or orders so made or issued shall not take effect till the commencement of the Act.'
21. This section confers power on the Government or order authority to make rules or issue orders maters mentioned therein in cases where there is a time gap between the passing of Act and its coming into force. Section 6 empowers the concerned Authority to exercise the power conferred by the Act, But any rules or orders so made or issued shall not take effect till the commencement of the Act. Section 6 is thus an enabling provision intended to facilitate the making of Rules and orders before the date of commencement of the enactment in anticipation of its coming into force. Thus, it validates issuance of rules and orders made after the passing of the Act but before it comes into force with a view to bring the Act into effective operation on the date of its coming into force. This Section corresponds to S. 22 of the Central General Clauses Act.
22. Section 37 of the English Interpretation Act, 1889 which corresponds to the aforesaid sections of the State Act and the Central Act, reads as follows:
'Where an Act passed after the commencement of this Act is not to come into operation immediately on the passing thereof, and confers power to make any appointment, to make grant or issue any instruction, that is to say, any Order in Council, order, warrant, scheme letters patent Rules, regulations or bye laws, to give notice to prescribe forms or to do any other thing for the purposes of the Act, that power may unless the contrary intention appears, be exercised at any time after the passing of the Act into operation at the date of commencement thereof subject to this restriction, that any instrument made under the power shall not, unless the contrary appears in the Act, or the contrary is necessary for bringing the Act into operation, come into operation.'
23. The interpretation of S.37 fell for consideration in Rex v. Minister of Town and Country Planning Ex parte, Montague Burton Ltd. (1951) 1 KB 1. In that case, the Town and County Planning Act, 1947 and the Minister concerned fixed 1st July 1948 as the appointed day for the coming into force of certain provisions of the Act which did not come into operation immediately on the passing of the Act. Para 16 of Sch. X was one of the provisions which did not come into force immediately on the passing of the Act but only came into force on the 1st July 1948. On 16 June, 1948, the Minister purported to give a direction under Para 15 of Sch. X that proceedings on the applications made under the earlier Act should be continued after the coming into force of para 16 of Sch. X. The said orders were challenged in the Divisional Court on the ground that the Minister had no power to pass the order, as Para 16 of Sch. X of the Act had not come into force on the date on which the orders were passed by the Minister. That motion was dismissed by the Divisional Court. On appeal, it was held by Tucker Lord Justice as follows:
'In my view S.37 applies to the present case. I think that it clearly gives power to take the necessary steps to set up the machinery for bringing the Act into operation as well as for doing such an act as appointing a day for the act to come into operation. The words in Section 37 referring to regulations, bye-laws, notices, prescribed forms and so further, make it clear that matters of that kind may be made under Sec. 27 so that the necessary machinery, will function as soon as the new Act comes into operation and things shall not come to a standstill by reason of the repeal of the existing Act.
In the present case there were these applications pending under S.1 of the Act of 1944. I think that that is just the kind of things that is contemplated by Sec. 37 of the Interpretation Act 1889 and that having regard to para 16 of Sch. X to the Act of 1947 the order contained in the letter of June 16, 1948, was valid notwithstanding that it was made before the appointed day.'
24. The same section fell for consideration in a later decision of the Chancery Division in Usher v. Barlow (1952) 1 Ch 255. In that case, the Registered Designs Act, 1949 was passed on Dec. 16, 1949 and on the same day, the Designs Rules, 1949 were made to come into force on Jan. 2, 1951 the day after the Act came into force. Section 1 (4) of the Act provides that rules made by the Board of Trade under that Act might be provided for excluding from registration thereunder design for such articles, being articles which are primarily literary or artistic in character as the board think fit R. 26 of the Designs Rules excluded wall plaques and other things from registration under the Act. A question arose before the Court of Chancery Division as to the validity of the Designs Rules 1949 and Rule 26 in particular, having regard to the fact that Rules were made on the day the Registered Designs Act 1949 was passed under Ss.1 (4) and 36 of the Act, and came into force a day after the Act did so on Jan. 1, 1951 it was held that 'the Designs Rules, 1949 were validly made in view of S. 37 of the Interpretation Act. 1889.'
25. Jenkins Lord Justice held that the point was covered in principle by the decision in Rex. V. Minister of Town and Country Planning (1951) 1 KB 1 (supra) and that the rules such as R. 26 of the Designs Rules could to held to be necessary or expedient for the purpose of bringing the Registered Designs Act 1949 into operation within the meaning of the S. 37 of the Interpretation Act.
26. Asquith Lord Justice agreed with the said view and observed as follows:
'It seems to me that S. 37, on its true construction in accordance with the natural meaning of the language used, is apt to authorise the making of rules such as these here concerned between the passing and the coming into operation of the relevant Act. As pointed out by Tucker Lord Justice in the passage cited above, the section extends to a comprehensive enumeration of matters; order in council, order, warrant, scheme, letters patent, rules regulaations or bye-laws. Clearly many of these matters are matters requiring to be dealt with under the Act when in operation, in order that it may operate effectively, rather than matters without which the Act cannot come into operation at all.'
Again the learned Judge observed that.
'Section 37 should be construed as extending to whatever is necessary or expedient for the purpose of bringing the Act into effective operation at the date fixed or prescribed as the time at which the Act comes into operation.'
27. Morris Lord Justice agreed with the conclusions of Lord Jenkins. Evershed Master of the Rolls expressed difficulty in treating as valid a rule made by virtue of S. 1(4) of the Act and solely relating to an exclusion under that sub-section, but held that:
'I do not think it would be right to pick out one rule because taken in isolation that rule might be said to fail to satisfy that rule might be said to fail to satisfy the requirements of S. 37 of the Act. 1889. In other words, I have been satisfied on the whole that in its context as part of a general body of rules providing the machinery for the effective operation of the new Act, this rule can fairly be said to satisfy the conditions of validity.'
28. In Craies on Statute Law, Seventh Edition at page 295, after referring to the aforesaid decisions, it is observed as follows:
'Time for exercising powers: In general a power to make rules etc. cannot be exercised until the enactment conferring the power has come into operation. Exceptionally, however, the Interpretation Act 1889 provides that where an Act. (Public, Local & Personal, or Private) passed after 1889 is not to come into operation immediately on the passing thereof, and conferees power to make any appointment, to make grant, or issue any instrument, that is to say, any order in council, order, warrant, scheme, letters patent, rules, regulations or bye-laws to give notices to prescribe forms, or to do any other thing for the purpose of the Act that power may, unless the contrary intention appears, be exercised at any time after the passing of the Act, so far, as may be necessary or expedient for the purpose of bringing the Act into operation at the date of the commencement of the Act, subject to this restriction, that any instrument made under the power must not come into operation until the act comes into operation unless the contrary intention appears in the Act, or the contrary is necessary for bringing the Act, into operation. This enactment is to be construed as extending to whatever is necessary or expedient for the purpose of bringing the Act into effective operation at the date fixed or prescribed as the time at which the Act comes into operation if the making of rules had to await the coming into operation of the act itself, there would be a period of uncertainty and confusion.'
29. Section 6 of the State Act clearly empowers the State Government or other Authority to make rules or issue orders with respect to the application of the Act after the passing of the Act but before the commencement of the same.
30. In the instant case, the Government which is the Authority empowered to issue the orders under S. 2(o) and S. 13(1), exercised the power after the passing of the Act but before the coming into force of the Act with a view to apply the provisions of the Act immediately on its coming into force and is covered by the provisions of Sec. 6 of the A. P. General Clauses Act and is, therefore, valid. The order in G. O. Ms. No. 411 did not become effective or operative on the date on which it was issued but it acquires statutory force under S. 2(k) only on the date of its publication in the Gazette on 1-10-1975, the date on which the Act came into force. This notification in the Gazette is in conformity with the provisions of S. 2(o) and S.13(1) read with S. 2(k) of the Act. Hence the said G.O. having been notified in lawful exercise of the provisions of the Act after the Act came into force the said G. O. cannot be said to be illegal or devoid of jurisdiction.
31. Sri Pratap Reddy relied upon the decision of this court in Venkata Durga Prakasa Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, : AIR1961AP98 where it was held that there was a clear distinction between the making of a declaration under sub-section (1) of S. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act and the publication of the declaration in the Gazette as contemplated under sub-sec. (2) and that a declaration under S. 6(1) made before the publication of the notification under S. 4, sub-sec (1) of the Act was a clear violation of the mandatory provision of S. 6 (1) and S.17(4) of the Act. But, that ruling has no application to the facts of the present case, as the question that arises for consideration here did not arise there. In that case the declaration under S. 6 (1) was challenged on the ground that there was violation of the mandatory provisions of S. 6 (1) read with S. 17 (4) of the Act.
32. Sri Pratap Reddy next relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Venkateswarloo v. Supdt., Central Jail, AIR 1953 SC 49 in that case, the Preventive Detention Act 4 of 1950 was to expire on 1-4-1951. But, an Amendment Act was passed which among other things prolonged its life till 1-4-1952. By a fresh Act in 1952 the life of the Act was extended till 1-10-1952. By Amendment Act, 61 of 1952, the life of the act was extended till 31-12-1954. By notification dated 15-9-1952 the Central Government appointed 30-9-1952 as the date when it was to come into force. On 20-10-1951 the petitioners therein were served with an order of detention. After following the prescribed procedure, the appropriate Government confirmed the order of detention to be in force till 31-3-1952. The period was extended first up to 30-9-52 and later up to 31-12-52.
33. The petitioners therein contended, that on 22-9-1952 the State Government has no jurisdiction to make an order for extension as to continue the detention beyond 1-10-1952, i.e., beyond life of the Act then in force, and that the order extending the period of detention up to 31-12-1952 was illegal.
34. On behalf of the Government the order made on 22-9-1952 sought to be justified on the ground that it has power to enlarge the period of extension, and that under S. 22 of the Central General Clauses Act, the State Government could pass the order after the Amendment Act was passed though it had not yet come into force. His Lordship Mahajan, J. speaking for the court held as follows (at p.50):-
'This section corresponds to S. 37, English Interpretation Act of 1899. It is an enabling provision, its intent and purpose being to facilitate the making of rules, bye-laws and orders, before the date of commencement of an enactment in anticipation of its coming into force. In otherwords, it validates rules bye-laws and orders made before the enactment comes into force provided they are made after the passing of the Act and as preparatory to the Act coming into force. It does not authorise or empower the State Government to pass substantive orders against any person in exercise of the authority conferred by any particular section of the new Act. The words of the section 'with respect to' prescribe limit and the scope of the power given by the section. Orders can only be issued with respect to the time when or the manner in which anything is to be done under the Act. An order for the extension of detention made under the purported exercise of the powers conferred by any of the provisions of the new Act is not an order with respect to the time or the manner in which anything is to be done under the Act. Such an order could only be made under the force and not in anticipation of its coming into force. The Act having no retrospective operation, it cannot validate an order made before it came into force. It seems to us that the expression 'order' in the section means an order laying down directions about the manner in which things are to be done under the Act and it is an order of that nature that can be issued before the Act comes into force but it does not mean that a substantive order against a particular person can be made before the Act comes into force. In our opinion, therefore, the contention raised on behalf of the State Government has no force and the order extending the detention of the detention 22-9-1952 up to 31-10-1952 is illegal'.
35. From the aforesaid observations, it is clear that S, 22 does not empower the Government to pass a substantive order after the passing of the Act but before its coming into force. In that case, it was held that the order for extension of detention made under the purported exercise of the powers conferred by the provisions of the new Act, was not an order with respect to the time or the manner in which anything was to be done under the Act.
36. In the instant case, the order made by the Government in G. O. Ms. No. 411 is not a substantive order but only an order intended to facilitate the application of the Act as soon as the Act came into force. Therefore, the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court does not apply to the impugned G. O.
37. In the view we have taken that the impugned G. O. is covered by the provisions of S. 6 of the Andhra Pradesh General clauses Act, it becomes unnecessary for us to go into the question whether the impugned G. O. can be supported on the ground that it constitutes merely a preparatory step.
38. For the foregoing reasons, the writ appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 150/-
39. Mr. Pratap Reddy , the learned counsel for the appellants, has made an oral request for grant of leave e to appeal to the Supreme Court of India under Art 133 of the Constitution. But the proposed appeal does not involve any substantial question of public importance which, in our opinion, requires to be decided by the Supreme Court of India.
40. Hence the oral application for leave is refused.