Gopal Rao Ekbote, J.
1. In this revision petition, the only question involved is as to whether the appeal filed by the petitioner before the Estates Abolition Tribunal was within time.
2. The essential facts in order to resolve that problem are that in a suo motu enquiry by the Assistant Settlement Officer the parties filed application for the grant of a patta. Originally the Assistant Settlement Officer decided in favour of the petitioner and directed the grant of a patta under Section 11(a) of the Act. Thereupon an appeal was filed before the Settlement Officer who allowing the appeal remanded the matter to the Assistant Settlement Officer.
On remand, this time the Assistant Settlement Officer found that it is a Government waste land and consequently reached the conclusion that no patta can be granted to any one of the parties. The respondents therefore preferred an appeal to the Estates Abolition Tribunal under Section 15 of the Act whereas the petitioner preferred a revision before the Settlement Officer as he thought that the order is passed under Section 11 of the Act.
The Settlement Officer dismissed the revision on 6-2-1960 holding that when the appeal is pending before the Estates Abolition Tribunal, the petitioner also should approach the appellate authority. Thereupon the petitioner filed an appeal on 8-3-1960 before the Estates Abolition Tribunal. Along with the appeal he filed an application under Section 5 of the Lim. Act to excuse the delay. By the order now impugned in this revision petition, the tribunal refused to excuse the delay.
3. It is contended by Mr. Venkaturamana Reddy, the learned counsel for the petitioner, that the time spent in prosecuting the revision before the Settlement Officer constitutes a sufficient cause and the entire period spent before the Settlement Officer should be added on to the two months' limitation which is prescribed to file appeal before the Estates Abolition Tribunal. Calculated thus, he submits that his appeal would be within time,
In support of this contention, he relies on Brij Indar Singh v. Kanshi Ram, 44 Ind App 218 : (AIR 1917 PC 156). I find sufficient force in this contention. It is true that rules made under Section 67 of the Act make only Section 5 of the Lim. Act applicable. S. M of the Limitation Act is not made applicable. Nevertheless while considering whether there is sufficient cause or not, in the above said decision, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council resolved that the period spent in prosecuting the case before a wrong tribunal should be deemed as added to the period allowed for presenting the appeal.
When once that method is followed, it is not in dispute that the appeal filed by the petitioner comes well within time. The period from the date of the Assistant Settlement Officer's order to the date when the appeal was actually filed is 116 days and if from that total period the period which the petitioner spent in actually prosecuting his revision petition before the Settlement Officer which comes to 58 days is excluded, then he would be deemed to have filed the appeal on the 58th day whereas two months' time is prescribed for preferring the appeal. It will thus be clear that Section 5 of the Limitation Act constitutes this cause as sufficient cause and for the purpose of computing the period as suggested by the decision of the Privy Council if that is added to the limitation prescribed the petitioner's appeal ought to have been heard and disposed of on merits and not dismissed as time barred.
4. I would therefore allow this revisionpetition and set aside the order of the EstatesAbolition Tribunal passed on 8-10-1960 anddirect the Tribunal to dispose of the appeal onmerits. In the circumstances of the case, Ileave the parties to bear their own costs.