1. As the two writ petitions raise common points, it is proposed to dispose of them by a common judgment. The two points raised are :
(i) Whether live-stock fall under 'goods' within the meaning of Section 2(h) of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act ;
(ii) Whether the petitioners are entitled for the exemption contemplated under G. 0. Ms. No. 2193, Revenue, dated 19th December, 1961.
2. The petitioners in both the writ petitions are dealers in goats and sheep. For the assessment year 1969-70, the respondent in W.P. No. 4419 of 1972, the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, accepted the return filed by the petitioner therein and assessed him on a purchase turnover of Rs. 2,43,487.75 in goats and sheep.
3. The petitioner in W. P. No. 5225 of 1972 is a dealer in goats and sheep at Kodavaluru. His business consists in purchasing locally live-stock such as goats and sheep and selling them to dealers at Madras who in their turn sell them to butchers in Madras. For the year 1968-69, the Commercial Tax Officer, Nellore, by his assessment order dated 9th May, 1969, assessed the petitioner to tax on a net purchase turnover of Rs. 3,75,087.00 as against the purchase turnover of Rs. 3,40,989 disclosed by the accounts of the petitioner.
4. It is contended by both Sri S. Dasaratharama Reddy and Sri A. Mahadev, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, that live-stock such as goats and sheep do not fall within the definition of 'goods' as defined in Section 2(h) of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to merely as 'the Act'), and if it is to be so construed as falling within that definition, the definition itself is ultra vires the Constitution of India as it is opposed to Clause (12) of Article 366 of the Constitution read with entry 54 of List II of the Seventh Schedule appended to the Constitution of India.
5. The live-stock, in order to be made the subject-matter of sales tax, must be shown as goods within the meaning of that expression occurring in Section 2(h) of the Act, which in so far as it is material, reads as follows :
2. (h) 'goods' means all kinds of movable property other than action able claims, stocks, shares and securities and includes all materials, articles...
6. So, what is manifest from this definition is that goods means movable property. The State Legislature derives power to levy taxes on sale or purchase of goods on account of articles 245 and 246 read with entry 54 of List II of the Seventh Schedule appended to the Constitution. That entry 54 reads as follows :
54. Taxes on the sale or purchase of goods other than newspapers, subject to the provisions of entry 92-A of List I.
7. Clause (12) of Article 366 defines goods as including all materials, commodities and articles. The learned counsel contended that the expression 'goods' do not take within their ambit the expression 'livestock'. The expression 'live-stock' though constitute movable property still it cannot be considered to be goods as defined by the Act and the expression 'goods' do not include, according to the learned counsel, animate chattel which no doubt is considered as movable property. No authority was cited by the learned counsel in support of their contention that live-stock are not movable property as defined in the General Clauses Act or goods within the meaning of the expression as denned in the Act. The expression 'movable property' occurring in the Act shall have to be understood in the light of the meaning given to the expression 'movable property' in Section 3(19) of the Andhra Pradesh General Clauses Act, 1891. The expression 'movable property' is defined in the General Clauses Act as meaning property of every description except immovable property. I am not able to find any juridicial basis for the proposition that animate objects such as live-stock could not come within the definition of movable property. The expression 'goods', as has already been noticed, is defined by the Act to mean all kinds of movable property. 'All kinds of movable property' is comprehensive enough to include within its ambit both animate as well as inanimate kinds of movable properties. The expression 'goods' as defined by Article 366, Clause (12), is an inclusive definition and the subject-matter with respect to which the State Legislature has been given power to make laws by way of levying tax under entry 54 of List II of the Seventh Schedule is taxes on the sale or purchase of goods. I am, therefore, of the opinion that live-stock is movable property and the expression 'goods' as defined in the Act includes all kinds of movable property and that expression takes within its ambit live-stock, which is admittedly movable property. In view of this, I do not propose to refer to the decisions cited arising from the Sale of Goods Act and other kinds of enactments.
8. The second submission was whether the petitioners are entitled for the exemption granted in G. 0. Ms. No. 2193, Revenue, dated 19th December, 1961. As per that G. 0., the dealers who purchase live-stock for the purpose of selling the flesh of such live-stock are exempted from the levy of tax on their purchases of live-stock under Sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the Act with effect from 20th August, 1959. The exemption as per the aforesaid notification is available only to those dealers who purchase the live-stock for the purpose of themselves selling the flesh of such live-stock. It is not the case of the petitioners that they themselves slaughter the goats and sheep purchased by them for the purpose of selling the flesh thereof. They merely sell the goats and sheep purchased by them locally to the dealers at Madras, who in their turn sell those animals to the butchers. Therefore, the petitioners, on their own showing, are not entitled for the exemption they claim under the aforesaid notification as it is not their case that they purchase this live-stock and slaughter the same and sell the flesh. I, therefore, find no merit in the contention regarding their claim for the exemption.
9. Sri A. Mahadev raised yet another point to the effect that Rule 5 of the Pradesh General Sales Tax Rules is ultra vires, as the rule-making authority was not given the power to fix the point of levy. The power to make rules is conferred on the rule-making authority for the purpose of carrying out the purpose of the Act, The purpose of the Act is to levy taxes on sale or purchase of goods. That, the charging provision provides. The fixation of the point for the levy of tax constitutes one of the integral steps necessary for carrying out the purpose of the Act and that power to carry out the purpose of the Act is admittedly conferred upon the rule-making authority. I do not find any merit in this contention. I hold that Rule 5 is intra vires and valid.
10. For all the aforesaid reasons, I am satisfied that there are no merits in these writ petitions. The writ petitions are, therefore, dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 100 in each writ petition.