1. This second appeal is by the Government against the decision of the District Judge, Chittoor in A. S. No. 259 of 1962. Munuswami Reddi was the plaintiff. He filed the suit for declaration that the orders passed by the Government dated 6-6-1951 and 11-9-1951 (by the Special Officer and the Deputy Inspector-General of Police) are illegal and ultra vires. He is a permanent employee as Sub-Inspector of Police and was promoted duly as Inspector of Police on 2-5-1950. He was also declared as in the rank of Inspector of Police on 29-10-55. He served as officiating Inspector of Police from 2-5-50 to 30-6-1955 and retired from service on superannuation on 1-7-1955. He then applied for the benefits of Article 487-B of the Civil Service Regulations. But he was informed that he had reversions as Inspector of Police within the law two years of his retirement and therefore he is not entitled to the benefits of the said Article. The plaintiff, therefore, questioned the orders as being illegal and void. The reversions were due to the unwarranted suspension, according to the plaintiff, the order being dated 6-6-1951 and the uncalled for termination of probation as Inspector of Police from 1-11-1951 and 2-9-1952. The plaintiff appealed to the various authorities for whom the appeal lies. But he was unsuccessful and so he filed the suit for declaration.
2. It is unnecessary for me to go into all the other details regarding the suit. Eight issues were framed and in the trial Court the decision was against the plaintiff. This decision was reversed by the appellate Court.
Hence this second appeal by the Government. In this second appeal the only outstanding question that deserves consideration is the question of limitation. The learned appellate Judge held that the suit was not barred by limitation. According to him the article of the limitation Act that is applicable is Art. 120 which gives a period of 6 years for institution of the suit computed from the date when the right to sue accrued. He was of the view that the starting point for limitation is afforded by Ex. A-15 dated 21-1-55. That is the final order of the Government refusing to treat the suspension as not affecting any break in service by reason of suspension. The relief in the suit is therefore based not on the previous orders which dealt with the charges against the plaintiff but his complaint is limited in scope as he contends that the suspension should not be allowed to operate as break in his service. From this date the suit is within time, time being computed under Article 120 from the date when the right to sue accrued. The cause of action, therefore, is totally different from the cause of action which relates to other matters with which we are not concerned. In this view of the matter, the suit is not barred. It is unnecessary to go into the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the Government as in those decisions the cause of action is different. The latest decision which deals with the question of limitation where the cause of action is different is the unreported judgment of Sri Justice Krishna Rao in S. A. No. 873 of 1964 D/-12-12-1967 (AP). It is unnecessary for me to go into details of that decision.
3. I must also point out one other matter which escaped the attention of both the Courts below. The Government have issued a G. O. (G. O. No. 2413, Home - Service-A) Department, Government of Andhra Pradesh dated 19-11-1954. The substance of the G. O. is that whenever a Government servant threatens to seek redress in a Court of law in respect of any matter connected with his employment or conditions of service, he may simply be informed that the threatened suit is awaited and that if he goes to Court before exhausting the normal official channels of redress, disciplinary action can be taken against him. The Government of India have expressed the view that the Government servants in the matter of grievances arising out of their employment or conditions of service should first exhaust the normal official channels or redress before they take the issue to a Court of law and where permission to sue Government in a Court of law is asked for by any Government servant either before exhausting the normal official channels or redress before they take the issue to a Court of law and where permission to sue Government in a Court of law is asked for by any Government servant either before exhausting the normal official channels or redress or after exhausting them, he may be informed that such permission is not necessary and if he decides to have recourse to a Court of law he may do so on his own responsibility. The Government of Andhra Pradesh agree with the Government of India and direct as follows:
'(a) Government servants seeking redress of their grievances arising out of their employment or conditions of service should, in their own interest and also consisting with official propriety and discipline, first exhaust the normal official channels of redress before they take the issue to a Court of law.
(b) Whenever a Government servant asks for permission to sue Government in a Court of law for the redress of his grievances either before exhausting the normal official channels or redress or after exhausting them, he may be informed that such permission is not necessary and that if he decides to have not necessary and that if he decides to have recourse to a Court of law he may do so on his own responsibility'.
In view of this G. O., it is impossible for an officer of the Government to get redress in a Court of law unless he first follows the procedure enacted by the Government procedure enacted by the Government which means that he must first exhaust all the departmental avenues and if he fails even in that then only he should approach a Court of law. Therefore the cause of action for such a suit would arise only after termination of the proceedings in the various departments and the cause of action for such a suit would arise only after such termination of the proceedings. Therefore, this case stands on a different footing from the one covered by the decision of Mr. Justice Krishna Rao. The other question argued are questions of fact and cannot be interfered with. The second appeal is dismissed with costs. No leave.
HGP/ D. V. C.
4. Appeal dismissed.